40 ideas
326 | For relaxation one can consider the world of change, instead of eternal things [Plato] |
Full Idea: If, for relaxation, one gives up discussing eternal things, it is pleasant to consider likely accounts of the world of change. | |
From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 59c) | |
A reaction: To understand this, examine Plato's example of the Line at 'Republic' 509d. |
315 | Philosophy is the supreme gift of the gods to mortals [Plato] |
Full Idea: Philosophy is the greatest gift the gods have ever given or ever will give to mortals. | |
From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 47b) | |
A reaction: I wonder why they gave it to us? |
8138 | Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy [Paul] |
Full Idea: Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy. | |
From: St Paul (12: Colossians [c.55], 2.8) | |
A reaction: The same might be said of preaching. The two sorts of spoiling seem to be fanaticism and wickedness. While reason can lead to fanaticism, I believe (with Socrates) that it is unlikely to corrupt morally. |
306 | Nothing can come to be without a cause [Plato] |
Full Idea: Nothing can come to be without a cause. | |
From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 28a) |
18806 | Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: Frege rejected the traditional categories as importing psychological and linguistic impurities into logic. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891]) by Ian Rumfitt - The Boundary Stones of Thought 1.2 | |
A reaction: Resisting such impurities is the main motivation for making logic entirely symbolic, but it doesn't follow that the traditional categories have to be dropped. |
8490 | First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege] |
Full Idea: Just as functions are fundamentally different from objects, so also functions whose arguments are and must be functions are fundamentally different from functions whose arguments are objects. The latter are first-level, the former second-level, functions. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891], p.38) | |
A reaction: In 1884 he called it 'second-order'. This is the standard distinction between first- and second-order logic. The first quantifies over objects, the second over intensional entities such as properties and propositions. |
8492 | Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege] |
Full Idea: Functions of one argument are concepts; functions of two arguments are relations. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891], p.39) | |
A reaction: Nowadays we would say 'two or more'. Another interesting move in the aim of analytic philosophy to reduce the puzzling features of the world to mathematical logic. There is, of course, rather more to some relations than being two-argument functions. |
8487 | Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege] |
Full Idea: I am of the opinion that arithmetic is a further development of logic, which leads to the requirement that the symbolic language of arithmetic must be expanded into a logical symbolism. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891], p.30) | |
A reaction: This may the the one key idea at the heart of modern analytic philosophy (even though logicism may be a total mistake!). Logic and arithmetical foundations become the master of ontology, instead of the servant. The jury is out on the whole enterprise. |
324 | Before the existence of the world there must have been being, space and becoming [Plato] |
Full Idea: There were, before the world came into existence, being, space, and becoming, three distinct realities. | |
From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 52d) | |
A reaction: 'Becoming' is the central idea of Heraclitus, and must be what Aristotle calls 'potentiality' [dunamis]. If it was 'before' creation, he should add time to the list. Are these three 'distinct'? Being has potential. |
20364 | The apprehensions of reason remain unchanging, but reasonless sensation shows mere becoming [Plato] |
Full Idea: That which is apprehended by intelligence and reason is always in the same state, but that which is conceived by opinion with the help of sensation and without reason is always in a process of becoming and perishing, and never really is. | |
From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 28a) | |
A reaction: Lots of problems with this, of which I take the main one to be the idea that sensation is 'without reason', as if there were a sharp dichotomy in our ways of evaluating reality. Laws of nature seem to be laws of change, not of stasis. |
18899 | Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers] |
Full Idea: Frege regarded the existence of horses as a property of the concept 'horse'. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891]) by Fred Sommers - Intellectual Autobiography 'Realism' |
4028 | Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege] |
Full Idea: Frege's theory of properties (which he calls 'concepts') yields too few properties, by identifying coextensive properties, and also too many, by letting every predicate express a property. | |
From: comment on Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891]) by DH Mellor / A Oliver - Introduction to 'Properties' §2 | |
A reaction: Seems right; one extension may have two properties (have heart/kidneys), two predicates might express the same property. 'Cutting nature at the joints' covers properties as well as objects. |
321 | For knowledge and true opinion to be different there must be Forms; otherwise we are just stuck with sensations [Plato] |
Full Idea: If intelligence and true opinion are different, then the forms must exist, but if they are the same, then what our senses perceive must be the most certain reality. | |
From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 51d) |
12042 | Plato's Forms were seen as part of physics, rather than of metaphysics [Plato, by Annas] |
Full Idea: In the ancient world Plato's Theory of Forms was mostly seen as one aspect of Plato's 'physics' or theory of the world (rather than as 'metaphysics'). | |
From: report of Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE]) by Julia Annas - Ancient Philosophy: very short introduction Ch.5 | |
A reaction: This is how I also see the theory, but then I am inclined to see religion as a rather startling branch of speculative physics. Annas cites 'Timaeus' as the key text for this. |
307 | Something will always be well-made if the maker keeps in mind the eternal underlying pattern [Plato] |
Full Idea: Whenever the maker of anything keeps his eye on the eternally unchanging and uses it as his pattern for the form and function of his product the result must be good. | |
From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 28b) |
318 | In addition to the underlying unchanging model and a changing copy of it, there must also be a foundation of all change [Plato] |
Full Idea: In addition to an eternal unchanging model and a visible and changing copy of reality, there must be a third part, the receptacle and nurse of all becoming and change. | |
From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 49b) | |
A reaction: cf Aristotle's criticism in Metaphysics |
317 | The universe is basically an intelligible and unchanging model, and a visible and changing copy of it [Plato] |
Full Idea: Our basic description of the universe contained an intelligible and unchanging model, and a visible and changing copy of it. | |
From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 48e) |
8489 | The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege] |
Full Idea: I regard a regular definition of 'object' as impossible, since it is too simple to admit of logical analysis. Briefly: an object is anything that is not a function, so that an expression for it does not contain any empty place. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891], p.32) | |
A reaction: Here is the core of the programme for deriving our ontology from our logic and language, followed through by Russell and Quine. Once we extend objects beyond the physical, it becomes incredibly hard to individuate them. |
334 | Only bird-brained people think astronomy is entirely a matter of evidence [Plato] |
Full Idea: Birds are empty-headed men who grew feathers instead of hair, because they were interested in astronomy but thought it was entirely a matter of physical evidence. | |
From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 91d) |
5962 | Plato says the soul is ordered by number [Plato, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: Plato regards the substance of soul not as number but as being ordered by number. | |
From: report of Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE]) by Plutarch - 68: Generation of the soul in 'Timaeus' 1023 | |
A reaction: This remark points towards Plato's esoteric doctrines, which are some sort of mathematical metaphysics. The idea that order and numbers are in some way connected is one of the most powerful in western civilization, with undeniable appeal. |
330 | No one wants to be bad, but bad men result from physical and educational failures, which they do not want or choose [Plato] |
Full Idea: No one wishes to be bad, but a bad man is bad because of some flaw in his physical makeup and failure in his education, neither of which he likes or chooses. | |
From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 86e) |
9947 | Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: Concepts, for Frege, are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891]) by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.2 | |
A reaction: That sounds awfully like what many philosophers call 'universals'. Frege, as a platonist (at least about numbers), I would take to be in sympathy with that. At least we can say that concepts seem to be properties. |
10319 | An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale] |
Full Idea: Frege had a notorious difficulty over the concept 'horse', when he suggests that if we wish to assert something about a concept, we are obliged to proceed indirectly by speaking of an object that represents it. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891], Ch.2.II) by Bob Hale - Abstract Objects | |
A reaction: This sounds like the thin end of a wedge. The great champion of objects is forced to accept them here as a façon de parler, when elsewhere they have ontological status. |
8488 | A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege] |
Full Idea: A concept in logic is closely connected with what we call a function. Indeed, we may say at once: a concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value. ..I give the name 'function' to what is meant by the 'unsaturated' part. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891], p.30) | |
A reaction: So a function becomes a concept when the variable takes a value. Problems arise when the value is vague, or the truth-value is indeterminable. |
9948 | Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: For Frege, concepts differ from objects in being inherently incomplete in nature. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891]) by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.2 | |
A reaction: This is because they are 'unsaturated', needing a quantified variable to complete the sentence. This could be a pointer towards Quine's view of properties, as simply an intrinsic feature of predication about objects, with no separate identity. |
4972 | I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege] |
Full Idea: From sameness of meaning there does not follow sameness of thought expressed. A fact about the Morning Star may express something different from a fact about the Evening Star, as someone may regard one as true and the other false. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891], p.14) | |
A reaction: This all gets clearer if we distinguish internalist and externalist theories of content. Why take sides on this? Why not just ask 'what is in the speaker's head?', 'what does the sentence mean in the community?', and 'what is the corresponding situation?' |
316 | Music has harmony like the soul, and serves to reorder disharmony within us [Plato] |
Full Idea: Music has harmonic motions like the orbits of the soul, and is not for irrational pleasure, but to reduce to order any disharmony in the revolutions within us. | |
From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 47d) |
332 | One should exercise both the mind and the body, to avoid imbalance [Plato] |
Full Idea: One should preserve a balance and avoid exercising the mind or body without the other; mathematicians should exercise physically, and athletes mentally. | |
From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 88c) | |
A reaction: Excellent, and very modern. Use it or lose it. It suggests that Plato had a fairly holistic view of a human being, and saw mind and body as closely integrated. |
328 | Everything that takes place naturally is pleasant [Plato] |
Full Idea: Everything that takes place naturally is pleasant. | |
From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 81e) | |
A reaction: Not many people would agree with this. I recently watched a sparrowhawk eat a pigeon in my garden. This is the source of the stoic formula of living according to nature. |
322 | Intelligence is the result of rational teaching; true opinion can result from irrational persuasion [Plato] |
Full Idea: Intelligence is produced by teaching, involves truth and reason, and cannot be moved; true opinion involves persuasion, is irrational and can be moved. | |
From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 51e) |
331 | Bad governments prevent discussion, and discourage the study of virtue [Plato] |
Full Idea: Under a bad government discussion, both public and private, is bad, and no courses of study are available to cure faults of character. | |
From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 87b) |
310 | The creator of the cosmos had no envy, and so wanted things to be as like himself as possible [Plato] |
Full Idea: This changing cosmos was made because its maker is good, and therefore lacks envy; he therefore wished all things to be as like himself as possible. | |
From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 29e) |
311 | The cosmos must be unique, because it resembles the creator, who is unique [Plato] |
Full Idea: So that our universe can resemble the perfect living creature in being unique, the universe was, is and will continue to be its maker's only creation. | |
From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 31c) |
325 | We must consider the four basic shapes as too small to see, only becoming visible in large numbers [Plato] |
Full Idea: We must think of the individual units of all four basic shapes as being far too small to be visible, and only becoming visible when massed together in large numbers. | |
From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 56c) |
327 | There are two types of cause, the necessary and the divine [Plato] |
Full Idea: We must distinguish two types of cause, the necessary and the divine. | |
From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 68e) |
314 | Heavenly movements gave us the idea of time, and caused us to inquire about the heavens [Plato] |
Full Idea: Days, months, years and solstices have caused the invention of number, given us the notion of time, and caused us to inquire into the nature of the universe. | |
From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 47a) |
312 | Time came into existence with the heavens, so that there will be a time when they can be dissolved [Plato] |
Full Idea: Time came into being with the heavens, so that they should be dissolved together if ever they are dissolved. | |
From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 38c) |
309 | Clearly the world is good, so its maker must have been concerned with the eternal, not with change [Plato] |
Full Idea: If the world is beautiful and its maker good, he had an eye on the eternal; if not, on that which is subject to change; clearly the world is the fairest of things, and he the best of causes, so it is eternal. | |
From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 29a) |
308 | If the cosmos is an object of perception then it must be continually changing [Plato] |
Full Idea: The cosmos is visible, tangible and corporeal, and therefore perceptible by the senses; therefore it is an object of opinion and sensation, and therefore change and coming into being. | |
From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 28d) |
8491 | The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege] |
Full Idea: The ontological proof of God's existence suffers from the fallacy of treating existence as a first-level concept. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891], p.38 n) | |
A reaction: [See Idea 8490 for first- and second-order functions] This is usually summarised as the idea that existence is a quantifier rather than a predicate. |