Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Science and Method', 'The Nature of Necessity' and 'Hippias Major'

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7 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
10245 One geometry cannot be more true than another [Poincaré]
     Full Idea: One geometry cannot be more true than another; it can only be more convenient.
     From: Henri Poincaré (Science and Method [1908], p.65), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics
     A reaction: This is the culminating view after new geometries were developed by tinkering with Euclid's parallels postulate.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
18383 Plantinga says there is just this world, with possibilities expressed in propositions [Plantinga, by Armstrong]
     Full Idea: Plantinga rejects other possible worlds, but adds to our world an uncountable multitude of sets of propositions, each set a way that the world might have been, but is in fact not. (Roughly, for each Lewis world, Plantinga has such a set).
     From: report of Alvin Plantinga (The Nature of Necessity [1974]) by David M. Armstrong - Truth and Truthmakers 07.2
     A reaction: To me it seems as ontologically extravagant to postulate unexpressed propositions as to postulate concrete possible worlds. I think the best line is that there is just the actual world, with the possibilities implied in its dispositions.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
11891 Possibilities for an individual can only refer to that individual, in some possible world [Plantinga, by Mackie,P]
     Full Idea: Plantinga says for an individual to exist with certain properties in some possible world is simply for it to be true that, had that possible world obtained, that individual would have existed with those properties.
     From: report of Alvin Plantinga (The Nature of Necessity [1974]) by Penelope Mackie - How Things Might Have Been 5.1
     A reaction: This is intended to dissolve the problem of transworld identity, and is certainly a flat rejection of counterparts. I take the point to be that the individual is the key element in defining the possible world, so can't possibly be different.
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
299 What is fine is always difficult [Plato]
     Full Idea: The proverb says 'Anything fine is difficult'.
     From: Plato (Hippias Major [c.392 BCE], 304e)
     A reaction: attributed (as usual) to Solon
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
297 What is fine is the parent of goodness [Plato]
     Full Idea: Fineness is the father of goodness.
     From: Plato (Hippias Major [c.392 BCE], 297b)
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 5. Sexual Morality
298 While sex is very pleasant, it should be in secret, as it looks contemptible [Plato]
     Full Idea: As for sex, everyone agrees that, while it is extremely pleasant, it should be indulged in (if at all) in secret, because it is a highly contemptible sight.
     From: Plato (Hippias Major [c.392 BCE], 299a)
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
20704 A possible world contains a being of maximal greatness - which is existence in all worlds [Plantinga, by Davies,B]
     Full Idea: Plantinga reformulates Malcolm's argument thus: 1) There is a possible world in which there exists a being with maximal greatness, 2) A being has maximal greatness in a world only if it exists in every world.
     From: report of Alvin Plantinga (The Nature of Necessity [1974], p.213) by Brian Davies - Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion 4 'b Descartes'
     A reaction: This is only Plantinga's starting point, which says nothing about the nature of God, but only that this 'great' being exists in all worlds. I would like to know why it is a 'being' rather than a 'thing'. Malcolm says if it is possible it is necessary.