55 ideas
8460 | Philosophers have given precise senses to deduction, probability, computability etc [Quine/Ullian] |
Full Idea: Successful explications (giving a precise sense to a term) have been found for the concepts of deduction, probability and computability, to name just three. | |
From: W Quine / J Ullian (The Web of Belief [1970], 65), quoted by Alex Orenstein - W.V. Quine Ch.3 | |
A reaction: Quine also cites the concept of an 'ordered pair'. Orenstein adds Tarski's definition of truth, Russell's definite descriptions, and the explication of existence in terms of quantifications. Cf. Idea 2958. |
22317 | Truth does not admit of more and less [Frege] |
Full Idea: What is only half true is untrue. Truth does not admit of more and less. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (works [1890], CP 353), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 48 'Truth' | |
A reaction: What about a measurement which is accurate to three decimal places? Maybe being 'close to' the truth is not the same as being 'more' true. The truth about a distance between two points is unknowable? |
10354 | Correspondence could be with other beliefs, rather than external facts [Kusch] |
Full Idea: The correspondence theory of truth does not commit one to the view the reality is mind-independent. There is no reason why the 'facts' that correspond to true beliefs might not themselves be beliefs or ideas. | |
From: Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Ch.17) | |
A reaction: This seems important, as it is very easy to assume that espousal of correspondence necessarily goes with realism about the external world. It is surprising to think that a full-blown Idealist might espouse the correspondence theory. |
10353 | Tarskians distinguish truth from falsehood by relations between members of sets [Kusch] |
Full Idea: According to the Tarskians we separate out truths from falsehoods by tracing the relations between members of different sets. | |
From: Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Ch.16) |
13455 | Frege did not think of himself as working with sets [Frege, by Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: Frege did not think of himself as working with sets. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by William D. Hart - The Evolution of Logic 1 | |
A reaction: One can hardly blame him, given that set theory was only just being invented. |
16895 | The null set is indefensible, because it collects nothing [Frege, by Burge] |
Full Idea: Frege regarded the null set as an indefensible entity from the point of view of iterative set theory. It collects nothing. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by Tyler Burge - Frege on Apriority (with ps) 2 | |
A reaction: The null set defines the possibility that something could be collected. At the very least, it introduces curly brackets into the language. |
3328 | Frege proposed a realist concept of a set, as the extension of a predicate or concept or function [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: Contrary to Dedekind's anti-realism, Frege proposed a realist definition of a set as the extension of a predicate (or concept, or function). | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.13 |
9179 | Frege frequently expressed a contempt for language [Frege, by Dummett] |
Full Idea: Frege frequently expressed a contempt for language. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890], p.228) by Michael Dummett - Frege's Distinction of Sense and Reference p.228 | |
A reaction: This strikes me as exactly the right attitude for a logician to have. Russell seems to have agreed. Attitudes to vagueness are the test case. Over-ambitious modern logicians dream of dealing with vagueness. Forget it. Stick to your last. |
13473 | Frege thinks there is an independent logical order of the truths, which we must try to discover [Frege, by Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: Frege thinks there is a single right deductive order of the truths. This is not an epistemic order, but a logical order, and it is our job to arrange our beliefs in this order if we can make it out. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by William D. Hart - The Evolution of Logic 2 | |
A reaction: Frege's dream rests on the belief that there exists a huge set of logical truths. Pluralism, conventionalism, constructivism etc. about logic would challenge this dream. I think the defence of Frege must rest on Russellian rooting of logic in nature. |
6076 | For Frege, predicates are names of functions that map objects onto the True and False [Frege, by McGinn] |
Full Idea: For Frege, a predicate does not refer to the objects of which it is true, but to the function that maps these objects onto the True and False; ..a predicate is a name for this function. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by Colin McGinn - Logical Properties Ch.3 | |
A reaction: McGinn says this is close to the intuitive sense of a property. Perhaps 'predicates are what make objects the things they are?' |
3319 | Frege gives a functional account of predication so that we can dispense with predicates [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: The whole point of Frege's functional account of predication lies in its allowing us to dispense with all properties across the board. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.9 |
9871 | Frege always, and fatally, neglected the domain of quantification [Dummett on Frege] |
Full Idea: Frege persistently neglected the question of the domain of quantification, which proved in the end to be fatal. | |
From: comment on Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by Michael Dummett - Frege philosophy of mathematics Ch.16 | |
A reaction: The 'fatality' refers to Russell's paradox, and the fact that not all concepts have extensions. Common sense now says that this is catastrophic. A domain of quantification is a topic of conversation, which is basic to all language. Cf. Idea 9874. |
16884 | Basic truths of logic are not proved, but seen as true when they are understood [Frege, by Burge] |
Full Idea: In Frege's view axioms are basic truth, and basic truths do not need proof. Basic truths can be (justifiably) recognised as true by understanding their content. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by Tyler Burge - Frege on Knowing the Foundations 1 | |
A reaction: This is the underpinning of the rationalism in Frege's philosophy. |
3331 | If '5' is the set of all sets with five members, that may be circular, and you can know a priori if the set has content [Benardete,JA on Frege] |
Full Idea: There is a suspicion that Frege's definition of 5 (as the set of all sets with 5 members) may be infected with circularity, …and how can we be sure on a priori grounds that 4 and 5 are not both empty sets, and hence identical? | |
From: comment on Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.14 |
16880 | Frege aimed to discover the logical foundations which justify arithmetical judgements [Frege, by Burge] |
Full Idea: Frege saw arithmetical judgements as resting on a foundation of logical principles, and the discovery of this foundation as a discovery of the nature and structure of the justification of arithmetical truths and judgments. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by Tyler Burge - Frege on Knowing the Foundations Intro | |
A reaction: Burge's point is that the logic justifies the arithmetic, as well as underpinning it. |
8689 | Eventually Frege tried to found arithmetic in geometry instead of in logic [Frege, by Friend] |
Full Idea: After the problem with Russell's paradox, Frege did not publish for fourteen years, and he then tried to re-found arithmetic in Euclidean geometry, rather than in logic. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890], 3.4) by Michčle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 3.4 | |
A reaction: I take it that his new road would have led him to modern Structuralism, so I think he was probably on the right lines. Unfortunately Frege had already done enough for one good lifetime. |
5657 | Frege's logic showed that there is no concept of being [Frege, by Scruton] |
Full Idea: Frege's quantificational logic vindicates Kant's insight that existence is not a predicate and leads to fallacies when treated as one; and we might also say, despite Hegel, that there is no concept of being. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by Roger Scruton - Short History of Modern Philosophy Ch.17 | |
A reaction: I notice that Colin McGinn has questioned the value of quantificational logic. It is difficult to assert that 'there is no concept of x', if several people have written large books about it. |
3318 | Frege made identity a logical notion, enshrined above all in the formula 'for all x, x=x' [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: It was Frege who first made identity a logical notion, enshrining it above all in the formula (x) x=x. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.9 |
16885 | To understand a thought, understand its inferential connections to other thoughts [Frege, by Burge] |
Full Idea: Frege famously realised that understanding a thought requires understanding its inferential connections to other thoughts. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by Tyler Burge - Frege on Knowing the Foundations 1 | |
A reaction: If true, this is probably our greatest advance in grasping the concept of 'understanding' since Aristotle - but is it true? It is a striking and interesting idea, and central to the importance of Frege in modern analytic philosophy. |
10337 | We can have knowledge without belief, if others credit us with knowledge [Kusch] |
Full Idea: We can have knowledge that p without believing that p. It is enough that others credit us with the knowledge. | |
From: Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: [He is discussing Welbourne 1993] This is an extreme of the communitarian view. |
10357 | Methodological Solipsism assumes all ideas could be derived from one mind [Kusch] |
Full Idea: 'Methodological solipsism' says merely that everyone can conceive of themselves as the only subject. Everyone can construct all referents of their thought and talk out of complexes of their very own experience. | |
From: Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Ch.19) | |
A reaction: The possibility of this can be denied (e.g. by Putnam 1983, dating back to Wittgenstein). I too would doubt it, though finding a good argument seems a forlorn hope. |
16887 | Frege's concept of 'self-evident' makes no reference to minds [Frege, by Burge] |
Full Idea: Frege's terms that translate 'self-evident' usually make no explicit reference to actual minds. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by Tyler Burge - Frege on Knowing the Foundations 4 | |
A reaction: This follows the distinction in Aquinas, between things that are intrinsically self-evident, and things that are self-evident to particular people. God, presumably, knows all of the former. |
16894 | An apriori truth is grounded in generality, which is universal quantification [Frege, by Burge] |
Full Idea: Generality for Frege is simply universal quantification; what makes a truth apriori is that its ultimate grounds are universally quantified. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by Tyler Burge - Frege on Apriority (with ps) 2 |
10339 | Foundations seem utterly private, even from oneself at a later time [Kusch] |
Full Idea: Foundationalists place the foundations of knowledge at a point where they are in principle accessible only to the individual knower. They cannot be 'shared' with another person, or with oneself at a later time. | |
From: Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Ch. 8) | |
A reaction: Kusch is defending an extremely social view of knowledge. Being private to an individual may just he an unfortunate epistemological fact. Being unavailable even to one's later self seems a real problem for foundational certainty. |
10331 | Testimony is reliable if it coheres with evidence for a belief, and with other beliefs [Kusch] |
Full Idea: Testimony must be reliable since its deliveries cohere both with input from other information routes in the formation of single beliefs, and with other types of beliefs in the formation of systems of belief. | |
From: Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Ch. 4) | |
A reaction: Kusch criticises this view (credited to C.A.J. Coady 1992) as too individualistic , but it sounds to me dead right. I take a major appeal of the coherence account of justification to be its capacity to extend seamlessly out into external testimony. |
10338 | The coherentist restricts the space of reasons to the realm of beliefs [Kusch] |
Full Idea: The coherentist restricts the space of reasons to the realm of beliefs. | |
From: Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Ch. 8) | |
A reaction: I endorse this idea, which endorses Davidson's slogan on the subject. The key thought is that a 'pure' sensation is uninterpreted, and so cannot justify anything. It is only once it generates a proposition that it can justify. But McDowell 1994. |
10340 | Individualistic coherentism lacks access to all of my beliefs, or critical judgement of my assessment [Kusch] |
Full Idea: Individualistic versions of coherentism assume that a belief is justified if it fits with all, or most, of my contemporaneous beliefs. But who has access to that totality? Who can judge my assessment? From what position could it be judged? | |
From: Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Ch. 8) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Though I agree with Kusch on the social aspect of coherence, I don't think these are major criticisms. Who can access, or critically evaluate a society's body of supposedly coherent beliefs? We just do our best. |
10345 | Individual coherentism cannot generate the necessary normativity [Kusch] |
Full Idea: Standard forms of coherentism are unable to account for normativity, because of their common individualism. Normativity cannot be generated within the isolated individual, or in the causal interaction between world and individual mind. | |
From: Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Ch.10) | |
A reaction: This thought leads to belief in rationalism and the a priori, not (as Kusch hopes) to the social dimension. How can social normativity get off the ground if there is none of it to be found in individuals? The criteria of coherence seem to be given. |
10350 | Cultures decide causal routes, and they can be critically assessed [Kusch] |
Full Idea: Assessments of causal routes are specific to cultures, and thus not beyond dialectical justification. | |
From: Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Ch.11) | |
A reaction: This is a good defence of the social and communitarian view against those who are trying to be thoroughly naturalistic and physicalist by relying entirely on causal processes for all explanation, even though I sympathise with such naturalism. |
10343 | Process reliabilism has been called 'virtue epistemology', resting on perception, memory, reason [Kusch] |
Full Idea: Process reliabilism is sometimes subsumed under the label 'virtue epistemology', so that processes are 'epistemically virtuous' if they lead mostly to true beliefs. The 'intellectual virtues' here are perception, memory or reasoning. | |
From: Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Ch. 9) | |
A reaction: I am shocked that 'intellectual virtue' should be hijacked by reliabilists, suggesting that it even applies to a good clock. I like the Aristotelian idea that sound knowledge rests on qualities of character in the knower - including social qualities. |
10341 | Justification depends on the audience and one's social role [Kusch] |
Full Idea: How a claim (about an X-ray) needs to be justified depends on whether one is confronted by a group of laypersons, or of experts, and is prescribed by one's social role. | |
From: Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Ch. 8) | |
A reaction: I think this is exactly right. I cannot think of any absolute criterion for justification which doesn't play straight into the hands of sceptics. Final and certain justification is an incoherent notion. But I am a little more individualistic than Kusch. |
10334 | Testimony is an area in which epistemology meets ethics [Kusch] |
Full Idea: Testimony is an area in which epistemology meets ethics. | |
From: Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: This is very thought-provoking. A key concept linking the two would be 'respect'. Consider also 'experts'. |
10336 | Powerless people are assumed to be unreliable, even about their own lives [Kusch] |
Full Idea: The powerless in society are not usually taken to be trustworthy witnesses even when it comes to providing information about their own lives. | |
From: Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: This is where epistemology shades off into politics and the writings of Foucault. |
10324 | Testimony does not just transmit knowledge between individuals - it actually generates knowledge [Kusch] |
Full Idea: Testimony is not just a means of transmission of complete items of knowledge from and to an individual. Testimony is almost always generative of knowledge. | |
From: Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Intro) | |
A reaction: I'm not clear how my testimony could fail to be knowledge for me, but become knowledge just because I pass it to you. I might understand what I say better than you did. When fools pool their testimony, presumably not much knowledge results. |
10327 | Some want to reduce testimony to foundations of perceptions, memories and inferences [Kusch] |
Full Idea: Reductionalists about testimony are foundationalists by temperament. ...Their project amounts to justifying our testimonial beliefs in terms of perceptions, memories and inferences. | |
From: Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Ch. 4) | |
A reaction: Kusch wants to claim that the sharing of testimony is the means by which knowledge is created. My line is something like knowledge being founded on a social coherence, which is an extension of internal individual coherence. |
10329 | Testimony won't reduce to perception, if perception depends on social concepts and categories [Kusch] |
Full Idea: How can we hope to reduce testimony to perception if the way we perceive the world is to a considerable extent shaped by concepts and categories that we have learned from others? | |
From: Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Ch. 4) | |
A reaction: To me this sounds like good support for coherentism, the benign circle between my reason, my experience, and the testimony and reason of others. Asking how the circle could get started shows ignorance of biology. |
10330 | A foundation is what is intelligible, hence from a rational source, and tending towards truth [Kusch] |
Full Idea: It can be argued that testimony is non-reductive because it relies on the fact that whatever is intelligible is likely to come from a rational source, and that rational sources, by their very nature, tend towards the truth. | |
From: Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Ch. 4 n7) | |
A reaction: [He cites Tyler Burge 1993, 1997] If this makes testimony non-reductive, how would one assess whether the testimony is 'intelligible'? |
10325 | Vindicating testimony is an expression of individualism [Kusch] |
Full Idea: To believe that testimony needs a general vindication is itself an expression of individualism. | |
From: Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Intro) | |
A reaction: Kusch is a spokesman for Communitarian Epistemology. Surely we are allowed to identify the criteria for what makes a good witness? Ask a policeman. |
10335 | Myths about lonely genius are based on epistemological individualism [Kusch] |
Full Idea: Many myths about the lonely scientific genius underwrite epistemological individualism. | |
From: Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: They all actually say that they 'stood on the shoulders of giants', and they are invariably immersed in the contemporary researches of teams of like-minded people. How surprised were the really expert contemporaries by Newton, Einstein, Gödel? |
10323 | Communitarian Epistemology says 'knowledge' is a social status granted to groups of people [Kusch] |
Full Idea: I propose 'communitarian epistemology' - claiming first that the term 'knowledge' marks a social status, and is dependent on the existence of communities, and second that this social status is typically granted to groups of people. | |
From: Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Intro) | |
A reaction: I find this very congenial, though Kusch goes a little far when he claims that knowledge is largely created by social groups. He allows that Robinson Crusoe might have knowledge of his island, but can't give a decent account of it. |
10348 | Private justification is justification to imagined other people [Kusch] |
Full Idea: Coming to convince myself is actually to form a pretend communal belief with pretend others, ..which is clearly parasitic on the case where the others are real. | |
From: Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Ch.11) | |
A reaction: This slightly desperate move is a way for 'communitarian' epistemologists to deal with Robinson Crusoe cases. I think Kusch is right, but it is a bit hard to prove that this is what is 'actually' going on. |
16882 | The building blocks contain the whole contents of a discipline [Frege] |
Full Idea: The ultimate building blocks of a discipline contain, as it were in a nutshell, its whole contents. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (works [1890]), quoted by Tyler Burge - Frege on Knowing the Foundations 1 | |
A reaction: [Burge gives a reference] I would describe this nutshell as the 'essence' of the subject, and it fits Aristotle's concept of an essence perfectly. Does it fit biology or sociology, in the way it might fit maths or logic? Think of DNA or cells in biology. |
10349 | To be considered 'an individual' is performed by a society [Kusch] |
Full Idea: One cannot even have the social status of 'being an individual' unless it has been conferred on one by a communal performative belief. | |
From: Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Ch.11) | |
A reaction: This sounds crazy until you think of the mentality of a tenth generation slave in a fully slave-owning society. |
10344 | Our experience may be conceptual, but surely not the world itself? [Kusch] |
Full Idea: I am unconvinced by McDowell's arguments in favour of treating the world as itself conceptual. Granted that our experience is conceptual in quality; it still does not follow that the world itself is conceptual. | |
From: Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Ch. 9) | |
A reaction: I would take Kusch's point to be a given in any discussion of concepts, and McDowell as a non-starter on this one. I am inclined to believe that we do have non-conceptual experiences, but I take them to be epistemologically useless. |
5816 | Frege said concepts were abstract entities, not mental entities [Frege, by Putnam] |
Full Idea: Frege, rebelling against 'psychologism', identified concepts (and hence 'intensions' or meanings) with abstract entities rather than mental entities. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by Hilary Putnam - Meaning and Reference p.119 | |
A reaction: This, of course, assumes that 'abstract' entities and 'mental' entities are quite distinct things. A concept is presumably a mental item which has content, and the word 'concept' is simply ambiguous, between the container and the contents. |
7307 | A thought is not psychological, but a condition of the world that makes a sentence true [Frege, by Miller,A] |
Full Idea: For Frege, a thought is not something psychological or subjective; rather, it is objective in the sense that it specifies some condition in the world the obtaining of which is necessary and sufficient for the truth of the sentence that expresses it. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by Alexander Miller - Philosophy of Language 2.2 | |
A reaction: It is worth emphasising Russell's anti-Berkeley point about 'ideas', that the idea is in the mind, but its contents are in the world. Since the contents are what matter, this endorses Frege, and also points towards modern externalism. |
7309 | Frege's 'sense' is the strict and literal meaning, stripped of tone [Frege, by Miller,A] |
Full Idea: Frege held that "and" and "but" have the same 'sense' but different 'tones' (note: they have the same truth tables); the sense of an expression is what a sentence strictly and literally means, stripped of its tone. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by Alexander Miller - Philosophy of Language 2.6 | |
A reaction: It seems important when studying Frege to remember what has been stripped out. In "he is a genius and he plays football", if you substitute 'but' for 'and', the new version says (literally?) something very distinctive about football. |
7312 | 'Sense' solves the problems of bearerless names, substitution in beliefs, and informativeness [Frege, by Miller,A] |
Full Idea: Frege's introduction of 'sense' was motivated by the desire to solve three problems: the problem of bearerless names, the problem of substitution in belief contexts, and the problem of informativeness. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by Alexander Miller - Philosophy of Language 2.9 | |
A reaction: A proposal which solves three problems sounds pretty good! These three problems can be used to test the counter-proposals of Russell and Kripke. |
7725 | 'P or not-p' seems to be analytic, but does not fit Kant's account, lacking clear subject or predicate [Frege, by Weiner] |
Full Idea: 'It is raining or it is not raining' appears to true because of the general principle 'p or not-p', so it is analytic; but this does not fit Kant's idea of an analytic truth, because it is not obvious that it has a subject concept or a predicate concept. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by Joan Weiner - Frege Ch.2 | |
A reaction: The general progress of logic seems to be a widening out to embrace problem sentences. However, see Idea 7315 for the next problem that arises with analyticity. All this culminates in Quine's attack (e.g. Idea 1624). |
7316 | Analytic truths are those that can be demonstrated using only logic and definitions [Frege, by Miller,A] |
Full Idea: Frege (according to Quine) characterises analytic truths as those that can be demonstrated or proved using only logical laws and definitions as premises. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by Alexander Miller - Philosophy of Language 4.2 | |
A reaction: This is the big shift away from the Kantian version (predicate contained in the subject) towards a modern version, perhaps fixed by a truth table giving true for all values. |
10358 | Often socialising people is the only way to persuade them [Kusch] |
Full Idea: Often we can convince members of other cultures only by socializing them into our culture. | |
From: Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Ch.19) | |
A reaction: This looks both true and interesting, and is good support for Kusch's communitarian epistemology. What actually persuades certainly doesn't have to be reasons, and may be almost entirely social. |
10333 | Communitarianism in epistemology sees the community as the primary knower [Kusch] |
Full Idea: Communitarianism in epistemology sees the community as the primary knower. | |
From: Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: This thought offers an account of epistemology which could fit in with communitarian political views. See the ideas of Martin Kusch in this database. |
10351 | Natural kinds are social institutions [Kusch] |
Full Idea: Natural kinds are social institutions. | |
From: Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Ch.11) | |
A reaction: I can see what he means, but I take this to be deeply wrong. A clarification of what exactly is meant by a 'natural kind' is needed before we can make any progress with this one. Is a village a natural kind? Or a poodle? Or a shoal? |
10332 | Omniscience is incoherent, since knowledge is a social concept [Kusch] |
Full Idea: The very idea of omniscience is dubious, at least for the communitarian epistemologist, since knowing is a social state, and knowledge is a social status, needing a position in a social network. | |
From: Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Ch. 4) | |
A reaction: A nice test case. Would an omniscient mind have evidence for its beliefs? Would it continually check for coherence? Is it open to criticism? Does it even entertain the possibility of error? Could another 'omniscient' mind challenge it? |
3307 | Frege put forward an ontological argument for the existence of numbers [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: Frege put forward an ontological argument for the existence of numbers. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.4 |