6 ideas
| 19433 | The universe is infinitely varied, so the Buridan's Ass dilemma could never happen [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: The Buridan's Ass case of perfect equilibrium is chimerical. ...The universe has no centre and its parts are infinitely varied; thus it will never happen that all will be perfectly equal and will strike equally from one side or the other. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Coste [1707], 1707) | |
| A reaction: Can the great Leibniz have missed the point? Surely all that matters is that the ass cannot distinguish the two options - not that they actually are identical in every detail? If the ass is short-sighted, that should be easy to set up. |
| 10245 | One geometry cannot be more true than another [Poincaré] |
| Full Idea: One geometry cannot be more true than another; it can only be more convenient. | |
| From: Henri Poincaré (Science and Method [1908], p.65), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics | |
| A reaction: This is the culminating view after new geometries were developed by tinkering with Euclid's parallels postulate. |
| 19434 | There may be a world where dogs smell their game at a thousand leagues [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: There will perhaps be a world in which dogs will have sufficiently good noses to scent their game at a thousand leagues. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Coste [1707], 1707) | |
| A reaction: Wonderful. This should immediately replace Lewis's much repeated example of a world containing a talking donkey. We should always honour the first person to suggest an idea. That is one of the motivations for this collection of ideas. |
| 7522 | A full neural account of qualia will give new epistemic access to them, beyond private experience [Churchlands] |
| Full Idea: When the hidden neurophysiological structure of qualia (if there is any) gets revealed by unfolding research, then we will automatically gain a new epistemic access to qualia, beyond each person's native and exclusive capacity for internal discrimination. | |
| From: Churchland / Churchland (Recent Work on Consciousness [1997]) | |
| A reaction: Carefully phrased and hard to deny, but something is impenetrable. What experience does an insect have when it encounters ultra-violet light? Nothing remotely interesting about their qualia is likely to emerge from the study of insect brains. |
| 7521 | It is question-begging to assume that qualia are totally simple, hence irreducible [Churchlands] |
| Full Idea: One of the crucial premises of the antireductionists - concerning the intrinsic, nonrelational, metaphysical simplicity of our sensory qualia - is a question-begging and unsupported assumption. | |
| From: Churchland / Churchland (Recent Work on Consciousness [1997]) | |
| A reaction: This is a key point for reductionists, with emphasis on the sheer numbers of connections involved in a simple quale (I estimate a billion involved in one small patch of red). |
| 7523 | The qualia Hard Problem is easy, in comparison with the co-ordination of mental states [Churchlands] |
| Full Idea: The so-called Hard Problem (of qualia) appears to be one of the easiest, in comparison with the problems of short-term memory, fluid and directable attention, the awake state vs sleep, and the unity of consciousness. | |
| From: Churchland / Churchland (Recent Work on Consciousness [1997]) | |
| A reaction: Most of their version of the Hard Problems centre on personal identity, and the centralised co-ordination of mental events. I am inclined to agree with them. Worriers about qualia should think more about the complexity of systems of neurons. |