Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Elucidation of some points in E.Schröder', 'Truth, Correspondence, Explanation and Knowledge' and 'Calculus Ratiocinator'

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4 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers

18487	We want to know what makes sentences true, rather than defining 'true' [McFetridge]
	Full Idea: The generalisation 'What makes a (any) sentence true?' is not a request for definitions of 'true' (the concept), but rather requests for (partial) explanations of why certain particular sentences are true.
	From: Ian McFetridge (Truth, Correspondence, Explanation and Knowledge [1977], II)
	A reaction: McFetridge is responding to the shortcomings of Tarski's account of truth. The mystery seems to be why some of our representations of the world are 'successful', and others are not.

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set

14238	A class is an aggregate of objects; if you destroy them, you destroy the class; there is no empty class [Frege]
	Full Idea: A class consists of objects; it is an aggregate, a collective unity, of them; if so, it must vanish when these objects vanish. If we burn down all the trees of a wood, we thereby burn down the wood. Thus there can be no empty class.
	From: Gottlob Frege (Elucidation of some points in E.Schröder [1895], p.212), quoted by Oliver,A/Smiley,T - What are Sets and What are they For?
	A reaction: This rests on Cantor's view of a set as a collection, rather than on Dedekind, which allows null and singleton sets.

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts

18488	We normally explain natural events by citing further facts [McFetridge]
	Full Idea: If one were asked 'What makes salt soluble in water?', the most natural answer would be something of the style 'The fact that it has such-and-such structure'.
	From: Ian McFetridge (Truth, Correspondence, Explanation and Knowledge [1977], II)
	A reaction: Personally I would want to talk about its 'powers' (dispositional properties), rather than its 'structure' (categorical properties). This defends facts, but you could easily paraphrase 'fact' out of this reply (as McFetridge realised).

11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism

12742	A whole is just its parts, but there are no smallest parts, so only minds and perceptions exist [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: The whole, if it is assumed to be body or matter, is nothing other than all of its parts; but this is absurd, since there aren't any smallest parts. Therefore there really exist only minds and their perceptions.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Calculus Ratiocinator [1679], A6.4.279), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 7
	A reaction: Leibniz is sometimes labelled as an 'idealist', but this text is unusual in being so explicit, and he was mainly concerned to explain the reality of individual bodies. Monads were his final attempt to do this, not an attempt to escape into pure minds.