Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'What is so bad about Contradictions?', 'Many, but almost one' and 'Persons, Character and Morality'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

---

8 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction

9123	Someone standing in a doorway seems to be both in and not-in the room [Priest,G, by Sorensen]
	Full Idea: Priest says there is room for contradictions. He gives the example of someone in a doorway; is he in or out of the room. Given that in and out are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, and neither is the default, he seems to be both in and not in.
	From: report of Graham Priest (What is so bad about Contradictions? [1998]) by Roy Sorensen - Vagueness and Contradiction 4.3
	A reaction: Priest is a clever lad, but I don't think I can go with this. It just seems to be an equivocation on the word 'in' when applied to rooms. First tell me the criteria for being 'in' a room. What is the proposition expressed in 'he is in the room'?

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic

15538	Semantic indecision explains vagueness (if we have precisifications to be undecided about) [Lewis]
	Full Idea: Semantic indecision will suffice to explain the phenomenon of vagueness. [note] Provided that there exist the many precisifications for us to be undecided between. If you deny this, you will indeed have need of vague objects.
	From: David Lewis (Many, but almost one [1993], 'Two solutions')
	A reaction: [He mentions Van Inwagen 1990:213-83] There seem to be three solutions to vague objects: that they really are vague, that they are precise but we can't know precisely, or Lewis's view. I like Lewis's view. Do animals have any problem with vagueness?

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail

15537	If cats are vague, we deny that the many cats are one, or deny that the one cat is many [Lewis]
	Full Idea: To deny that there are many cats on the mat (because removal of a few hairs seems to produce a new one), we must either deny that the many are cats, or else deny that the cats are many. ...I think both alternatives lead to successful solutions.
	From: David Lewis (Many, but almost one [1993], 'The paradox')
	A reaction: He credits the problem to Geach (and Tibbles), and says it is the same as Unger's 'problem of the many' (Idea 15536).

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects

15536	We have one cloud, but many possible boundaries and aggregates for it [Lewis]
	Full Idea: Many surfaces are equally good candidates to be boundaries of a cloud; therefore many aggregates of droplets are equally good candidates to be the cloud. How is it that we have just one cloud? And yet we do. This is Unger's (1980) 'problem of the many'.
	From: David Lewis (Many, but almost one [1993], 'The problem')
	A reaction: This is the problem of vague objects, as opposed to the problem of vague predicates, or the problem of vague truths, or the problem of vague prepositions (like 'towards').

19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity

15539	Basic to pragmatics is taking a message in a way that makes sense of it [Lewis]
	Full Idea: The cardinal principle of pragmatics is that the right way to take what is said, if at all possible, is the way that makes sense of the message.
	From: David Lewis (Many, but almost one [1993], 'A better solution')
	A reaction: Thus when someone misuses a word, suggesting nonsense, we gloss over it, often without even mentioning it, because the underlying sense is obvious. A good argument for the existence of propositions. Lewis doesn't mention truth.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character

23279	It is important that a person can change their character, and not just be successive 'selves' [Williams,B]
	Full Idea: I want to emphasise the basic importance of the ordinary idea of a self or person which undergoes changes of character, as opposed to dissolving a changing person into a series of 'selves'.
	From: Bernard Williams (Persons, Character and Morality [1976], II)
	A reaction: [compressed] He mentions Derek Parfit for the rival view. Williams has the Aristotelian view, that a person has an essential nature, which endures through change, and explains that change. But that needs some non-essential character traits.

23280	Kantians have an poor account of individuals, and insist on impartiality, because they ignore character [Williams,B]
	Full Idea: The Kantians' omission of character is a condition of their ultimate insistence on the demands of impartial morality, just as it is a reason to find inadequate their account of the individual.
	From: Bernard Williams (Persons, Character and Morality [1976], II)
	A reaction: This is also why the Kantian account of virtue is inadequate, in comparison with the Aristotelian view.

23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism

23278	For utilitarians states of affairs are what have value, not matter who produced them [Williams,B]
	Full Idea: The basic bearer of value for Utilitarianism is the state of affairs, and hence, when the relevant causal differences have been allowed for, it cannot make any further difference who produces a given state of affairs.
	From: Bernard Williams (Persons, Character and Morality [1976], I)
	A reaction: Which is morally better, that I water your bed of flowers, or that it rains? Which is morally better, that I water them from love, or because you threaten me with a whip?