6 ideas
15464 | The distinction between dispositional and 'categorical' properties leads to confusion [Lewis] |
Full Idea: To avoid the danger of claiming that dispositions are their own categorical bases, we do better to eschew the alleged distinction between dispositional and 'categorical' properties altogether. | |
From: David Lewis (Finkish dispositions [1997], II) | |
A reaction: Since I have been unable to form any intuitive notion of what a 'categorical' property is, I like this, though not necessarily for his reason. |
15463 | All dispositions must have causal bases [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Prior, Pargetter and Jackson have argued convincingly for the thesis that all dispositions must have causal bases. | |
From: David Lewis (Finkish dispositions [1997], II) | |
A reaction: [Their paper is 1982] This key thesis is tackled by modern defenders of powers. The question is not who has the best arguments, but who offers the most coherent picture. What is a 'causal basis'? What sort of thing could be primitive or fundamental? |
15461 | A 'finkish' disposition is real, but disappears when the stimulus occurs [Lewis] |
Full Idea: A disposition which would straight away vanish if put to the test is called 'finkish'. A finkishly fragile thing is fragile so long as it is not struck. But if it were struck, it would straight away cease to be fragile, and it would not break. | |
From: David Lewis (Finkish dispositions [1997], I) | |
A reaction: There are also 'antidotes'. Finks kill the disposition, antidotes kill the effect. These cases are problems for the simple conditional analysis of a disposition - because we never achieved the consequent. |
15462 | Backtracking counterfactuals go from supposed events to their required causal antecedents [Lewis] |
Full Idea: 'Backtracking' counterfactual reasoning runs from a counterfactually supposed event to the causal antecedents it would have to have had. | |
From: David Lewis (Finkish dispositions [1997], I) | |
A reaction: Why not call it a 'transcendental' counterfactual? Presumably you go thisworld>> counterfactualevent>> worldneededtocauseit. It conjures up two possible worlds instead of one. |
7639 | The Homunculus Fallacy explains a subject perceiving objects by repeating the problem internally [Evans] |
Full Idea: The 'homunculus fallacy' attempts to explain what is involved in a subject's being related to objects in the external world by appealing to the existence of an inner situation which recapitulates the essential features of the original situation. | |
From: Gareth Evans (Molyneux's Question [1978], p.397) | |
A reaction: This is obviously right, but we aren't forced to settle for direct realism. Inner perception may be very different, or we may employ the idea of Dennett and Lycan, that the homunculi don't regress, they deteriorate steadily down into mechanisms. |
15877 | The aim of science is just to create a comprehensive, elegant language to describe brute facts [Poincaré, by Harré] |
Full Idea: In Poincaré's view, we try to construct a language within which the brute facts of experience are expressed as comprehensively and as elegantly as possible. The job of science is the forging of a language precisely suited to that purpose. | |
From: report of Henri Poincaré (The Value of Science [1906], Pt III) by Rom Harré - Laws of Nature 2 | |
A reaction: I'm often struck by how obscure and difficult our accounts of self-evident facts can be. Chairs are easy, and the metaphysics of chairs is hideous. Why is that? I'm a robust realist, but I like Poincaré's idea. He permits facts. |