Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Value of Science', 'Elusive Knowledge' and 'Daodejing (Tao Te Ching)'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Wise people choose inaction and silence [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
     Full Idea: The sage keeps to the deed that consists in taking no action and practises the teaching that uses no words.
     From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], I.II.6)
     A reaction: Notice that this is an active 'deed', and a positive 'practice'. He is not just recommending indifference and lethargy. Personally I don't find the advice very appealing, but it might be good if you live in 'interesting times'.
One who knows does not speak; one who speaks does not know [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
     Full Idea: One who knows does not speak; one who speaks does not know.
     From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.LVI.128)
     A reaction: A famous remark, which my western mind finds simply perplexing. It strikes me as wicked selfishness to keep your wisdom to yourself, and not try to persuade others to follow it. We are all in this together, I say.
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Vulgar people are alert; I alone am muddled [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
     Full Idea: Vulgar people are alert; I alone am muddled.
     From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], I.XX.47)
     A reaction: Personally I think all human beings are deeply perplexed when they actually address their situation, but most people never spend more than a few minutes a year worrying about it.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
To know yet to think that one does not know is best [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
     Full Idea: To know yet to think that one does not know is best.
     From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.LXXI.173)
     A reaction: Tricky. Self-deception doesn't sound like a virtue to me. There are epistemic virtues, and caution about one's own knowledge has to be one of them, but a totally false assessment sounds counter-productive.
Pursuit of learning increases activity; the Way decreases it [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
     Full Idea: In the pursuit of learning one knows more every day; in the pursuit of the Way one does less every day.
     From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.XLVII.108)
     A reaction: Everything in my culture has raised the status of the pursuit of learning, so that I can hardly comprehend what is proposed by the Way. I don't believe that the Way can be achieved without great learning, but one might move beyond learning.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
The timid student has knowledge without belief, lacking confidence in their correct answer [Lewis]
     Full Idea: I allow knowledge without belief, as in the case of the timid student who knows the answer but has no confidence that he has it right, and so does not believe what he knows.
     From: David Lewis (Elusive Knowledge [1996], p.429)
     A reaction: [He cites Woozley 1953 for the timid student] I don't accept this example (since my views on knowledge are rather traditional, I find). Why would the student give that answer if they didn't believe it? Sustained timid correctness never happens.
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
To say S knows P, but cannot eliminate not-P, sounds like a contradiction [Lewis]
     Full Idea: If you claim that S knows that P, and yet grant that S cannot eliminate a certain possibility of not-P, it certainly seems as if you have granted that S does not after all know that P. To speak of fallible knowledge just sounds contradictory.
     From: David Lewis (Elusive Knowledge [1996], p.419)
     A reaction: Starting from this point, fallibilism seems to be a rather bold move. The only sensible response seems to be to relax the requirement that not-P must be eliminable. Best: in one epistemic context P, in another not-P.
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
Justification is neither sufficient nor necessary for knowledge [Lewis]
     Full Idea: I don't agree that the mark of knowledge is justification, first because justification isn't sufficient - your true opinion that you will lose the lottery isn't knowledge, whatever the odds; and also not necessary - for what supports perception or memory?
     From: David Lewis (Elusive Knowledge [1996])
     A reaction: I don't think I agree. The point about the lottery is that an overwhelming reason will never get you to knowing that you won't win. But good reasons are coherent, not statistical. If perceptions are dubious, justification must be available.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
Knowing is context-sensitive because the domain of quantification varies [Lewis, by Cohen,S]
     Full Idea: The context-sensitivity of 'knows' is a function of contextual restrictions on the domain of quantification.
     From: report of David Lewis (Elusive Knowledge [1996]) by Stewart Cohen - Contextualism Defended p.68
     A reaction: I think the shifting 'domain of quantification' is one of the most interesting features of ordinary talk. Or, more plainly. 'what are you actually talking about?' is the key question in any fruitful dialogue. Sophisticated speakers tacitly shift domain.
We have knowledge if alternatives are eliminated, but appropriate alternatives depend on context [Lewis, by Cohen,S]
     Full Idea: S knows P if S's evidence eliminates every alternative. But the nature of the alternatives depends on context. So for Lewis, the context sensitivity of 'knows' is a function of contextual restrictions ln the domain of quantification.
     From: report of David Lewis (Elusive Knowledge [1996]) by Stewart Cohen - Contextualism Defended (and reply) 1
     A reaction: A typical modern attempt to 'regiment' a loose term like 'context'. That said, I like the idea. I'm struck by how the domain varies during a conversation (as in 'what we are talking about'). Domains standardly contain 'objects', though.
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Truth is not beautiful; beautiful speech is not truthful [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
     Full Idea: Truthful words are not beautiful; beautiful words are not truthful.
     From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.LXXXI.194)
     A reaction: A sharp disagreement with Keats ('Ode to a Grecian Urn'). A deep and important question, especially in relation to Plato's discussion of rhetoric (where he is very ambivalent). Great mathematics is beautiful. Truth can harsh. On the whole, I disagree.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
One with no use for life is wiser than one who values it [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
     Full Idea: It is just because one has no use for life that one is wiser than the man who values life.
     From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.LXXV.181a)
     A reaction: To have no use for life certainly seems to put a person into a position of superiority, especially when the 'Titanic' is sinking. However, if our lives have no value, I don't know what does. A balance must clearly be struck.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Do good to him who has done you an injury [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
     Full Idea: Do good to him who has done you an injury.
     From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.LXIII.148)
     A reaction: Compare Idea 6288 (Jesus). People like this really mess up the social contract theory of morality. If they are going to return good for your evil, there doesn't seem much point in helping them, given how much effort is involved. Most peculiar…
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
The highest virtue is achieved without effort [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
     Full Idea: Those of highest virtue do not strive for virtue, and so they have it.
     From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], 38), quoted by Bryan van Norden - Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy 8.II.2
     A reaction: Every moralist's dream is the person to whom virtue comes so naturally that no thought is required. This says they don't even notice it; Aristotle says they simply enjoying behaving virtuously.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
To gain in goodness, treat as good those who are good, and those who are not [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
     Full Idea: Those who are good I treat as good; those who are not good I also treat as good; in doing so I gain in goodness.
     From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.XLIX.111)
     A reaction: Socrates (idea 346) and Jesus (Idea 6288) had similar ideas. Who, though, is going to administer justice, and where is the idea that people 'deserve' good or ill treatment? Schoolteachers should treat all children as if they were good.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / g. Desires
There is no crime greater than having too many desires [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
     Full Idea: There is no crime greater than having too many desires.
     From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.XLVI.104)
     A reaction: It seems harsh to call this a 'crime', given that no one is likely to choose to have 'too many' desires. The crime is in deciding to stimulate desire to excess, or deciding to show no sensible restraint.
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / a. Autocracy
The best rulers are invisible, the next admired, the next feared, and the worst are exploited [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
     Full Idea: The best of all rulers is but a shadowy presence to his subjects; next comes the ruler they love and praise; next comes one they fear; next comes one with whom they take liberties.
     From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], I.XVII.39)
     A reaction: This fits our understanding of football referees to perfection. It might apply to anyone doing a vital adminstrative job, such as compiling a school timetable. It is hard, though, to accept anonymity as a mark of success.
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / a. Government
People are hard to govern because authorities love to do things [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
     Full Idea: It is because those in authority are too fond of action that the people are difficult to govern.
     From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.LXXV.181)
     A reaction: I love this. It should be on the wall of every human institution in our civilization. How the heart sinks at the prospect of a 'new initiative'. Not that I am against action; it is just important to recognise that inaction is sometimes the best option.
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / a. Legal system
The better known the law, the more criminals there are [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
     Full Idea: The better known the laws and edicts, the more thieves and robbers there are.
     From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.LVII.132)
     A reaction: Nice. I link this with my favourite moral maxim from Democritus (Idea 519). The idea is that continual emphasis on what you should not do fills the mind with evil possibilities. Moral perfection must start by taking goodness for granted.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / e. Peace
A military victory is not a thing of beauty [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
     Full Idea: A military victory is not a thing of beauty.
     From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], 31), quoted by Bryan van Norden - Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy 8.II.1
     A reaction: Should be written on the wall of every military academy and barracks.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
The aim of science is just to create a comprehensive, elegant language to describe brute facts [Poincaré, by Harré]
     Full Idea: In Poincaré's view, we try to construct a language within which the brute facts of experience are expressed as comprehensively and as elegantly as possible. The job of science is the forging of a language precisely suited to that purpose.
     From: report of Henri Poincaré (The Value of Science [1906], Pt III) by Rom Harré - Laws of Nature 2
     A reaction: I'm often struck by how obscure and difficult our accounts of self-evident facts can be. Chairs are easy, and the metaphysics of chairs is hideous. Why is that? I'm a robust realist, but I like Poincaré's idea. He permits facts.