Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'What is so bad about Contradictions?', 'The Myth of the Given' and 'Semantic Necessity'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

---

8 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction

9123	Someone standing in a doorway seems to be both in and not-in the room [Priest,G, by Sorensen]
	Full Idea: Priest says there is room for contradictions. He gives the example of someone in a doorway; is he in or out of the room. Given that in and out are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, and neither is the default, he seems to be both in and not in.
	From: report of Graham Priest (What is so bad about Contradictions? [1998]) by Roy Sorensen - Vagueness and Contradiction 4.3
	A reaction: Priest is a clever lad, but I don't think I can go with this. It just seems to be an equivocation on the word 'in' when applied to rooms. First tell me the criteria for being 'in' a room. What is the proposition expressed in 'he is in the room'?

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 8. Theories in Logic

14620	Theories in logic are sentences closed under consequence, but in truth discussions theories have axioms [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: It is customary in logic to take a theory to be a set of sentences closed under logical consequence, whereas it is common in discussions of theories of truth to take a theory to be an axiomatized theory.
	From: Kit Fine (Semantic Necessity [2010], n8)

10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity

14530	The role of semantic necessity in semantics is like metaphysical necessity in metaphysics [Fine,K, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
	Full Idea: Fine's paper argues that the notion of semantic necessity has a role to play in understanding the nature and content of semantics comparable to the role of metaphysical necessity in metaphysics.
	From: report of Kit Fine (Semantic Necessity [2010]) by Bob Hale/ Aviv Hoffmann - Introduction to 'Modality' 2

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism

8790	The 'doctrine of the given' is correct; some beliefs or statements are self-justifying [Chisholm]
	Full Idea: In my opinion, the 'doctrine of the given' is correct in saying that there are some beliefs or statements which are 'self-justifying' and that among such beliefs are statements some of which concern appearances or 'ways of being appeared to'.
	From: Roderick Chisholm (The Myth of the Given [1964], §12)
	A reaction: To boldly assert that they are 'self-justifying' invites a landslide of criticisms, pointing at a regress. It might be better to say they are self-evident, or intuitively known, or primitive, or true by the natural light of reason.

19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics

14618	Semantics is either an assignment of semantic values, or a theory of truth [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: On one view, a semantics for a given language is taken to be an assignment of semantic values to its expressions; according to the other, a semantics is taken to be a theory of truth for that language.
	From: Kit Fine (Semantic Necessity [2010], Intro)
	A reaction: The first is Frege, the second Tarski via Davidson, says Fine. Fine argues against these as the correct alternatives, and says the distinction prevents us understanding what is really going on. He votes for semantics as giving 'semantic requirements'.

14621	Semantics is a body of semantic requirements, not semantic truths or assigned values [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: Semantics should be conceived as a body of semantic requirements or facts - and not as a body of semantic truths, or as an assignment of semantic values.
	From: Kit Fine (Semantic Necessity [2010], 5)
	A reaction: The 'truths' view is Tarski, and the 'values' view is Frege. You'll have to read the Fine paper to grasp his subtle claim.

19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics

14622	Referential semantics (unlike Fregeanism) allows objects themselves in to semantic requirements [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: What distinguishes the referential position in semantics from Fregeanism is that it makes use of de re semantic facts, in which it is required of an object itself that it enter into certain semantic requirements.
	From: Kit Fine (Semantic Necessity [2010], 5)
	A reaction: I have a repugnance to any sort of semantics that involves the objects themselves, even when dealing with proper names. If I talk of 'Napoleon', no small Frenchman is to be found anywhere in my sentences.

19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique

14619	The Quinean doubt: are semantics and facts separate, and do analytic sentences have no factual part? [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: The source of the Quinean scepticism about analytic and synthetic is, first, scepticism over whether we can factor truth into a semantic and a factual component, and (second) if we can, is the factual component ever null?
	From: Kit Fine (Semantic Necessity [2010], 1)
	A reaction: You certainly can't grasp 'bachelors are unmarried men' if you haven't grasped the full Woosterian truth about men and marriage. But I could interdefine four meaningless words, so that you could employ them in analytic sentences.