7 ideas
3340 | Von Neumann defines each number as the set of all smaller numbers [Neumann, by Blackburn] |
Full Idea: Von Neumann defines each number as the set of all smaller numbers. | |
From: report of John von Neumann (works [1935]) by Simon Blackburn - Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy p.280 |
3355 | Von Neumann wanted mathematical functions to replace sets [Neumann, by Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: Von Neumann suggested that functions be pressed into service to replace sets. | |
From: report of John von Neumann (works [1935]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.23 |
10245 | One geometry cannot be more true than another [Poincaré] |
Full Idea: One geometry cannot be more true than another; it can only be more convenient. | |
From: Henri Poincaré (Science and Method [1908], p.65), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics | |
A reaction: This is the culminating view after new geometries were developed by tinkering with Euclid's parallels postulate. |
22716 | Von Neumann defined ordinals as the set of all smaller ordinals [Neumann, by Poundstone] |
Full Idea: At age twenty, Von Neumann devised the formal definition of ordinal numbers that is used today: an ordinal number is the set of all smaller ordinal numbers. | |
From: report of John von Neumann (works [1935]) by William Poundstone - Prisoner's Dilemma 02 'Sturm' | |
A reaction: I take this to be an example of an impredicative definition (not predicating something new), because it uses 'ordinal number' in the definition of ordinal number. I'm guessing the null set gets us started. |
7522 | A full neural account of qualia will give new epistemic access to them, beyond private experience [Churchlands] |
Full Idea: When the hidden neurophysiological structure of qualia (if there is any) gets revealed by unfolding research, then we will automatically gain a new epistemic access to qualia, beyond each person's native and exclusive capacity for internal discrimination. | |
From: Churchland / Churchland (Recent Work on Consciousness [1997]) | |
A reaction: Carefully phrased and hard to deny, but something is impenetrable. What experience does an insect have when it encounters ultra-violet light? Nothing remotely interesting about their qualia is likely to emerge from the study of insect brains. |
7521 | It is question-begging to assume that qualia are totally simple, hence irreducible [Churchlands] |
Full Idea: One of the crucial premises of the antireductionists - concerning the intrinsic, nonrelational, metaphysical simplicity of our sensory qualia - is a question-begging and unsupported assumption. | |
From: Churchland / Churchland (Recent Work on Consciousness [1997]) | |
A reaction: This is a key point for reductionists, with emphasis on the sheer numbers of connections involved in a simple quale (I estimate a billion involved in one small patch of red). |
7523 | The qualia Hard Problem is easy, in comparison with the co-ordination of mental states [Churchlands] |
Full Idea: The so-called Hard Problem (of qualia) appears to be one of the easiest, in comparison with the problems of short-term memory, fluid and directable attention, the awake state vs sleep, and the unity of consciousness. | |
From: Churchland / Churchland (Recent Work on Consciousness [1997]) | |
A reaction: Most of their version of the Hard Problems centre on personal identity, and the centralised co-ordination of mental events. I am inclined to agree with them. Worriers about qualia should think more about the complexity of systems of neurons. |