Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'What is so bad about Contradictions?', 'Papers of 1913' and 'Quantification and Descriptions'

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4 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction

9123	Someone standing in a doorway seems to be both in and not-in the room [Priest,G, by Sorensen]
	Full Idea: Priest says there is room for contradictions. He gives the example of someone in a doorway; is he in or out of the room. Given that in and out are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, and neither is the default, he seems to be both in and not in.
	From: report of Graham Priest (What is so bad about Contradictions? [1998]) by Roy Sorensen - Vagueness and Contradiction 4.3
	A reaction: Priest is a clever lad, but I don't think I can go with this. It just seems to be an equivocation on the word 'in' when applied to rooms. First tell me the criteria for being 'in' a room. What is the proposition expressed in 'he is in the room'?

2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition

18776	Contextual definitions eliminate descriptions from contexts [Linsky,B]
	Full Idea: A 'contextual' definition shows how to eliminate a description from a context.
	From: Bernard Linsky (Quantification and Descriptions [2014], 2)
	A reaction: I'm trying to think of an example, but what I come up with are better described as 'paraphrases' than as 'definitions'.

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions

18774	Definite descriptions, unlike proper names, have a logical structure [Linsky,B]
	Full Idea: Definite descriptions seem to have a logical structure in a way that proper names do not.
	From: Bernard Linsky (Quantification and Descriptions [2014], 1.1.1)
	A reaction: Thus descriptions have implications which plain names do not.

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility

22308	Only the actual exists, so possibilities always reduce to actuality after full analysis [Russell]
	Full Idea: Possibility always marks insufficient analysis: when analysis is completed, only the actual can be relevant, for the simple reason that there is only the actual, and that the mere possibility is nothing.
	From: Bertrand Russell (Papers of 1913 [1913], VII.26), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 42 'Logic'
	A reaction: Quine agreed with Russell on this. You won't get far in life if you deny possibilities. The answer is to recognise that the actual is dynamic, and not passive.