Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'What is so bad about Contradictions?', 'Comments on a Certain Broadsheet' and 'A Plea for Substitutional Quantification'

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7 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction

9123	Someone standing in a doorway seems to be both in and not-in the room [Priest,G, by Sorensen]
	Full Idea: Priest says there is room for contradictions. He gives the example of someone in a doorway; is he in or out of the room. Given that in and out are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, and neither is the default, he seems to be both in and not in.
	From: report of Graham Priest (What is so bad about Contradictions? [1998]) by Roy Sorensen - Vagueness and Contradiction 4.3
	A reaction: Priest is a clever lad, but I don't think I can go with this. It just seems to be an equivocation on the word 'in' when applied to rooms. First tell me the criteria for being 'in' a room. What is the proposition expressed in 'he is in the room'?

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic

9470	Modal logic is not an extensional language [Parsons,C]
	Full Idea: Modal logic is not an extensional language.
	From: Charles Parsons (A Plea for Substitutional Quantification [1971], p.159 n8)
	A reaction: [I record this for investigation. Possible worlds seem to contain objects]

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification

9469	Substitutional existential quantifier may explain the existence of linguistic entities [Parsons,C]
	Full Idea: I argue (against Quine) that the existential quantifier substitutionally interpreted has a genuine claim to express a concept of existence, which may give the best account of linguistic abstract entities such as propositions, attributes, and classes.
	From: Charles Parsons (A Plea for Substitutional Quantification [1971], p.156)
	A reaction: Intuitively I have my doubts about this, since the whole thing sounds like a verbal and conventional game, rather than anything with a proper ontology. Ruth Marcus and Quine disagree over this one.

9468	On the substitutional interpretation, '(∃x) Fx' is true iff a closed term 't' makes Ft true [Parsons,C]
	Full Idea: For the substitutional interpretation of quantifiers, a sentence of the form '(∃x) Fx' is true iff there is some closed term 't' of the language such that 'Ft' is true. For the objectual interpretation some object x must exist such that Fx is true.
	From: Charles Parsons (A Plea for Substitutional Quantification [1971], p.156)
	A reaction: How could you decide if it was true for 't' if you didn't know what object 't' referred to?

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities

2602	What experience could prove 'If a=c and b=c then a=b'? [Descartes]
	Full Idea: Please tell me what the corporeal motion is that is capable of forming some common notion to the effect that 'things which are equal to a third thing are equal to each other'.
	From: René Descartes (Comments on a Certain Broadsheet [1644], p.366)

18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts

2600	The mind's innate ideas are part of its capacity for thought [Descartes]
	Full Idea: I have never written or taken the view that the mind requires innate ideas which are something distinct from its own faculty of thinking.
	From: René Descartes (Comments on a Certain Broadsheet [1644], p.365)

2601	Qualia must be innate, because physical motions do not contain them [Descartes]
	Full Idea: The ideas of pains, colours, sounds etc. must be all the more innate if, on the occasion of certain corporeal motions, our mind is to be capable of representing them to itself, for there is no similarity between these ideas and the corporeal motions.
	From: René Descartes (Comments on a Certain Broadsheet [1644], p.365)
	A reaction: Simple and brilliant! We know perfectly well that there is no redness zooming through the air from a tomato (or the air would be pink!). Redness occurs when the light arrives, so we add the redness, so it is innate.