26 ideas
4424 | A warlike philosopher challenges problems to single combat [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: A warlike philosopher challenges problems to single combat. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Ecce Homo [1889], Wise §7) | |
A reaction: And what do pacifist philosophers do? It is a moot point whether philosophy is even possible without a streak of aggression. Otherwise you circle the problem, but don't confront it. |
18806 | Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: Frege rejected the traditional categories as importing psychological and linguistic impurities into logic. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891]) by Ian Rumfitt - The Boundary Stones of Thought 1.2 | |
A reaction: Resisting such impurities is the main motivation for making logic entirely symbolic, but it doesn't follow that the traditional categories have to be dropped. |
8490 | First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege] |
Full Idea: Just as functions are fundamentally different from objects, so also functions whose arguments are and must be functions are fundamentally different from functions whose arguments are objects. The latter are first-level, the former second-level, functions. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891], p.38) | |
A reaction: In 1884 he called it 'second-order'. This is the standard distinction between first- and second-order logic. The first quantifies over objects, the second over intensional entities such as properties and propositions. |
8492 | Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege] |
Full Idea: Functions of one argument are concepts; functions of two arguments are relations. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891], p.39) | |
A reaction: Nowadays we would say 'two or more'. Another interesting move in the aim of analytic philosophy to reduce the puzzling features of the world to mathematical logic. There is, of course, rather more to some relations than being two-argument functions. |
8487 | Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege] |
Full Idea: I am of the opinion that arithmetic is a further development of logic, which leads to the requirement that the symbolic language of arithmetic must be expanded into a logical symbolism. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891], p.30) | |
A reaction: This may the the one key idea at the heart of modern analytic philosophy (even though logicism may be a total mistake!). Logic and arithmetical foundations become the master of ontology, instead of the servant. The jury is out on the whole enterprise. |
18899 | Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers] |
Full Idea: Frege regarded the existence of horses as a property of the concept 'horse'. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891]) by Fred Sommers - Intellectual Autobiography 'Realism' |
4028 | Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege] |
Full Idea: Frege's theory of properties (which he calls 'concepts') yields too few properties, by identifying coextensive properties, and also too many, by letting every predicate express a property. | |
From: comment on Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891]) by DH Mellor / A Oliver - Introduction to 'Properties' §2 | |
A reaction: Seems right; one extension may have two properties (have heart/kidneys), two predicates might express the same property. 'Cutting nature at the joints' covers properties as well as objects. |
8489 | The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege] |
Full Idea: I regard a regular definition of 'object' as impossible, since it is too simple to admit of logical analysis. Briefly: an object is anything that is not a function, so that an expression for it does not contain any empty place. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891], p.32) | |
A reaction: Here is the core of the programme for deriving our ontology from our logic and language, followed through by Russell and Quine. Once we extend objects beyond the physical, it becomes incredibly hard to individuate them. |
9947 | Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: Concepts, for Frege, are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891]) by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.2 | |
A reaction: That sounds awfully like what many philosophers call 'universals'. Frege, as a platonist (at least about numbers), I would take to be in sympathy with that. At least we can say that concepts seem to be properties. |
10319 | An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale] |
Full Idea: Frege had a notorious difficulty over the concept 'horse', when he suggests that if we wish to assert something about a concept, we are obliged to proceed indirectly by speaking of an object that represents it. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891], Ch.2.II) by Bob Hale - Abstract Objects | |
A reaction: This sounds like the thin end of a wedge. The great champion of objects is forced to accept them here as a façon de parler, when elsewhere they have ontological status. |
8488 | A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege] |
Full Idea: A concept in logic is closely connected with what we call a function. Indeed, we may say at once: a concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value. ..I give the name 'function' to what is meant by the 'unsaturated' part. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891], p.30) | |
A reaction: So a function becomes a concept when the variable takes a value. Problems arise when the value is vague, or the truth-value is indeterminable. |
9948 | Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: For Frege, concepts differ from objects in being inherently incomplete in nature. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891]) by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.2 | |
A reaction: This is because they are 'unsaturated', needing a quantified variable to complete the sentence. This could be a pointer towards Quine's view of properties, as simply an intrinsic feature of predication about objects, with no separate identity. |
4972 | I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege] |
Full Idea: From sameness of meaning there does not follow sameness of thought expressed. A fact about the Morning Star may express something different from a fact about the Evening Star, as someone may regard one as true and the other false. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891], p.14) | |
A reaction: This all gets clearer if we distinguish internalist and externalist theories of content. Why take sides on this? Why not just ask 'what is in the speaker's head?', 'what does the sentence mean in the community?', and 'what is the corresponding situation?' |
22392 | Morality is inescapable, in descriptive words such as 'dishonest', 'unjust' and 'uncharitable' [Foot] |
Full Idea: There is a sense in which morality is inescapable - in moral epithets such as 'dishonest', 'unjust', 'uncharitable'; these do not cease to apply to a man because he is indifferent to the ends of morality: they may indeed apply because of his indifference. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives [1972], p.172 n15) | |
A reaction: Odysseus was admired for lying, and charity wasn't a virtue in the ancient world. They won't go away as factual descriptions, but the values attached to them vary quite a lot. |
23685 | Reason is not a motivator of morality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
Full Idea: In her middle period she changed her mind, and attacks moral rationalism. | |
From: report of Philippa Foot (Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives [1972]) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought Intro | |
A reaction: That is, she doubted whether moral reasons are sufficient to motivate moral actions, which presumably therefore need desires, as the Humeans claimed. Reasons rely on merely hypothetical rules. |
23691 | Rejecting moral rules may be villainous, but it isn't inconsistent [Foot] |
Full Idea: The man who rejects morality because he sees no reason to obey its rules can be convicted of villainy but not of inconsistency. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives [1972], p.161) | |
A reaction: This is 'middle period' Foot, when she decided that Hume was right about the need for a desire as moral motivator. Before and after this time, she thought there were reasons to be moral, as well as desires. |
2886 | The distinction between egoistic and non-egoistic acts is absurd [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: There are neither egoistic nor unegoistic actions: both concepts are psychologically nonsense. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Ecce Homo [1889], 4.5) | |
A reaction: Not quite true, but I like this observation. The idea that you could divide everyone's actions into these two groups is certainly nonsense. But some people are more altruistic than others! |
4426 | A bad result distorts one's judgement about the virtue of what one has done [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: I should prefer to exclude the bad result, the consequences, from the question of value as a matter of principle. Faced with a bad result, one loses all too easily the right perspective for what one has done. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Ecce Homo [1889], Clever §1) | |
A reaction: If the perspective is easily lost, we should make more effort, not ignore consequences. The question is whether you could have foreseen or controlled the consequences. |
4425 | The overcoming of pity I count among the noble virtues [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The overcoming of pity I count among the noble virtues. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Ecce Homo [1889], Wise §4) | |
A reaction: Hm. I can just about see that there might be more important things than compassion for suffering, but I can't see any human activity that makes it worthwhile to trample on pity. |
22391 | Saying we 'ought to be moral' makes no sense, unless it relates to some other system [Foot] |
Full Idea: 'One ought to be moral' makes no sense at all unless the 'ought' has the moral subscript, giving a tautology, or else relates morality to some other system such as prudence or etiquette. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives [1972], p.169 n18) | |
A reaction: This aims to undercut the Kantian view that morality is an absolute call to duty (filling us with wonder, like the starry heavens). Foot aims to root morality in the real world. |
22389 | Morality no more consists of categorical imperatives than etiquette does [Foot] |
Full Idea: Moral judgements have no better claim to be categorical imperatives than do statements about matters of etiquette. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives [1972], p.164) | |
A reaction: Her claim is that all moral judgements are responses to situations, and so are hypothetical. This judgement of hers is the culmination of a careful discussion. |
20132 | To become what you are you must have no self-awareness [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: To become what one is, one must not have the faintest notion of what one is. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Ecce Homo [1889], II.9), quoted by Brian Leiter - Nietzsche On Morality 3 'fatalism' | |
A reaction: [Don't understand 'II.9'] Enigmatic but striking. As I understand it, Nietzsche thought that knowing what you are is virtually impossible, though he spent a lifetime studying himself. Would you recognise someone who had become what they are? |
20144 | Eternal recurrence is the highest attainable affirmation [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Eternal recurrence is the highest formula of affirmation that is at all attainable. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Ecce Homo [1889], Zar 1) | |
A reaction: Did Nietzsche have in mind an even higher formulation that was unattainable? The aim of eternal recurrence is to offer the highest possible ideal that remains rooted in the nature of ordinary life. It is a cut-down version of the Form of the Good. |
2889 | One repays a teacher badly if one remains only a pupil [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: One repays a teacher badly if one remains only a pupil. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Ecce Homo [1889], Fore) |
8491 | The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege] |
Full Idea: The ontological proof of God's existence suffers from the fallacy of treating existence as a first-level concept. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891], p.38 n) | |
A reaction: [See Idea 8490 for first- and second-order functions] This is usually summarised as the idea that existence is a quantifier rather than a predicate. |
2887 | I am not an atheist because of reasoning or evidence, but because of instinct [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: I have absolutely no knowledge of atheism as an outcome of reasoning, still less an event: with me it is obvious by instinct. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Ecce Homo [1889], 3.1) |