10 ideas
15544 | If what is actual might have been impossible, we need S4 modal logic [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
Full Idea: Armstrong says what is actual (namely a certain roster of universals) might have been impossible. Hence his modal logic is S4, without the 'Brouwersche Axiom'. | |
From: report of David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978]) by David Lewis - Armstrong on combinatorial possibility 'The demand' | |
A reaction: So p would imply possibly-not-possibly-p. |
10245 | One geometry cannot be more true than another [Poincaré] |
Full Idea: One geometry cannot be more true than another; it can only be more convenient. | |
From: Henri Poincaré (Science and Method [1908], p.65), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics | |
A reaction: This is the culminating view after new geometries were developed by tinkering with Euclid's parallels postulate. |
7024 | Properties are universals, which are always instantiated [Armstrong, by Heil] |
Full Idea: Armstrong takes properties to be universals, and believes there are no 'uninstantiated' universals. | |
From: report of David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978]) by John Heil - From an Ontological Point of View §9.3 | |
A reaction: At first glance this, like many theories of universals, seems to invite Ockham's Razor. If they are always instantiated, perhaps we should perhaps just try to talk about the instantiations (i.e. tropes), and skip the universal? |
9478 | Even if all properties are categorical, they may be denoted by dispositional predicates [Armstrong, by Bird] |
Full Idea: Armstrong says all properties are categorical, but a dispositional predicate may denote such a property; the dispositional predicate denotes the categorical property in virtue of the dispositional role it happens, contingently, to play in this world. | |
From: report of David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978]) by Alexander Bird - Nature's Metaphysics 3.1 | |
A reaction: I favour the fundamentality of the dispositional rather than the categorical. The world consists of powers, and we find ourselves amidst their categorical expressions. I could be persuaded otherwise, though! |
10729 | Universals explain resemblance and causal power [Armstrong, by Oliver] |
Full Idea: Armstrong thinks universals play two roles, namely grounding objective resemblances and grounding causal powers. | |
From: report of David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978]) by Alex Oliver - The Metaphysics of Properties 11 | |
A reaction: Personally I don't think universals explain anything at all. They just add another layer of confusion to a difficult problem. Oliver objects that this seems a priori, contrary to Armstrong's principle in Idea 10728. |
4031 | It doesn't follow that because there is a predicate there must therefore exist a property [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: I suggest that we reject the notion that just because the predicate 'red' applies to an open class of particulars, therefore there must be a property, redness. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978], p.8), quoted by DH Mellor / A Oliver - Introduction to 'Properties' §6 | |
A reaction: At last someone sensible (an Australian) rebuts that absurd idea that our ontology is entirely a feature of our language |
10024 | The type-token distinction is the universal-particular distinction [Armstrong, by Hodes] |
Full Idea: Armstrong conflates the type-token distinction with that between universals and particulars. | |
From: report of David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978], xiii,16/17) by Harold Hodes - Logicism and Ontological Commits. of Arithmetic 147 n23 | |
A reaction: This seems quite reasonable, even if you don’t believe in the reality of universals. I'm beginning to think we should just use the term 'general' instead of 'universal'. 'Type' also seems to correspond to 'set', with the 'token' as the 'member'. |
10728 | A thing's self-identity can't be a universal, since we can know it a priori [Armstrong, by Oliver] |
Full Idea: Armstrong says that if it can be proved a priori that a thing falls under a certain universal, then there is no such universal - and hence there is no universal of a thing being identical with itself. | |
From: report of David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978], II p.11) by Alex Oliver - The Metaphysics of Properties 11 | |
A reaction: This is a distinctively Armstrongian view, based on his belief that universals must be instantiated, and must be discoverable a posteriori, as part of science. I'm baffled by self-identity, but I don't think this argument does the job. |
4988 | Folk psychology may not be reducible, but that doesn't make it false [Kirk,R on Churchland,PM] |
Full Idea: It may well be that completed neuroscience will not include a reduction of folk psychology, but why should that be a reason to regard it as false? It would only be a reason if irreducibility entailed that they could not possibly both be true. | |
From: comment on Paul M. Churchland (Eliminative Materialism and Prop. Attitudes [1981]) by Robert Kirk - Mind and Body §3.9 | |
A reaction: If all our behaviour had been explained by a future neuro-science, this might not falsify folk psychology, but it would totally marginalise it. It is still possible that dewdrops are placed on leaves by fairies, but this is no longer a hot theory. |
4987 | Eliminative materialism says folk psychology will be replaced, not reduced [Churchland,PM] |
Full Idea: Eliminative materialism says our common-sense conception of psychological phenomena is a radically false theory, so defective that both the principles and the ontology of that theory will eventually be displaced (rather than reduced). | |
From: Paul M. Churchland (Eliminative Materialism and Prop. Attitudes [1981], Intro) | |
A reaction: It is hard to see what you could replace the idea of a 'belief' with in ordinary conversation. We may reduce beliefs to neuronal phenomena, but we can't drop the vocabulary of the macro-phenomena. The physics of weather doesn't eliminate 'storms'. |