9 ideas
15575 | Knowledge is not a static set of correct propositions, but a continuing search for better interpretations [Polt] |
Full Idea: Thanks to Heidegger, hermeneutics has gained wider acceptance - that knowledge is not a static set of correct propositions, but a continuing search for better interpretations. | |
From: Richard Polt (Heidegger: an introduction [1999], 3.§7) | |
A reaction: I am not sure if I understand the notion of a search that has a refusal to actually find anything as one of its basic principles. |
20475 | Maybe modal sentences cannot be true or false [Casullo] |
Full Idea: Some people claim that modal sentences do not express truths or falsehoods. | |
From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 3.2) | |
A reaction: I can only imagine this coming from a narrow hardline empiricist. It seems to me obvious that we make true or false statements about what is possible or impossible. |
15568 | When we consider possibilities, there must be something we are considering [Polt] |
Full Idea: We would hardly want to say that a possibility is nothing, since surely we are considering something when we consider possibilities. | |
From: Richard Polt (Heidegger: an introduction [1999], 1) | |
A reaction: A nice contribution to the issue of whether modality is a feature of actuality. I would prefer to say that we can self-evidently utter truths and falsehoods about what is or is not possible, in nature, in logic, and maybe in metaphysics. |
20476 | If the necessary is a priori, so is the contingent, because the same evidence is involved [Casullo] |
Full Idea: If one can only know a priori that a proposition is necessary, then one can know only a priori that a proposition is contingent. The evidence relevant to determining the latter is the same as that relevant to determining the former. | |
From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 3.2) | |
A reaction: This seems a telling point, but I suppose it is obvious. If you see that the cat is on the mat, nothing in the situation tells you whether this is contingent or necessary. We assume it is contingent, but that may be an a priori assumption. |
20471 | Epistemic a priori conditions concern either the source, defeasibility or strength [Casullo] |
Full Idea: There are three suggested epistemic conditions on a priori knowledge: the first regards the source of justification, the second regards the defeasibility of justification, and the third appeals to the strength of justification. | |
From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 2) | |
A reaction: [compressed] He says these are all inspired by Kant. The non-epistemic suggested condition involve necessity or analyticity. The source would have to be entirely mental; the defeasibly could not be experiential; the strength would be certainty. |
20477 | The main claim of defenders of the a priori is that some justifications are non-experiential [Casullo] |
Full Idea: The leading claim of proponents of the a priori is that sources of justification are of two significantly different types: experiential and nonexperiential. Initially this difference is marked at the phenomenological level. | |
From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 5) | |
A reaction: He cites Plantinga and Bealer for the phenomenological starting point (that some knowledge just seems rationally obvious, certain, and perhaps necessary). |
20472 | Analysis of the a priori by necessity or analyticity addresses the proposition, not the justification [Casullo] |
Full Idea: There is reason to view non-epistemic analyses of a priori knowledge (in terms of necessity or analyticity) with suspicion. The a priori concerns justification. Analysis by necessity or analyticity concerns the proposition rather than the justification. | |
From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 2.1) | |
A reaction: [compressed] The fact that the a priori is entirely a mode of justification, rather than a type of truth, is the modern view, influenced by Kripke. Given that assumption, this is a good objection. |
20474 | 'Overriding' defeaters rule it out, and 'undermining' defeaters weaken in [Casullo] |
Full Idea: A justified belief that a proposition is not true is an 'overriding' defeater, ...and the belief that a justification is inadequate or defective is an 'undermining' defeater. | |
From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], n 40) | |
A reaction: Sounds more like a sliding scale than a binary option. Quite useful, though. |
15877 | The aim of science is just to create a comprehensive, elegant language to describe brute facts [Poincaré, by Harré] |
Full Idea: In Poincaré's view, we try to construct a language within which the brute facts of experience are expressed as comprehensively and as elegantly as possible. The job of science is the forging of a language precisely suited to that purpose. | |
From: report of Henri Poincaré (The Value of Science [1906], Pt III) by Rom Harré - Laws of Nature 2 | |
A reaction: I'm often struck by how obscure and difficult our accounts of self-evident facts can be. Chairs are easy, and the metaphysics of chairs is hideous. Why is that? I'm a robust realist, but I like Poincaré's idea. He permits facts. |