28 ideas
| 18915 | If facts are the truthmakers, they are not in the world [Engelbretsen] |
| Full Idea: If there are such things as truthmakers (facts), they are not to be found in the world. As Strawson would say to Austin: there is the cat, there is the mat, but where in the world is the fact that the cat is on the mat? | |
| From: George Engelbretsen (Trees, Terms and Truth [2005], 4) | |
| A reaction: He cites Strawson, Quine and Davidson for this point. |
| 18919 | There are no 'falsifying' facts, only an absence of truthmakers [Engelbretsen] |
| Full Idea: A false proposition is not made false by anything like a 'falsifying' fact. A false proposition simply fails to be made true by any fact. | |
| From: George Engelbretsen (Trees, Terms and Truth [2005], 4) | |
| A reaction: Sounds good. In truthmaker theory, one truth-value (T) is 'made', but the other one is not, so there is no symmetry between the two. Better to talk of T and not-T? See ideas on Excluded Middle. |
| 18913 | Traditional term logic struggled to express relations [Engelbretsen] |
| Full Idea: The greatest challenge for traditional term logicians was the proper formulation and treatment of relational expressions. | |
| From: George Engelbretsen (Trees, Terms and Truth [2005]) | |
| A reaction: The modern term logic of Fred Sommers claims to have solved this problem. |
| 18907 | Term logic rests on negated terms or denial, and that propositions are tied pairs [Engelbretsen] |
| Full Idea: That terms can be negated, that such negation is distinguishable from denial, and that propositions can be construed syntactically as predicationally tied pairs of terms, are important for the tree theory of predication, and for term logic. | |
| From: George Engelbretsen (Trees, Terms and Truth [2005], 2) |
| 18912 | Was logic a branch of mathematics, or mathematics a branch of logic? [Engelbretsen] |
| Full Idea: Nineteenth century logicians debated whether logic should be treated simply as a branch of mathematics, and mathematics could be applied to it, or whether mathematics is a branch of logic, with no mathematics used in formulating logic. | |
| From: George Engelbretsen (Trees, Terms and Truth [2005], 3) | |
| A reaction: He cites Boole, De Morgan and Peirce for the first view, and Frege and Russell (and their 'logicism') for the second. The logic for mathematics slowly emerged from doing it, long before it was formalised. Mathematics is the boss? |
| 18922 | Logical syntax is actually close to surface linguistic form [Engelbretsen] |
| Full Idea: The underlying logical syntax of language is close to the surface syntax of ordinary language. | |
| From: George Engelbretsen (Trees, Terms and Truth [2005], 5) | |
| A reaction: This is the boast of the Term logicians, in opposition to the strained and unnatural logical forms of predicate logic, which therefore don't give a good account of the way ordinary speakers reason. An attractive programme. 'Terms' are the key. |
| 18905 | Propositions can be analysed as pairs of terms glued together by predication [Engelbretsen] |
| Full Idea: Sommers's 'tree theory' of predication assumes that propositions can be analysed as pairs of terms joined by some kind of predicational glue. | |
| From: George Engelbretsen (Trees, Terms and Truth [2005], 2) | |
| A reaction: This is the basis of Sommers's upgraded Aristotelian logic, known as Term Logic. The idea of reasoning with 'terms', rather than with objects, predicates and quantifiers, seems to me very appealing. I think I reason more about facts than about objects. |
| 18908 | Standard logic only negates sentences, even via negated general terms or predicates [Engelbretsen] |
| Full Idea: Standard logic recognises only one kind of negation: sentential negation. Consequently, negation of a general term/predicate always amounts to negation of the entire sentence. | |
| From: George Engelbretsen (Trees, Terms and Truth [2005], 3) |
| 18917 | Existence and nonexistence are characteristics of the world, not of objects [Engelbretsen] |
| Full Idea: Existence and nonexistence are not primarily properties of individual objects (dogs, unicorns), but of totalities. To say that some object exists is just to say that it is a constituent of the world, which is a characteristic of the world, not the object. | |
| From: George Engelbretsen (Trees, Terms and Truth [2005], 4) | |
| A reaction: This has important implications for the problem of truthmakers for negative existential statements (like 'there are no unicorns'). It is obviously a relative of Armstrong's totality facts that do the job. Not sure about 'a characteristic of'. |
| 18916 | Facts are not in the world - they are properties of the world [Engelbretsen] |
| Full Idea: Facts must be viewed as properties of the world - not as things in the world. | |
| From: George Engelbretsen (Trees, Terms and Truth [2005], 4) | |
| A reaction: Not sure I'm happy with either of these. Do animals grasp facts? If not, are they (as Strawson said) just the truths expressed by true sentences? That is not a clear idea either, given that facts are not the sentences themselves. Facts overlap. |
| 18921 | Individuals are arranged in inclusion categories that match our semantics [Engelbretsen] |
| Full Idea: The natural categories of individuals are arranged in a hierarchy of inclusion relations that is isomorphic with the linguistic semantic structure. | |
| From: George Engelbretsen (Trees, Terms and Truth [2005], 5) | |
| A reaction: This is the conclusion of a summary of modern Term Logic. The claim is that Sommers discerned this structure in our semantics (via the study of 'terms'), and was pleasantly surprised to find that it matched a plausible structure of natural categories. |
| 18918 | Terms denote objects with properties, and statements denote the world with that property [Engelbretsen] |
| Full Idea: In term logic, what a term denotes are the objects having the property it signifies. What a statement denotes is the world, that which has the constitutive property it signifies. | |
| From: George Engelbretsen (Trees, Terms and Truth [2005], 4) |
| 18920 | 'Socrates is wise' denotes a sentence; 'that Socrates is wise' denotes a proposition [Engelbretsen] |
| Full Idea: Whereas 'Socrates is wise' denotes a sentence, 'that Socrates is wise' denotes a proposition. | |
| From: George Engelbretsen (Trees, Terms and Truth [2005], 4) | |
| A reaction: In traditional parlance, 'reported speech' refers to the underlying proposition, because it does not commit to the actual words being used. As a lover of propositions (as mental events, not mysterious abstract objects), I like this. |
| 18906 | Negating a predicate term and denying its unnegated version are quite different [Engelbretsen] |
| Full Idea: There is a crucial distinction in term logic between affirming a negated predicate term of some subject and denying the unnegated version of that term of that same subject. We must distinguish 'X is non-P' from 'X is not P'. | |
| From: George Engelbretsen (Trees, Terms and Truth [2005], 2) | |
| A reaction: The first one affirms something about X, but the second one just blocks off a possible description of X. 'X is non-harmful' and 'X is not harmful' - if X had ceased to exist, the second would be appropriate and the first wouldn't? I'm guessing. |
| 23874 | Armies and businesses create moralities in which their activity can do no wrong [Marx, by Weil] |
| Full Idea: Marx saw that social groups manufacture moralities for their own use, so their activity is placed outside the reach of evil. Thus the first articles of soldiers and businessmen is to deny that it is possible to do evil while waging war or doing business. | |
| From: report of Karl Marx (works [1860]) by Simone Weil - Fragments: London 1943 p.146 | |
| A reaction: This is especially true of the modern reverence for 'market forces'. It is a key debate in the ethics of warfare - compare Walzer and McMahon. A striking thought, obviously containing a lot of truth. |
| 18662 | Liberal freedom is the right to be separate, and ignores the union of man with man [Marx] |
| Full Idea: The liberal right of man to freedom is not based on the union of man with man, but on the separation of man from man; it is the right to this separation. | |
| From: Karl Marx (works [1860]), quoted by Will Kymlicka - Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) 7.2.a | |
| A reaction: [quoted from an anthology] It is interesting that liberal freedom is the right NOT to be involved in politics, and even not to vote in elections. Home counties England (high hedges etc) is the embodiment of the freedom not to be involved in society. |
| 23372 | Liberals want the right to be separate, rather than for people to be united [Marx] |
| Full Idea: The [liberal] right of man to freedom is not based on the union of man with man, but on the separation of man from man. It is the right to this separation. | |
| From: Karl Marx (works [1860], p.53), quoted by Will Kymlicka - Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) 7 | |
| A reaction: [in collection ed.McLelland p.53] That nicely encapsulates the debate. Modern liberal thinkers regret the loss of community, but people in authoritarian communities yearn for separation. You can have too much 'union'! |
| 20576 | Early Marx anticipates communitarian objections to liberalism [Marx, by Oksala] |
| Full Idea: The early writings of Marx anticipate the communitarian critique of liberalism. | |
| From: report of Karl Marx (works [1860]) by Johanna Oksala - Political Philosophy: all that matters Ch.8 | |
| A reaction: [Oksala says modern writers seem to prefer this to the hardcore later Marx, which is presumably too 'scientific'. He says 'Capital Vol 1' is Marx's most important work] |
| 23862 | By saying the material dialectic of history aspires to the best, Marx agreed with capitalism [Weil on Marx] |
| Full Idea: When Marx inverted Hegel's dialectic of history, by substituting matter for mind as the motive, he attributed to matter the essence of mind, an unceasing aspiration towards the best - which was in keeping with the general current of capitalist thought. | |
| From: comment on Karl Marx (works [1860]) by Simone Weil - Reflections on Liberty and Social Oppression p.43 | |
| A reaction: [compressed] A rather nice debating point! Marx seems to share the universal nineteenth century belief in unremitting progress. Without that, it is impossible to believe that a revolution will necessarily improve anything. |
| 21999 | False consciousness results from concealment by the superstructure [Marx, by Singer] |
| Full Idea: False consciousness involves failing to see things as they really are. It comes about because a society's superstructure can conceal the real basis of the society. | |
| From: report of Karl Marx (works [1860]) by Peter Singer - Marx 9 | |
| A reaction: That seems a poor label, probably revealing a Hegelian background. It seems a matter of knowledge rather than consciousness. Can a whole mind be in a state of error? |
| 23875 | Marx says force is everything, and that the weak will become strong, while remaining the weak [Weil on Marx] |
| Full Idea: Marx posits on the one hand that force alone governs social relations to the exclusion of anything else, and on the other hand that one day the weak, while remaining weak, will nevertheless be stronger. He believed in miracles. | |
| From: comment on Karl Marx (works [1860]) by Simone Weil - Fragments: London 1943 p.149 | |
| A reaction: This is close to the obvious contradiction if the working classes despise the middle classes (the dreaded 'bourgeoisie') while their only aspiration is to be like them. It is hard to custom design a new class to which they could both aspire. |
| 18653 | Marx rejected equal rights because they never actually treat people as equals [Marx, by Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Marx rejected the idea of equal rights, not because he was not a friend to the idea of treating people as equals, but precisely because he thought rights failed to live up to that ideal. | |
| From: report of Karl Marx (works [1860]) by Will Kymlicka - Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) 5.1 | |
| A reaction: Presumably because the power to award 'rights' goes to the highest bidder. If equality is to be enshrined in law, it is a bit difficult to see how else to manage it. |
| 20958 | Capitalism changes the world, by socialising the idea of a commodity [Marx, by Bowie] |
| Full Idea: In Marx's view the essential factor in capitalism is that the encroachment of the commodity form into society fundamentally changes the world. | |
| From: report of Karl Marx (works [1860]) by Andrew Bowie - Introduction to German Philosophy 6 'Historical' | |
| A reaction: The main point is that people and their labour become commodities. Haven't animals always been treated as commodities? Clearly slave were commodities, long before capitalism. Capitalism universalises it? |
| 23876 | The essence of capitalism is the subordination of people to things [Marx, by Weil] |
| Full Idea: Marx discovered a formula impossible to surpass when he said that the essence of capitalism lies in the subordination of subject to object, of man to thing. | |
| From: report of Karl Marx (works [1860]) by Simone Weil - Fragments: London 1943 p,155 | |
| A reaction: I find this rather too vague to be a penetrating observation. I would suggest the obliteration of cooperation and community, in favour of competition. Winners and losers. |
| 20960 | Marx thought capitalism was partly liberating, and could make labour and ownership more humane [Marx, by Bowie] |
| Full Idea: Marx did not disapprove per se of capitalism. New divisions of labour and forms of ownership could transform individuals in modern societies, creating a more humane world with the means capitalism had liberated from feudalism. | |
| From: report of Karl Marx (works [1860]) by Andrew Bowie - Introduction to German Philosophy 11 'Metaphysics' | |
| A reaction: I'm guessing this might be early Marx, which has less to say about the 'scientific' inevitably of deep change, and the necessity for revolution. Nowadays we tinker with humane changes at the poorer end, while the rich run rampant. |
| 21236 | Instead of gravitational force, we now have a pervasive gravitational field [Farmelo] |
| Full Idea: Physics replaced the notion that bodies exert gravitational force on each other by the more effective picture that the bodies in the universe give rise to a pervasive gravitational field which exerts a force on each particle. | |
| From: Graham Farmelo (The Strangest Man [2009], 08) | |
| A reaction: This still uses the word 'force'. I sometimes get the impression that gravity is the curvature of space, but gravity needs more. Which direction along the curvature are particles attracted? The bottom line is the power of the bodies. |
| 21235 | The Schrödinger waves are just the maths of transforming energy values to positions [Farmelo] |
| Full Idea: Dirac showed that the Schrödinger waves were simply the mathematical quantities involved in transforming the description of a quantum based on its energy values to one based on possible values of its position. | |
| From: Graham Farmelo (The Strangest Man [2009], 08) | |
| A reaction: Does this eliminate actual physical 'waves' from the theory? |
| 21234 | Experiments show that fundamental particles of one type are identical [Farmelo] |
| Full Idea: It is an established experimental fact ...that every single fundamental particle in the universe is the same and identical to all other particles of the same type. | |
| From: Graham Farmelo (The Strangest Man [2009], 07) | |
| A reaction: A loud groan is heard from the tomb of Leibniz. I'm unclear how experiments can establish this. If electrons have internal structure (which is not ruled out) then uniformity is highly unlikely. |