51 ideas
6961 | An analogy begins to break down as soon as the two cases differ [Hume] |
Full Idea: But wherever you depart, in the least, from the similarity of the cases, you diminish proportionably the evidence; and may at last bring it to a very weak analogy. | |
From: David Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1751], Part 2) |
22355 | In the realist view, the real external world explains how it (and perceptions of it) are possible [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: The substance of the absolute conception [of external reality] lies in the idea that it could nonvacuously explain how it itself, and the various perspectival views of the world, are possible. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], p.139), quoted by Reiss,J/Spreger,J - Scientific Objectivity 2.1 | |
A reaction: I like this. Explanation and understanding strike me as more important than justified truths, and I am struck by the complete inability of subjectivists, relativists and anti-realists to give any kinds of good explanation. |
21285 | Events are baffling before experience, and obvious after experience [Hume] |
Full Idea: Every event, before experience, is equally difficult and incomprehensible; and every event, after experience, is equally easy and intelligible. | |
From: David Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1751], Part 8) | |
A reaction: If you don't believe this, spend some time watching documentaries about life in the deep oceans. Things beyond imagination swim around in front of you. But we can extrapolate, once the possibilities are revealed by experience. |
4243 | Our ability to react to an alien culture shows that ethical thought extends beyond cultural boundaries [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: The fact that people can and must react when confronted with another culture, and do so by applying existing notions, seems to show that ethical thought of a given culture can always stretch beyond its boundaries. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 9) | |
A reaction: Hardly conclusive, but it does seem to show that there is an element of universalising in values, no matter how local you may consider them to be. |
4244 | It is very confused to deduce a nonrelativist morality of universal toleration from relativism [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: Some people believe a properly relativist view requires you to be equally well disposed to everybody's ethical beliefs, but this is seriously confused, as relativism has led to a nonrelativist morality of universal toleration. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 9) | |
A reaction: Good point. This need not stop a relativist from passionately defending tolerance - it is only that the lack of rational support for the passion must be recognised. |
4114 | Philosophers try to produce ethical theories because they falsely assume that ethics can be simple [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: If there is a truth about the subject matter of ethics, why should it be simple? ..I shall argue that philosophy should not try to produce ethical theories. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 1) | |
A reaction: Bizarrely defeatist - in parallel with Mysterians about the mind like McGinn. Is there any point in thinking at all? I suggest the aim of life as the best starting point. |
4128 | Intuitionism has been demolished by critics, and no longer looks interesting [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: Intuitionism in ethics has been demolished by a succession of critics, and the ruins of it that remain above ground are not impressive enough to invite much history of what happened to it. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: Why does intuitionism have such appeal to beginners in moral philosophy? There is a truth buried in it somewhere. See 'Sources of the Self' by Charles Taylor. |
4132 | The category of person is a weak basis for ethics, because it is not fixed but comes in degrees [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: The category of person is a poor foundation for ethical thought, because it looks like a sortal or classificatory notion while in fact it signals characteristics that almost all come in degrees (responsibility, self-reflection etc). | |
From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: On the contrary, it must be the basis of moral theory, and its shifting character is strong support for Aristotle's approach to moral growth and responsibility. |
4134 | The weakness of prescriptivism is shown by "I simply don't like staying at good hotels" [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: That "I simply don't like staying at good hotels" is intelligible brings out the basic weakness of prescriptive accounts of the evaluative. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 7) | |
A reaction: This might be an elision of two different prescriptions, mine and most people's. In what sense do I think the hotel good, as opposed to other people? |
4135 | Some ethical ideas, such as 'treachery' and 'promise', seem to express a union of facts and values [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: Some 'thicker' ethical notions, such as 'treachery', 'promise', 'brutality' and 'courage', seem to express a union of facts and values. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 8) | |
A reaction: The onus does seem to be on the followers of Hume to disentangle what the rest of us have united. They may, of course, manage it. |
4120 | It is an error of consequentialism to think we just aim at certain states of affairs; we also want to act [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: We do not merely want the world to contain certain states of affairs (it is a deep error of consequentialism to believe that this is all we want). Among the things we basically want is to act in certain ways. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 4) | |
A reaction: A key objection. Does it matter whether Hiroshima is destroyed by earthquake or bombing? |
4252 | Promise keeping increases reliability, by making deliberation focus on something which would be overlooked [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: The institution of promise keeping operates to provide portable reliability, by offering a formula that will confer high deliberative priority on what might not otherwise receive it. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch.10) | |
A reaction: This is a bit pessimistic. We do not perceive promise keeping as a mere suggestion that we should bear something in mind when making a decision. 'May I rot in hell if I fail you'. |
4116 | A weakness of contractual theories is the position of a person of superior ability and power [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: A particular weakness of the contractual theory is that it is unstable with respect to a superior agent, one more intelligent and resourceful and persuasive than the rest. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 3) | |
A reaction: The very weak are equally a problem. Democratic societies produce fewer inequalities. Hierarchical societies are miserable (I expect..). |
4112 | A crucial feature of moral thought is second-order desire - the desire to have certain desires [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: Recently there has been much emphasis on the importance of our capacity to have second-order desires - the desire to have certain desires - and its significance for ethical reflection and the practical consciousness. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 1) | |
A reaction: This is a crucial point if we are to defend a reasonably rational view of morality against (say) emotivism. I agree that it is crucial to morality. |
4113 | 'Deon' in Greek means what one must do; there was no word meaning 'duty' [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: There is no ancient Greek word for duty; the word 'deon' (the basis of 'deontology') means what one must do. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 1) | |
A reaction: Presumably it covered compulsions which were not duties, such as the need to eat or drink. Greeks thought morally, but lacked a good moral vocabulary? |
4110 | Obligation and duty look backwards (because of a promise or job), although the acts are in the future [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: Obligation and duty look backwards; the acts they require lie in the future, but the reasons for those acts lie in the fact that I have already promised, the job I have undertaken, the position I am already in. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 1) | |
A reaction: Maybe the central issue in morality is forwards versus backwards. It reflects two types of human temperament. Tomorrow is another day. Spilt milk. |
4249 | "Ought implies can" is a famous formula in connection with moral obligation [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: "Ought implies can" is a famous formula in connection with moral obligation. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch.10) | |
A reaction: Williams says it is true in particular instances, but is not generally true of 'ought'. Maybe you 'ought' before you know whether you 'can'. |
4248 | Not all moral deliberations lead to obligations; some merely reveal what 'may' be done [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: Not every conclusion of moral deliberation expresses an obligation; for example, some moral conclusions merely announce that you 'may' do something. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch.10) | |
A reaction: An important point for any deontological ethics. It may be possible to translate what 'may' be done into some form of duty, but it will probably involve contortions. |
4250 | The concept of a 'duty to myself' is fraudulent [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: The concept of a 'duty to myself' is fraudulent. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch.10) | |
A reaction: The only person who can offer a rebuttal of this is Aristotle. With the magnet of the Platonic Form of the Good, I can perceive the natural excellences of which I am capable, and feel a duty to pursue them. |
4121 | Why should I think of myself as both the legislator and the citizen who follows the laws? [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: Why should I think of myself as a legislator and at the same time a citizen of a republic governed by some notional laws? | |
From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 4) | |
A reaction: Kant's answer is supposed to be 'because you are rational, and hence must want consistency'. If we were all rational, Kant would be right. |
4122 | If the self becomes completely impartial, it no longer has enough identity to worry about its interests [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: How can an 'I' that has taken on the perspective of impartiality be left with enough identity to live a life that respects its own interests? | |
From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 4) | |
A reaction: Not a big problem. Thought constantly flips between objective and subjective, as Nagel has shown us. Compare Nagel in Idea 6446. |
4124 | Utilitarian benevolence involves no particular attachments, and is immune to the inverse square law [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: Utilitarian benevolence involves no particular attachments, and it is immune to the inverse square law. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: Nicely put. The point is that the theory is inhuman, but Mill says it tells us what we should do, not what we actually tend to do. |
4245 | Ethical conviction must be to some extent passive, and can't just depend on the will and decisions [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: The view that the only alternative to the intellect is the will, and the source of ethical conviction is decisions about principles and ways of life, cannot be right; ethical conviction, like any conviction, must to some extent come to you passively. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 9) | |
A reaction: Seems right. We cannot choose our factual beliefs (look at the sun and believe it is cloudy!). Could I 'decide' that it was right to betray my family just for fun? |
4246 | Taking responsibility won't cure ethical uncertainty by; we are uncertain what to decide [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: If ethics is a matter of decision, and we must face the responsibility and burden of those decisions, this ignores the obvious point that if we are uncertain, then we are uncertain what to decide. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 9) | |
A reaction: Good point. The defence would be that the decision itself contains the seeds of certainty. Do something rather than nothing, and the sense of it will emerge. Modify as you go along. |
4247 | It is a mark of our having ethical values that we aim to reproduce them in our children [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: It is a mark of our having ethical values that we aim to reproduce them in our children. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 9) | |
A reaction: Maybe beliefs imply education. A commitment to truth is an aspiration that others will agree, especially those over whom we have the greatest influence. |
4131 | Most women see an early miscarriage and a late stillbirth as being very different in character [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: Few women see a spontaneous abortion or early miscarriage as the same thing as having a child who is stillborn or who dies very soon after birth. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: This implies a theory about the nature of what is lost. Everyone sees the difference between potential and actual. |
4133 | Speciesism isn't like racism, because the former implies a viewpoint which belongs to no one [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: Speciesism is falsely modelled on racism and sexism, which really are prejudices; ..our arguments have to be founded on the human point of view; they cannot be derived from a point of view that is no one's point of view at all. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: This must be wrong. How else are we going to judge cruelty to animals as wrong? The 'point of view of the Universe' (Sidgwick) is not an empty concept. |
15877 | The aim of science is just to create a comprehensive, elegant language to describe brute facts [Poincaré, by Harré] |
Full Idea: In Poincaré's view, we try to construct a language within which the brute facts of experience are expressed as comprehensively and as elegantly as possible. The job of science is the forging of a language precisely suited to that purpose. | |
From: report of Henri Poincaré (The Value of Science [1906], Pt III) by Rom Harré - Laws of Nature 2 | |
A reaction: I'm often struck by how obscure and difficult our accounts of self-evident facts can be. Chairs are easy, and the metaphysics of chairs is hideous. Why is that? I'm a robust realist, but I like Poincaré's idea. He permits facts. |
6959 | We can't assume God's perfections are like our ideas or like human attributes [Hume] |
Full Idea: But let us beware, lest we think, that our ideas anywise correspond to his perfections, or that his attributes have any resemblance to these qualities among men. | |
From: David Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1751], Part 2) |
6957 | The objects of theological reasoning are too big for our minds [Hume] |
Full Idea: But in theological reasonings … we are employed upon objects, which, we must be sensible, are too large for our grasp. | |
From: David Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1751], Part 1) |
21255 | No being's non-existence can imply a contradiction, so its existence cannot be proved a priori [Hume] |
Full Idea: Nothing that is distinctly conceivable implies a contradiction. Whatever we conceive of as existent we can also conceive as non-existent. So there is no being whose non-existence implies a contradiction. So no being's existence is demonstrable. | |
From: David Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1751], Part 9) | |
A reaction: I totally subscribe to this idea, and take claims that nature actually contains contradictions (based on the inevitable quantum mechanics) to be ridiculous. Nature is the embodiment, chief exemplar and prime test of consistency. |
21254 | A chain of events requires a cause for the whole as well as the parts, yet the chain is just a sum of parts [Hume] |
Full Idea: The whole chain or succession [of causes and effects], taken together, is not caused by anything, and yet it is evident that it requires a cause or reason, as much as any particular object which begins to exist in time. | |
From: David Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1751], Part 9) | |
A reaction: This is such a major and significant idea. With blinkers on we think our questions are answered. Then someone (a philosopher, inevitably) makes you pull back and ask a much wider and more difficult question. |
1435 | If something must be necessary so that something exists rather than nothing, why can't the universe be necessary? [Hume] |
Full Idea: What was it that determined something to exist rather than nothing? ...This implies a necessary being… But why may not the material universe be the necessarily existent being? | |
From: David Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1751], Part 9) | |
A reaction: There certainly seems no need for whatever the necessary thing is that it qualify as a 'god'. If could be a necessary subatomic particle that suddenly triggers reactions. |
6962 | The thing which contains order must be God, so see God where you see order [Hume] |
Full Idea: By supposing something to contain the principle of its order within itself, we really assert it to be God; and the sooner we arrive at that divine being, so much the better. | |
From: David Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1751], Part 4) |
6960 | Analogy suggests that God has a very great human mind [Hume] |
Full Idea: Since the effects resemble, we must infer by analogy that the causes also resemble; and that the Author of Nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man, though possessed of much larger faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of his work. | |
From: David Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1751], Part 2) |
6963 | Why would we infer an infinite creator from a finite creation? [Hume] |
Full Idea: By this method of reasoning, you renounce all claim to infinity in any of the attributes of the deity. For … the cause ought only to be proportioned to the effect, and the effect, so far as it falls under our cognizance, is not infinite. | |
From: David Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1751], Part 5) |
21279 | If the divine cause is proportional to its effects, the effects are finite, so the Deity cannot be infinite [Hume] |
Full Idea: By this method of reasoning you renounce all claim to infinity in any of the attributes of the Deity. The cause ought to be proportional to the effect, and the effect, so far as it falls under our cognizance, is not infinite. | |
From: David Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1751], Part 5) | |
A reaction: You cannot deny that the Deity MAY be infinite, be only accept that your evidence is not enough to prove it. But if nothing infinite has been observed, it is a reasonable provisional inference that nothing infinite exists. |
21280 | From a ship you would judge its creator a genius, not a mere humble workman [Hume] |
Full Idea: It is uncertain whether all the excellences of the work can justly be ascribed to the workman. If we survey a ship, what an exalted idea must we form of the ingenuity of the carpenter ...and what surprise must we feel when we find him a stupid mechanic. | |
From: David Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1751], Part 5) | |
A reaction: You can at least infer that the ship was not made entirely by makers who are ignorant of carpentry. Somewhere in the divine team there must exist the skills that produce whatever we observe? |
21282 | Design cannot prove a unified Deity. Many men make a city, so why not many gods for a world? [Hume] |
Full Idea: How can you prove the unity of a Deity? A great number of men join in building a house or ship, in rearing a city; why may not several deities combine in contriving and framing a world? | |
From: David Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1751], Part 5) | |
A reaction: You might look at the Cistine Chapel ceiling and conclude that only a team could have achieve such a thing. Since there is no way to infer how many gods might be involved, then one god is a possible theory. |
21281 | This excellent world may be the result of a huge sequence of trial-and-error [Hume] |
Full Idea: Many worlds might have been botched and bungled, throughout an eternity, ere this system was struck out; many fruitless trials made, and a slow but continued improvement carried on during infinite ages in the art of world-making. | |
From: David Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1751], Part 5) | |
A reaction: Lee Smolin, a modern cosmographer, suggests that this evolution may have led to the current universe, after a long train of selective creations. The idea of natural selection was waiting to happen in 1760. |
21283 | Humans renew their species sexually. If there are many gods, would they not do the same? [Hume] |
Full Idea: Men are mortal and renew their species by generation. Why must this circumstance, so universal, so essential, be excluded from those numerous and limited deities? | |
From: David Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1751], Part 5) | |
A reaction: Hume observes that this would be like the Greek gods. Hume makes mincemeat of attempts to prove the existence of God merely by analogy with human affairs. |
21284 | This Creator god might be an infant or incompetent or senile [Hume] |
Full Idea: [Maybe] this world ...was only the first essay of some infant deity ...or it is the work only of some dependent, inferior deity, the object of derision to his superiors ...or it is the product of the dotage of some superannuated deity... | |
From: David Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1751], Part 5) | |
A reaction: His opponent in the dialogue rejoices that, in the face of these sacreligious fantasies, Hume still accepts the likelihood of some sort of design. Hume is right that it is not much of a theory if nothing can be said about the Designer. |
21286 | Motion often begins in matter, with no sign of a controlling agent [Hume] |
Full Idea: Motion in many instances begins in matter, without any known voluntary agent; to suppose always, in these cases, an unknown voluntary agent is mere hypothesis, attended with no advantages. | |
From: David Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1751], Part 8) | |
A reaction: This is the modern 'powers' view of science, and a direct contradiction of Plato's claims in The Laws. It seems a bit primitive to assume that magnetism must be the work of some god. |
21287 | The universe could settle into superficial order, without a designer [Hume] |
Full Idea: The universe goes on in a succession of chaos and disorder. But is it not possible that it may settle at last, so as not to lose its inherent motion and active force, yet so as to produce a uniformity of appearance, amidst the continual fluctuation. | |
From: David Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1751], Part 8) | |
A reaction: From what I know of the constant fluctuation of virtual particles (e.g. inside protons) this is exactly what actually is happening. There is an 'appearance' of order, but at the lowest level this is not the case. |
21288 | Ideas arise from objects, not vice versa; ideas only influence matter if they are linked [Hume] |
Full Idea: In all known instances, ideas are copied from real objects. You reverse this order and give thought the precedence. ...Thought has no influence upon matter except where that matter is so conjoined with it as to have an equal reciprocal influence upon it. | |
From: David Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1751], Part 8) | |
A reaction: He allows something like mental causation, provided mind and brain are closely linked. Hume brings out the close relationship between divine design theories, and the mind-body problem. |
21256 | A surprise feature of all products of 9 looks like design, but is actually a necessity [Hume] |
Full Idea: The products of 9 always compose either 9 or some lesser product of 9, if you add the characters of the product. To a superficial observer this regularity appears as chance or design, but a skilful algebraist sees it as necessity. | |
From: David Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1751], Part 9) | |
A reaction: An example of this universal generality is that 369 is a product of 9 (9x41), and if you add 3, 6 and 9 you get 18, which is 2x9. Similar examples occur in nature, such as crystals, which are necessary once the atomic structure is known. |
6964 | From our limited view, we cannot tell if the universe is faulty [Hume] |
Full Idea: It is impossible for us to tell, from our limited views, whether this system contains any great faults. | |
From: David Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1751], Part 5) |
6966 | Creation is more like vegetation than human art, so it won't come from reason [Hume] |
Full Idea: If the universe is more like animal bodies and vegetables than works of human art, it is more probable that its cause resembles the cause of the former than of the latter, and its cause should be ascribed to generation rather than to reason of design. | |
From: David Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1751], Part 7) |
6967 | Order may come from an irrational source as well as a rational one [Hume] |
Full Idea: Why an orderly system may not be spun from the belly as well as from the brain, it will be difficult … to give a satisfactory reason. | |
From: David Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1751], Part 7) |
6958 | How can we pronounce on a whole after a brief look at a very small part? [Hume] |
Full Idea: A very small part of this great system, during a very short time, is very imperfectly discovered to us: and do we thence pronounce decisively concerning the origin of the whole? | |
From: David Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1751], Part 2) |
6965 | The universe may be the result of trial-and-error [Hume] |
Full Idea: Many worlds might have been botched and bungled, throughout an eternity, ere this system was struck out. | |
From: David Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1751], Part 5) |