Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Value of Science', 'On 'Generation and Corruption'' and 'Truth'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

---

7 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis

10838	To explain a concept, we need its purpose, not just its rules of usage [Dummett]
	Full Idea: We cannot in general suppose that we give a proper account of a concept by describing those circumstance in which we do, and those in which we do not, make use of the relevant word. We explain the point of the concept, what we use the word for.
	From: Michael Dummett (Truth [1959], p.231)
	A reaction: Well said. I am beginning to develop a campaign to make sure that analytical philosophy focuses on understanding concepts (in a full 'logos' sort of way), and doesn't just settle for logical form or definition or rules of usage.

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth

10837	It is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements [Dummett]
	Full Idea: It is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements.
	From: Michael Dummett (Truth [1959], p.231)
	A reaction: This strikes me as a rather contentious but very interesting claim. An even stronger claim might be that its value (its normative force) is ALL that the concept of truth contributes to speech, other aspects being analysed into something else.

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth

10840	We must be able to specify truths in a precise language, like winning moves in a game [Dummett]
	Full Idea: For a particular bounded language, if it is free of ambiguity and inconsistency, it must be possible to characterize the true sentences of the language; somewhat as, for a given game, we can say which moves are winning moves.
	From: Michael Dummett (Truth [1959], p.237)
	A reaction: The background of this sounds rather like Tarski, with truth just being a baton passed from one part of the language to another, though Dummett adds the very un-Tarskian notion that truth has a value.

3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth

19171	Tarski's truth is like rules for winning games, without saying what 'winning' means [Dummett, by Davidson]
	Full Idea: Tarski's definition of truth is like giving a definition of what it is to win in various games, without giving a hint as to what winning is (e.g. that it is what one tries to do when playing).
	From: report of Michael Dummett (Truth [1959]) by Donald Davidson - Truth and Predication 7
	A reaction: This led Dummett to his 'normative' account of truth. Formally, the fact that speakers usually aim at truth seems irrelevant, but in life you certainly wouldn't have grasped truth if you thought falsehood was just as satisfactory. The world is involved.

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities

16718	Primary qualities are the cause of all the other sensible qualities [Albertus Magnus]
	Full Idea: The primary qualities of tangible things are the cause of all the other sensible qualities.
	From: Albertus Magnus (On 'Generation and Corruption' [1261], II.1.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 21.2
	A reaction: This makes the primary qualities sound suspiciously like the essence.

18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought

10839	You can't infer a dog's abstract concepts from its behaviour [Dummett]
	Full Idea: One could train a dog to bark only when a bell rang and a light shone without presupposing that it possessed the concept of conjunction.
	From: Michael Dummett (Truth [1959], p.235)

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature

15877	The aim of science is just to create a comprehensive, elegant language to describe brute facts [Poincaré, by Harré]
	Full Idea: In Poincaré's view, we try to construct a language within which the brute facts of experience are expressed as comprehensively and as elegantly as possible. The job of science is the forging of a language precisely suited to that purpose.
	From: report of Henri Poincaré (The Value of Science [1906], Pt III) by Rom Harré - Laws of Nature 2
	A reaction: I'm often struck by how obscure and difficult our accounts of self-evident facts can be. Chairs are easy, and the metaphysics of chairs is hideous. Why is that? I'm a robust realist, but I like Poincaré's idea. He permits facts.