Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Remarks on the definition and nature of mathematics', 'Spinoza's Ethics' and 'Action, Intention and Reason'

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6 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 5. Later European Thought

21855	Only in the 1780s did it become acceptable to read Spinoza [Lord]
	Full Idea: It was not until the 1780s that it became acceptable to read the works of Spinoza, and even then it was not without a frisson of danger.
	From: Beth Lord (Spinoza's Ethics [2010], Intro 'Who?')
	A reaction: Hence we hear of Wordsworth and Coleridge reading him with excitement. So did Kant read him?

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 8. Theories in Logic

17807	To study formal systems, look at the whole thing, and not just how it is constructed in steps [Curry]
	Full Idea: In the study of formal systems we do not confine ourselves to the derivation of elementary propositions step by step. Rather we take the system, defined by its primitive frame, as datum, and then study it by any means at our command.
	From: Haskell B. Curry (Remarks on the definition and nature of mathematics [1954], 'The formalist')
	A reaction: This is what may potentially lead to an essentialist view of such things. Focusing on bricks gives formalism, focusing on buildings gives essentialism.

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism

17806	It is untenable that mathematics is general physical truths, because it needs infinity [Curry]
	Full Idea: According to realism, mathematical propositions express the most general properties of our physical environment. This is the primitive view of mathematics, yet on account of the essential role played by infinity in mathematics, it is untenable today.
	From: Haskell B. Curry (Remarks on the definition and nature of mathematics [1954], 'The problem')
	A reaction: I resist this view, because Curry's view seems to imply a mad metaphysics. Hilbert resisted the role of the infinite in essential mathematics. If the physical world includes its possibilities, that might do the job. Hellman on structuralism?

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique

17808	Saying mathematics is logic is merely replacing one undefined term by another [Curry]
	Full Idea: To say that mathematics is logic is merely to replace one undefined term by another.
	From: Haskell B. Curry (Remarks on the definition and nature of mathematics [1954], 'Mathematics')

15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 10. Conatus/Striving

21866	Hobbes and Spinoza use 'conatus' to denote all endeavour for advantage in nature [Lord]
	Full Idea: 'Conatus' [translated as 'striving' by Curley] is used by early modern philosophers, including Thomas Hobbes (a major influence of Spinoza), to express the notion of a thing's endeavour for what is advantageous to it. It drives all things in nature.
	From: Beth Lord (Spinoza's Ethics [2010], p.88)
	A reaction: I think it is important to connect conatus to Nietzsche's talk of a plurality of 'drives', which are an expression of the universal will to power (which is seen even in the interactions of chemistry). Conatus is also in Leibniz.

20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes

20064	Actions are not mere effects of reasons, but are under their control [Audi,R]
	Full Idea: An action for a reason is one that is, in a special way, under the control of reason. It is a response to, not a mere effect of, a reason.
	From: Robert Audi (Action, Intention and Reason [1992], p.177), quoted by Rowland Stout - Action 6 'Alien'
	A reaction: This modifies Davidson's 'reasons are causes'. Audi has a deviant causal chain which causes trouble for his idea, but Stout says he is right to focus on causal 'processes' (an Aristotelian idea) rather than causal 'chains'.