6 ideas
10245 | One geometry cannot be more true than another [Poincaré] |
Full Idea: One geometry cannot be more true than another; it can only be more convenient. | |
From: Henri Poincaré (Science and Method [1908], p.65), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics | |
A reaction: This is the culminating view after new geometries were developed by tinkering with Euclid's parallels postulate. |
14592 | Some abstract things have a beginning and end, so may exist in time (though not space) [Swoyer] |
Full Idea: Many things that seem to be abstract also seem to have a beginning (and ending) in time, such as a language like Urdu. It may be tempting to say that such things exist in time but not in space, but where exactly? | |
From: Chris Swoyer (Abstract Entities [2008], 1.1) | |
A reaction: A few distinctions might be needed. Urdu-speaking is an ability of certain people. We abstract from that their 'language'. There is nothing there apart from that ability. It has no more abstract existence than the 'weather'. |
14594 | Ontologists seek existence and identity conditions, and modal and epistemic status for a thing [Swoyer] |
Full Idea: Four things philosophers often want to know about a given sort of entity are: its existence conditions, its identity conditions, its modal status, and its epistemic status. | |
From: Chris Swoyer (Abstract Entities [2008], 3) | |
A reaction: I prefer 'modal profile' to 'modal status'. The 'existence conditions' sound rather epistemic. Why does the existence of anything require 'conditions' other than just existing? I suspect identity is irrelevant if humans aren't around. |
14595 | Can properties exemplify other properties? [Swoyer] |
Full Idea: Can properties themselves exemplify properties? | |
From: Chris Swoyer (Abstract Entities [2008], 3) | |
A reaction: Since I espouse a rather strict causal view of true properties, and lump the rest into the category of 'predicates', I am inclined to answer 'no' to this. Most people would disagree. 'Bright red' seems to be an example. But it isn't. |
14593 | Quantum field theory suggests that there are, fundamentally, no individual things [Swoyer] |
Full Idea: Quantum field theory strongly suggests that there are (at the fundamental level) no individual, particular things. | |
From: Chris Swoyer (Abstract Entities [2008], 2.1) | |
A reaction: When people introduce quantum theory into ontological discussions I reach for my shotgun, but it does rather look as if things turn to mush at the bottom level. |
7803 | Modal logic began with translation difficulties for 'If...then' [Lewis,CI, by Girle] |
Full Idea: C.I.Lewis began his groundbreaking work in modal logic because he was concerned about the unreliability of the material conditional as a translation of 'If ... then' conditionals. | |
From: report of C.I. Lewis (Symbolic Logic (with Langford) [1932]) by Rod Girle - Modal Logics and Philosophy 12.3 | |
A reaction: Compare 'if this is square then it has four corners' with 'if it rains then our afternoon is ruined'. Different modalities seem to be involved. We even find that 'a square has four corners' will be materially implied if it rains! |