37 ideas
20109 | Hegel inserted society and history between the God-world, man-nature, man-being binary pairs [Hegel, by Safranski] |
Full Idea: Before Hegel, people thought in binary oppositions of God and the world, man and nature, man and being. After Hegel an intervening world of society and history was inserted between these pairs. | |
From: report of Georg W.F.Hegel (Introduction to the Philosophy of History [1840]) by Rüdiger Safranski - Nietzsche: a philosophical biography 05 | |
A reaction: This is what Popper later called 'World Three'. This might be seen as the start of what we islanders call 'continental' philosophy, which we have largely ignored. Analytic philosophy only discovered this through philosophy of language. |
17979 | Research shows perceptual discrimination is sharper at category boundaries [Murphy] |
Full Idea: Goldstone's research has shown how learning concepts can change perceptual units. For example, perceptual discrimination is heightened along category boundaries. | |
From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch.13) | |
A reaction: [Goldstone 1994, 2000] This is just the sort of research which throws a spanner into the simplistic a priori thinking of many philosophers. |
18690 | Induction is said to just compare properties of categories, but the type of property also matters [Murphy] |
Full Idea: Most theories of induction claim that it should depend primarily on the similarity of the categories involved, but then the type of property should not matter, yet research shows that it does. | |
From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: I take this to be good empirical support for Gilbert Harman's view that induction is really inference to the best explanation. The thought (which strikes me as obviously correct) is that we bring nested domains of knowledge to bear in induction. |
17980 | The main theories of concepts are exemplar, prototype and knowledge [Murphy] |
Full Idea: The three main theories of concepts under consideration are the exemplar, the prototype and the knowledge approaches. | |
From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch.13) |
17973 | The theoretical and practical definitions for the classical view are very hard to find [Murphy] |
Full Idea: It has been extremely difficult to find definitions for most natural categories, and even harder to find definitions that are plausible psychological representations that people of all ages would be likely to use. | |
From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 2) |
17969 | The classical definitional approach cannot distinguish typical and atypical category members [Murphy] |
Full Idea: The early psychological approaches to concepts took a definitional approach. ...but this view does not have any way of distinguishing typical and atypical category members (...as when a trout is a typical fish and an eel an atypical one). | |
From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: [pp. 12 and 22] Eleanor Rosch in the 1970s is said to have largely killed off the classical view. |
17970 | Classical concepts follow classical logic, but concepts in real life don't work that way [Murphy] |
Full Idea: The classical view of concepts has been tied to traditional logic. 'Fido is a dog and a pet' is true if it has the necessary and sufficient conditions for both, ...but there is empirical evidence that people do not follow that rule. | |
From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: Examples given are classifying chess as a sport and/or game, and classifying a tree house (which is agreed to be both a building and not a building!). |
17971 | Classical concepts are transitive hierarchies, but actual categories may be intransitive [Murphy] |
Full Idea: The classical view of concepts explains hierarchical order, where categories form nested sets. But research shows that categories are often not transitive. Research shows that a seat is furniture, and a car seat is a seat, but it is not furniture. | |
From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Murphy adds that the nesting of definitions is classically used to match the nesting of hierarchies. This is a nice example of the neatness of the analytic philosopher breaking down when it meets the mess of the world. |
17972 | The classical core is meant to be the real concept, but actually seems unimportant [Murphy] |
Full Idea: A problem with the revised classical view is that the concept core does not seem to be an important part of the concept, despite its name and theoretical intention as representing the 'real' concept. | |
From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: Apparently most researchers feel they can explain their results without reference to any core. Not so fast, I would say (being an essentialist). Maybe people acknowledge an implicit core without knowing what it is. See Susan Gelman. |
17975 | There is no 'ideal' bird or dog, and prototypes give no information about variability [Murphy] |
Full Idea: Is there really an 'ideal bird' that could represent all birds? ...Furthermore a single prototype would give no information about the variability of a category. ...Compare the incredible variety of dogs to the much smaller diversity of cats. | |
From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 3) | |
A reaction: The point about variability is particularly noteworthy. You only grasp the concept of 'furniture' when you understand its range, as well as its typical examples. What structure is needed in a concept to achieve this? |
17976 | Prototypes are unified representations of the entire category (rather than of members) [Murphy] |
Full Idea: In the prototype view the entire category is represented by a unified representation rather than separate representations for each member, or for different classes of members. | |
From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 3) | |
A reaction: This is the improved prototype view, as opposed to the implausible idea that there is one ideal exemplar. The new theory still have the problem of how to represent diversity within the category, while somehow remaining 'unified'. |
18691 | The prototype theory uses observed features, but can't include their construction [Murphy] |
Full Idea: Nothing in the prototype model says the shape of an animal is more important than its location in identifying its kind. The theory does not provide a way the features can be constructed, rather than just observed. | |
From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: This makes some kind of mental modelling central to thought, and not just a bonus once you have empirically acquired the concepts. We bring our full range of experience to bear on even the most instantaneous observations. |
17983 | The prototype theory handles hierarchical categories and combinations of concepts well [Murphy] |
Full Idea: The prototype view has no trouble with either hierarchical structure or explaining categories. ...Meaning and conceptual combination provide strong evidence for prototypes. | |
From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch.13) | |
A reaction: Prototypes are not vague, making clearer classification possible. A 'mountain lion' is clear, because its components are clear. |
17985 | Prototypes theory of concepts is best, as a full description with weighted typical features [Murphy] |
Full Idea: Our theory of concepts must be primarily prototype-based. That is, it must be a description of an entire concept, with its typical features (presumably weighted by their importance). | |
From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch.13) | |
A reaction: This is to be distinguished from the discredited 'classical' view of concepts, that the concept consists of its definition. I take Aristotle's account of definition to be closer to a prototype description than to a dictionary definition. |
17986 | Learning concepts is forming prototypes with a knowledge structure [Murphy] |
Full Idea: My proposal is that people attempt to form prototypes as part of a larger knowledge structure when they learn concepts. | |
From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch.13) | |
A reaction: This combines theory theory (knowledge) with the prototype view, and sounds rather persuasive. The formation of prototypes fits with the explanatory account of essentialism I am defending. He later calls prototype formation 'abstraction' (494). |
17974 | The most popular theories of concepts are based on prototypes or exemplars [Murphy] |
Full Idea: The most popular theories of concepts are based on prototype or exemplar theories that are strongly unclassical. | |
From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 2) |
17977 | The exemplar view of concepts says 'dogs' is the set of dogs I remember [Murphy] |
Full Idea: In the exemplar view of concepts, the idea that people have a representation that somehow encompasses an entire concept is rejected. ...Instead a person's concept of dogs is the set of dogs that the person remembers. | |
From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 3) | |
A reaction: [The theory was introduced by Medin and Schaffer 1978] I think I have finally met a plausible theory of concepts. When I think 'dog' I conjure up a fuzz of dogs that exhibit the range I have encountered (e.g. tiny to very big). Individuals come first! |
17982 | Exemplar theory struggles with hierarchical classification and with induction [Murphy] |
Full Idea: The exemplar view has trouble with hierarchical classification and with induction in adults. | |
From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch.13) | |
A reaction: To me these both strongly support essentialism - that you form the concept 'dog' from seeing some dogs, but you then extrapolate to large categories and general truths about dogs, on the assumption of the natures of the dogs you have seen. |
17981 | Children using knowing and essentialist categories doesn't fit the exemplar view [Murphy] |
Full Idea: The findings showing that children use knowledge and may be essentialist about category membership do not comport well with the exemplar view. | |
From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch.13) | |
A reaction: Tricky, because Gelman persuaded me of the essentialism, but the exemplar view of concepts looks the most promising. Clearly they must be forced to coexist.... |
17984 | Conceptual combination must be compositional, and can't be built up from exemplars [Murphy] |
Full Idea: The exemplar accounts of conceptual combination are demonstrably wrong, because the meaning of a phrase has to be composed from the meaning of its parts (plus broader knowledge), and it cannot be composed as a function of exemplars. | |
From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch.13) | |
A reaction: This sounds quite persuasive, and I begin to see that my favoured essentialism fits the prototype view of concepts best, though this mustn't be interpreted too crudely. We change our prototypes with experience. 'Bird' is a tricky case. |
17987 | The concept of birds from exemplars must also be used in inductions about birds [Murphy] |
Full Idea: We don't have one concept of birds formed by learning from exemplars, and another concept of birds that is used in induction. | |
From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch.13) | |
A reaction: In other words exemplar concepts break down when we generalise using the concept. The exemplars must be unified, to be usable in thought and language. |
17978 | We do not learn concepts in isolation, but as an integrated part of broader knowledge [Murphy] |
Full Idea: The knowledge approach argues that concepts are part of our general knowledge about the world. We do not learn concepts in isolation, ...but as part of our overall understanding of the world. Animal concepts are integrated with biology, behaviour etc. | |
From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 3) | |
A reaction: This is one of the leading theories of concepts among psychologists. It seems to be an aspect of the true theory, but it needs underpinning with some account of isolated individual concepts. This is also known as the 'theory theory'. |
18687 | Concepts with familiar contents are easier to learn [Murphy] |
Full Idea: A concept's content influences how easy it is to learn. If the concept is grossly incompatible with what people know prior to the experiment, it will be difficult to acquire. | |
From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: This is a preliminary fact which leads towards the 'knowledge' theory of concepts (aka 'theory theory'). The point being that the knowledge involved is integral to the concept. Fits my preferred mental files approach. |
18688 | Some knowledge is involved in instant use of categories, other knowledge in explanations [Murphy] |
Full Idea: Some kinds of knowledge are probably directly incorporated into the category representation and used in normal, fast decisions about objects. Other kinds of knowledge, however, may come into play only when it has been solicited. | |
From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: This is a summary of empirical research, but seems to fit our normal experience. If you see a hawk, you have some instant understanding, but if you ask what the hawk is doing here, you draw more widely. |
18689 | People categorise things consistent with their knowledge, even rejecting some good evidence [Murphy] |
Full Idea: People tend to positively categorise items that are consistent with their knowledge and to exclude items that are inconsistent, sometimes even overruling purely empirical sources of information. | |
From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: The main rival to 'theory theory' is the purely empirical account of how concepts are acquired. This idea reports empirical research in favour of the theory theory (or 'knowledge') approach. |
22709 | We should first decide what are the great works of art, with aesthetic theory following from that [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: Our aesthetic must stand to be judged by great works of art which we know to be such independently. …So let us start by saying that Shakespeare is the greatest of all artists, and let our aesthetic be the philosophical justification of this judgement. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sublime and the Good [1959], p.205) | |
A reaction: She offers this view in specific contradiction of Tolstoy, which says we should first have a theory, and then judge accordingly. I take Murdoch to be entirely right, but it means that our aesthetic theory will shift over time. |
22715 | Great art proves the absurdity of art for art's sake [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: The work of the great artists shows up 'art-for-art's-sake' as a flimsy frivolous doctrine. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sublime and the Good [1959], p.218) | |
A reaction: She keeps referring to tragedy (as the greatest art), but it is hard to see how we learn love and morality from a great pot or a great abstract painting. Wilde makes the doctrine frivolous, but I think it contains a degree of truth. Music. |
22714 | Because art is love, it improves us morally [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: It is of course a fact that if art is love then art improves us morally, but this is, as it were, accidental. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sublime and the Good [1959], p.218) | |
A reaction: Is an enhancement of one's love necessarily a moral improvement? Love is a fine feeling, but how does it motivate? Has no wickedness ever been perpetrated in the name of love? 'All's fair in love and war'. |
22712 | Art and morals are essentially the same, and are both identical with love [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: Art and morals are (with certain provisos) one. Their essence is the same. The essence of both of them is love. Love is the perception of individuals. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sublime and the Good [1959], p.215) | |
A reaction: The idea that art, morals and love are all just a single thing seems unhelpful. What about satire? What about duty without love? What about pure abstract painting? What about Stravinsky's highly formal view of his music? |
22713 | Love is realising something other than oneself is real [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: Love is the extremely difficult realisation that something other than oneself is real. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sublime and the Good [1959], p.215) | |
A reaction: I suspect that this is a necessary condition for love, but not the thing itself. The realisation she describes may not be love. You would attain her realisation if you shared a prison cell with a terrifying psychopath. |
23274 | World history has no room for happiness [Hegel] |
Full Idea: World history is not the place for happiness. Periods of happiness are empty pages in history. | |
From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Introduction to the Philosophy of History [1840], 3) | |
A reaction: Clearly, Hegel thinks the progress of world history is much more important than happiness. This idea gives backing to those who don't care much about the casualties on either side in a major war. |
23275 | The state of nature is one of untamed brutality [Hegel] |
Full Idea: The 'state of nature' is not an ideal condition, but a condition of injustice, of violence, of untamed natural drives, inhuman acts and emotions. | |
From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Introduction to the Philosophy of History [1840], 3) | |
A reaction: He agrees with Hobbes, and disagrees with Rousseau. Hobbes's solution is authoritarian monarchy, but Hegel's solution is the unified and focused state, in which freedom can be realised. |
23276 | The soul of the people is an organisation of its members which produces an essential unity [Hegel] |
Full Idea: The soul [of the people] exists only insofar as it is an organisation of its members, which - by taking itself together in its simple unity - produce the soul. Thus the people is one individuality in its essence. | |
From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Introduction to the Philosophy of History [1840], 3) | |
A reaction: Hegel is seen (e.g. by Charles Taylor) as the ancestor of a rather attractive communitarianism, but I think Popper is more accurate in seeing him as the first stage of modern totalitarianism. The people seen as one individual terrifies me. |
23272 | The human race matters, and individuals have little importance [Hegel] |
Full Idea: Individuals are of slight importance compared to the mass of the human race. | |
From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Introduction to the Philosophy of History [1840], 3) | |
A reaction: A perfect statement of the anti-liberal viewpoint. Hegel is complex, but this is the strand that leads to ridiculous totalitarianism, where the highest ideal is to die for the glory of your nation. Importance can only start from individuals. |
23273 | In a good state the goal of the citizens and of the whole state are united [Hegel] |
Full Idea: A state is well constituted and internally strong if the private interest of the citizens is united in the universal goal of the state. | |
From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Introduction to the Philosophy of History [1840], 3) | |
A reaction: The obvious question is who decides on the goals, and what to do with the citizens who don't accept them. |
23271 | The goal of the world is Spirit's consciousness and enactment of freedom [Hegel] |
Full Idea: The final goal of the world is Spirit's consciousness of its freedom, and hence also the actualisation of that very freedom. | |
From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Introduction to the Philosophy of History [1840], 3) | |
A reaction: I have the impression that this ridiculous idea has been very influential in modern French philosophy, since they all seem to be dreaming of some perfect freedom at the end of the rainbow. Freedom is good, but this gives it a bad name. |
23270 | We should all agree that there is reason in history [Hegel] |
Full Idea: We ought to have the firm and unconquerable belief that there is reason in history. | |
From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Introduction to the Philosophy of History [1840], 2) | |
A reaction: This is a ridiculous but hugely influential idea, and I have no idea what makes Hegel believe it. It is the Stoic idea that nature is intrinsically rational, but extending it to human history is absurd. Human exceptionalism. Needs a dose of Darwin. |