44 ideas
18806 | Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: Frege rejected the traditional categories as importing psychological and linguistic impurities into logic. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891]) by Ian Rumfitt - The Boundary Stones of Thought 1.2 | |
A reaction: Resisting such impurities is the main motivation for making logic entirely symbolic, but it doesn't follow that the traditional categories have to be dropped. |
8083 | Boole applied normal algebra to logic, aiming at an algebra of thought [Boole, by Devlin] |
Full Idea: Boole proposed to use the entire apparatus of a school algebra class, with operations such as addition and multiplication, methods to solve equations, and the like, to produce an algebra of thought. | |
From: report of George Boole (The Laws of Thought [1854]) by Keith Devlin - Goodbye Descartes Ch.3 | |
A reaction: The Stoics didn’t use any algebraic notation for their study of propositions, so Boole's idea launched full blown propositional logic, and the rest of modern logic followed. Nice one. |
7727 | Boole's notation can represent syllogisms and propositional arguments, but not both at once [Boole, by Weiner] |
Full Idea: Boole introduced a new symbolic notation in which it was possible to represent both syllogisms and propositional arguments, ...but not both at once. | |
From: report of George Boole (The Laws of Thought [1854], Ch.3) by Joan Weiner - Frege | |
A reaction: How important is the development of symbolic notations for the advancement of civilisations? Is there a perfect notation, as used in logical heaven? |
9672 | Free logic is one of the few first-order non-classical logics [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: Free logic is an unusual example of a non-classical logic which is first-order. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], Pref) |
9697 | X1 x X2 x X3... x Xn indicates the 'cartesian product' of those sets [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: X1 x X2 x X3... x Xn indicates the 'cartesian product' of those sets, the set of all the n-tuples with its first member in X1, its second in X2, and so on. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.0) |
9685 | <a,b&62; is a set whose members occur in the order shown [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: <a,b> is a set whose members occur in the order shown; <x1,x2,x3, ..xn> is an 'n-tuple' ordered set. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.10) |
9675 | a ∈ X says a is an object in set X; a ∉ X says a is not in X [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: a ∈ X means that a is a member of the set X, that is, a is one of the objects in X. a ∉ X indicates that a is not in X. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.2) |
9674 | {x; A(x)} is a set of objects satisfying the condition A(x) [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: {x; A(x)} indicates a set of objects which satisfy the condition A(x). | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.2) |
9673 | {a1, a2, ...an} indicates that a set comprising just those objects [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: {a1, a2, ...an} indicates that the set comprises of just those objects. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.2) |
9677 | Φ indicates the empty set, which has no members [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: Φ indicates the empty set, which has no members | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.4) |
9676 | {a} is the 'singleton' set of a (not the object a itself) [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: {a} is the 'singleton' set of a, not to be confused with the object a itself. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.4) |
9679 | X⊂Y means set X is a 'proper subset' of set Y [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: X⊂Y means set X is a 'proper subset' of set Y (if and only if all of its members are members of Y, but some things in Y are not in X) | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.6) |
9678 | X⊆Y means set X is a 'subset' of set Y [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: X⊆Y means set X is a 'subset' of set Y (if and only if all of its members are members of Y). | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.6) |
9681 | X = Y means the set X equals the set Y [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: X = Y means the set X equals the set Y, which means they have the same members (i.e. X⊆Y and Y⊆X). | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.6) |
9683 | X ∩ Y indicates the 'intersection' of sets X and Y, the objects which are in both sets [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: X ∩ Y indicates the 'intersection' of sets X and Y, which is a set containing just those things that are in both X and Y. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.8) |
9682 | X∪Y indicates the 'union' of all the things in sets X and Y [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: X ∪ Y indicates the 'union' of sets X and Y, which is a set containing just those things that are in X or Y (or both). | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.8) |
9684 | Y - X is the 'relative complement' of X with respect to Y; the things in Y that are not in X [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: Y - X indicates the 'relative complement' of X with respect to Y, that is, all the things in Y that are not in X. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.8) |
9688 | A 'singleton' is a set with only one member [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: A 'singleton' is a set with only one member. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.4) |
9689 | The 'empty set' or 'null set' has no members [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: The 'empty set' or 'null set' is a set with no members. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.4) |
9690 | A set is a 'subset' of another set if all of its members are in that set [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: A set is a 'subset' of another set if all of its members are in that set. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.6) |
9691 | A 'proper subset' is smaller than the containing set [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: A set is a 'proper subset' of another set if some things in the large set are not in the smaller set | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.6) |
9694 | The 'relative complement' is things in the second set not in the first [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: The 'relative complement' of one set with respect to another is the things in the second set that aren't in the first. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.8) |
9693 | The 'intersection' of two sets is a set of the things that are in both sets [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: The 'intersection' of two sets is a set containing the things that are in both sets. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.8) |
9692 | The 'union' of two sets is a set containing all the things in either of the sets [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: The 'union' of two sets is a set containing all the things in either of the sets | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.8) |
9698 | The 'induction clause' says complex formulas retain the properties of their basic formulas [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: The 'induction clause' says that whenever one constructs more complex formulas out of formulas that have the property P, the resulting formulas will also have that property. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.2) |
9695 | An 'ordered pair' (or ordered n-tuple) is a set with its members in a particular order [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: An 'ordered pair' (or ordered n-tuple) is a set with its members in a particular order. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.10) |
9696 | A 'cartesian product' of sets is the set of all the n-tuples with one member in each of the sets [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: A 'cartesian product' of sets is the set of all the n-tuples with one member in each of the sets. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.10) |
9686 | A 'set' is a collection of objects [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: A 'set' is a collection of objects. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.2) |
9687 | A 'member' of a set is one of the objects in the set [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: A 'member' of a set is one of the objects in the set. | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.2) |
9680 | The empty set Φ is a subset of every set (including itself) [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: The empty set Φ is a subset of every set (including itself). | |
From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.6) |
8686 | Boole made logic more mathematical, with algebra, quantifiers and probability [Boole, by Friend] |
Full Idea: Boole (followed by Frege) began to turn logic from a branch of philosophy into a branch of mathematics. He brought an algebraic approach to propositions, and introduced the notion of a quantifier and a type of probabilistic reasoning. | |
From: report of George Boole (The Laws of Thought [1854], 3.2) by Michèle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics | |
A reaction: The result was that logic not only became more mathematical, but also more specialised. We now have two types of philosopher, those steeped in mathematical logic and the rest. They don't always sing from the same songsheet. |
8490 | First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege] |
Full Idea: Just as functions are fundamentally different from objects, so also functions whose arguments are and must be functions are fundamentally different from functions whose arguments are objects. The latter are first-level, the former second-level, functions. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891], p.38) | |
A reaction: In 1884 he called it 'second-order'. This is the standard distinction between first- and second-order logic. The first quantifies over objects, the second over intensional entities such as properties and propositions. |
8492 | Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege] |
Full Idea: Functions of one argument are concepts; functions of two arguments are relations. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891], p.39) | |
A reaction: Nowadays we would say 'two or more'. Another interesting move in the aim of analytic philosophy to reduce the puzzling features of the world to mathematical logic. There is, of course, rather more to some relations than being two-argument functions. |
22277 | Boole's method was axiomatic, achieving economy, plus multiple interpretations [Boole, by Potter] |
Full Idea: Boole's work was an early example of the axiomatic method, whereby intellectual economy is achieved by studying a set of axioms in which the primitive terms have multiple interpretations. | |
From: report of George Boole (The Laws of Thought [1854]) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 02 'Boole' | |
A reaction: Unclear about this. I suppose the axioms are just syntactic, and a range of semantic interpretations can be applied. Are De Morgan's Laws interpretations, or implications of the syntactic axioms? The latter, I think. |
8487 | Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege] |
Full Idea: I am of the opinion that arithmetic is a further development of logic, which leads to the requirement that the symbolic language of arithmetic must be expanded into a logical symbolism. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891], p.30) | |
A reaction: This may the the one key idea at the heart of modern analytic philosophy (even though logicism may be a total mistake!). Logic and arithmetical foundations become the master of ontology, instead of the servant. The jury is out on the whole enterprise. |
18899 | Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers] |
Full Idea: Frege regarded the existence of horses as a property of the concept 'horse'. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891]) by Fred Sommers - Intellectual Autobiography 'Realism' |
4028 | Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege] |
Full Idea: Frege's theory of properties (which he calls 'concepts') yields too few properties, by identifying coextensive properties, and also too many, by letting every predicate express a property. | |
From: comment on Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891]) by DH Mellor / A Oliver - Introduction to 'Properties' §2 | |
A reaction: Seems right; one extension may have two properties (have heart/kidneys), two predicates might express the same property. 'Cutting nature at the joints' covers properties as well as objects. |
8489 | The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege] |
Full Idea: I regard a regular definition of 'object' as impossible, since it is too simple to admit of logical analysis. Briefly: an object is anything that is not a function, so that an expression for it does not contain any empty place. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891], p.32) | |
A reaction: Here is the core of the programme for deriving our ontology from our logic and language, followed through by Russell and Quine. Once we extend objects beyond the physical, it becomes incredibly hard to individuate them. |
9947 | Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: Concepts, for Frege, are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891]) by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.2 | |
A reaction: That sounds awfully like what many philosophers call 'universals'. Frege, as a platonist (at least about numbers), I would take to be in sympathy with that. At least we can say that concepts seem to be properties. |
10319 | An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale] |
Full Idea: Frege had a notorious difficulty over the concept 'horse', when he suggests that if we wish to assert something about a concept, we are obliged to proceed indirectly by speaking of an object that represents it. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891], Ch.2.II) by Bob Hale - Abstract Objects | |
A reaction: This sounds like the thin end of a wedge. The great champion of objects is forced to accept them here as a façon de parler, when elsewhere they have ontological status. |
8488 | A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege] |
Full Idea: A concept in logic is closely connected with what we call a function. Indeed, we may say at once: a concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value. ..I give the name 'function' to what is meant by the 'unsaturated' part. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891], p.30) | |
A reaction: So a function becomes a concept when the variable takes a value. Problems arise when the value is vague, or the truth-value is indeterminable. |
9948 | Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: For Frege, concepts differ from objects in being inherently incomplete in nature. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891]) by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.2 | |
A reaction: This is because they are 'unsaturated', needing a quantified variable to complete the sentence. This could be a pointer towards Quine's view of properties, as simply an intrinsic feature of predication about objects, with no separate identity. |
4972 | I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege] |
Full Idea: From sameness of meaning there does not follow sameness of thought expressed. A fact about the Morning Star may express something different from a fact about the Evening Star, as someone may regard one as true and the other false. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891], p.14) | |
A reaction: This all gets clearer if we distinguish internalist and externalist theories of content. Why take sides on this? Why not just ask 'what is in the speaker's head?', 'what does the sentence mean in the community?', and 'what is the corresponding situation?' |
8491 | The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege] |
Full Idea: The ontological proof of God's existence suffers from the fallacy of treating existence as a first-level concept. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891], p.38 n) | |
A reaction: [See Idea 8490 for first- and second-order functions] This is usually summarised as the idea that existence is a quantifier rather than a predicate. |