23 ideas
1765 | Diogenes said avoidance of philosophy is the lack of a desire to live properly [Diogenes of Sin., by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: When a man said that he was not suited to philosophy, Diogenes said to him, 'Why then do you live, if you have no desire to live properly.' | |
From: report of Diogenes (Sin) (reports [c.360 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 06.Di.6 | |
A reaction: Meaning philosophy is already more practice than theory. |
18806 | Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: Frege rejected the traditional categories as importing psychological and linguistic impurities into logic. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891]) by Ian Rumfitt - The Boundary Stones of Thought 1.2 | |
A reaction: Resisting such impurities is the main motivation for making logic entirely symbolic, but it doesn't follow that the traditional categories have to be dropped. |
8490 | First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege] |
Full Idea: Just as functions are fundamentally different from objects, so also functions whose arguments are and must be functions are fundamentally different from functions whose arguments are objects. The latter are first-level, the former second-level, functions. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891], p.38) | |
A reaction: In 1884 he called it 'second-order'. This is the standard distinction between first- and second-order logic. The first quantifies over objects, the second over intensional entities such as properties and propositions. |
8492 | Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege] |
Full Idea: Functions of one argument are concepts; functions of two arguments are relations. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891], p.39) | |
A reaction: Nowadays we would say 'two or more'. Another interesting move in the aim of analytic philosophy to reduce the puzzling features of the world to mathematical logic. There is, of course, rather more to some relations than being two-argument functions. |
8487 | Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege] |
Full Idea: I am of the opinion that arithmetic is a further development of logic, which leads to the requirement that the symbolic language of arithmetic must be expanded into a logical symbolism. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891], p.30) | |
A reaction: This may the the one key idea at the heart of modern analytic philosophy (even though logicism may be a total mistake!). Logic and arithmetical foundations become the master of ontology, instead of the servant. The jury is out on the whole enterprise. |
18899 | Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers] |
Full Idea: Frege regarded the existence of horses as a property of the concept 'horse'. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891]) by Fred Sommers - Intellectual Autobiography 'Realism' |
4028 | Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege] |
Full Idea: Frege's theory of properties (which he calls 'concepts') yields too few properties, by identifying coextensive properties, and also too many, by letting every predicate express a property. | |
From: comment on Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891]) by DH Mellor / A Oliver - Introduction to 'Properties' §2 | |
A reaction: Seems right; one extension may have two properties (have heart/kidneys), two predicates might express the same property. 'Cutting nature at the joints' covers properties as well as objects. |
8489 | The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege] |
Full Idea: I regard a regular definition of 'object' as impossible, since it is too simple to admit of logical analysis. Briefly: an object is anything that is not a function, so that an expression for it does not contain any empty place. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891], p.32) | |
A reaction: Here is the core of the programme for deriving our ontology from our logic and language, followed through by Russell and Quine. Once we extend objects beyond the physical, it becomes incredibly hard to individuate them. |
1762 | When someone denied motion, Diogenes got up and walked away [Diogenes of Sin., by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Diogenes replied to one who asserted that there was no such thing as motion by getting up and walking away. | |
From: report of Diogenes (Sin) (reports [c.360 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 06.Di.6 |
5963 | Some say emotion is a sort of reason, and others say virtue concerns emotion [Plutarch] |
Full Idea: Some philosophers make the emotions varieties of reason, on the ground that all desire and grief and anger are judgments, while others declare that the virtues have to do with emotions, as when fear is the province of courage. | |
From: Plutarch (68: Generation of the soul in 'Timaeus' [c.85], 1025d) | |
A reaction: The second idea comes from Aristotle, but the second is interesting, and corresponds to the views coming from modern neuroscience, where even the most basic thought seems to involve emotion. What could be the motivation for 'pure' reason? |
9947 | Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: Concepts, for Frege, are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891]) by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.2 | |
A reaction: That sounds awfully like what many philosophers call 'universals'. Frege, as a platonist (at least about numbers), I would take to be in sympathy with that. At least we can say that concepts seem to be properties. |
10319 | An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale] |
Full Idea: Frege had a notorious difficulty over the concept 'horse', when he suggests that if we wish to assert something about a concept, we are obliged to proceed indirectly by speaking of an object that represents it. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891], Ch.2.II) by Bob Hale - Abstract Objects | |
A reaction: This sounds like the thin end of a wedge. The great champion of objects is forced to accept them here as a façon de parler, when elsewhere they have ontological status. |
8488 | A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege] |
Full Idea: A concept in logic is closely connected with what we call a function. Indeed, we may say at once: a concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value. ..I give the name 'function' to what is meant by the 'unsaturated' part. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891], p.30) | |
A reaction: So a function becomes a concept when the variable takes a value. Problems arise when the value is vague, or the truth-value is indeterminable. |
9948 | Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: For Frege, concepts differ from objects in being inherently incomplete in nature. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891]) by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.2 | |
A reaction: This is because they are 'unsaturated', needing a quantified variable to complete the sentence. This could be a pointer towards Quine's view of properties, as simply an intrinsic feature of predication about objects, with no separate identity. |
4972 | I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege] |
Full Idea: From sameness of meaning there does not follow sameness of thought expressed. A fact about the Morning Star may express something different from a fact about the Evening Star, as someone may regard one as true and the other false. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891], p.14) | |
A reaction: This all gets clearer if we distinguish internalist and externalist theories of content. Why take sides on this? Why not just ask 'what is in the speaker's head?', 'what does the sentence mean in the community?', and 'what is the corresponding situation?' |
7813 | Cynicism was open to anyone, and needed neither education nor sophistication [Diogenes of Sin., by Grayling] |
Full Idea: An advantage of Cynicism was that it was open to anyone who could grasp its simple teachings. Understanding it required neither education nor sophistication. | |
From: report of Diogenes (Sin) (reports [c.360 BCE]) by A.C. Grayling - What is Good? Ch.3 | |
A reaction: This was the source of the well-known opposition of Diogenes to Plato's Academy, and it makes him a key predecessor of the teachings of Jesus. Personally I think the really good life is difficult, and it needs education and careful rational thought. |
1763 | Diogenes said a plucked chicken fits Plato's definition of man [Diogenes of Sin., by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Plato defined man as a two-footed featherless animal, so Diogenes plucked a cock and brought it into the school, and said, 'This is Plato's man'. | |
From: report of Diogenes (Sin) (reports [c.360 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 06.Di.6 | |
A reaction: You have to be very serious about your philosophy to enact your counterexamples, rather than just suggest them. Which university will actually reconstruct the Trolley Problem? |
5071 | The Cynics rejected what is conventional as irrational, and aimed to live by nature [Taylor,R on Diogenes of Sin.] |
Full Idea: The Cynics were convinced of the purely conventional foundation of Athenian values, which meant they had no rational foundation at all. They therefore rejected them in favour of what is correct and worthwhile by nature. | |
From: comment on Diogenes (Sin) (reports [c.360 BCE]) by Richard Taylor - Virtue Ethics: an Introduction Ch.8 | |
A reaction: This shows how the Cynics are key players in the progress of the nomos-physis debate, which keeps resurfacing as relativism vs absolutism, cognitivism vs non-cognitivism, and even romanticism vs classicism. The trouble is, convention is natural! |
7812 | For peace of mind, you need self-government, indifference and independence [Diogenes of Sin.] |
Full Idea: There are three essential conditions for peace of mind: autarchy, apathy and freedom. Autarchy is self-government and self-sufficiency; apathy is indifference to what the world can do to you; the freedom is from dependence and possessions. | |
From: Diogenes (Sin) (reports [c.360 BCE]), quoted by A.C. Grayling - What is Good? Ch.3 | |
A reaction: Quite good advice, but I don't see 'peace of mind' as the highest human ideal. The basic suggestion here is live alone and do nothing. Certainly don't get married, or have children, or try to achieve anything. |
1764 | Diogenes said he was a citizen of the world [Diogenes of Sin., by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Diogenes said he was a citizen of no country, but of the world. | |
From: report of Diogenes (Sin) (reports [c.360 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 06.Di.6 |
5968 | Diogenes masturbated in public, wishing he could get rid of hunger so easily [Diogenes of Sin., by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus praises Diogenes for saying to bystanders as he masturbated in public, "Would that I could thus rub the hunger too out of my belly". | |
From: report of Diogenes (Sin) (reports [c.360 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1044b | |
A reaction: So it is not quite true that people only need corn and water. Diogenes' remark doesn't explain why he did it in public. Was it to defy local convention (as befits a citizen of the world), or was it to teach? |
1766 | Diogenes said that the most excellent thing among men was freedom of speech [Diogenes of Sin., by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Diogenes said that the most excellent thing among men was freedom of speech. | |
From: report of Diogenes (Sin) (reports [c.360 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 06.Di.6 |
8491 | The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege] |
Full Idea: The ontological proof of God's existence suffers from the fallacy of treating existence as a first-level concept. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891], p.38 n) | |
A reaction: [See Idea 8490 for first- and second-order functions] This is usually summarised as the idea that existence is a quantifier rather than a predicate. |