Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'What is so bad about Contradictions?', 'Emergent Evolution' and 'Questions on Aristotle's Physics'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

---

6 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction

9123	Someone standing in a doorway seems to be both in and not-in the room [Priest,G, by Sorensen]
	Full Idea: Priest says there is room for contradictions. He gives the example of someone in a doorway; is he in or out of the room. Given that in and out are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, and neither is the default, he seems to be both in and not in.
	From: report of Graham Priest (What is so bad about Contradictions? [1998]) by Roy Sorensen - Vagueness and Contradiction 4.3
	A reaction: Priest is a clever lad, but I don't think I can go with this. It just seems to be an equivocation on the word 'in' when applied to rooms. First tell me the criteria for being 'in' a room. What is the proposition expressed in 'he is in the room'?

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience

16051	Life has a new supervenient relation, which alters its underlying physical events [Morgan,L]
	Full Idea: When some new kind of relatedness is supervenient (say at the level of life), the way in which the physical events which are involved run their course is different in virtue of its presence.
	From: Lloyd Morgan (Emergent Evolution [1923], pp.15-16), quoted by Terence Horgan - From Supervenience to Superdupervenience 1
	A reaction: This is a clear assertion of 'downward causation' at the first introduction of 'supervenience', supporting 'emergentism' about life and mind. That is, the newly-emerged feature has new causal powers that affect the physical system from outside. Wrong!

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 4. Quantity of an Object

16678	Without magnitude a thing would retain its parts, but they would have no location [Buridan]
	Full Idea: If magnitude were removed from matter by divine power, it would still have parts distinct from one another, but they would not be positioned either outside one another or inside one another, because position would be removed.
	From: Jean Buridan (Questions on Aristotle's Physics [1346], I.8 f. 11va), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 14.4
	A reaction: This shows why Quantity is such an important category for scholastic philosopher.

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers

16793	A thing is (less properly) the same over time if each part is succeeded by another [Buridan]
	Full Idea: Less properly, one thing is said to be numerically the same as another according to the continuity of distinct parts, one in succession after another. In this way the Seine is said to be the same river after a thousand years.
	From: Jean Buridan (Questions on Aristotle's Physics [1346], I.10, f. 13vb), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 29.3
	A reaction: This is a rather good solution to the difficulty of the looser non-transitive notion of a thing being 'the same'. The Ship of Theseus endures (in the simple case) as long as you remember to replace each departing plank. Must some parts be originals?

14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration

16577	Induction is not demonstration, because not all of the instances can be observed [Buridan]
	Full Idea: Inductions are not demonstrations, because they do not conclude on account of their form, since it is not possible to make an induction from all cases.
	From: Jean Buridan (Questions on Aristotle's Physics [1346], I.15 f. 18vb), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 02.3
	A reaction: Thus showing that demonstration really is meant to be as conclusive as a mathematical proof, and that Aristotle seems to think such a thing is possible in physical science.

14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction

16576	Science is based on induction, for general truths about fire, rhubarb and magnets [Buridan]
	Full Idea: Induction should be regarded as a principle of natural science. For otherwise you could not prove that every fire is hot, that all rhubarb is purgative of bile, that every magnet attracts iron.
	From: Jean Buridan (Questions on Aristotle's Physics [1346], I.15 f. 18vb), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 02.3
	A reaction: He is basing this on Aristotle, and refers to 'Physics' 190a33-b11.