3 ideas
21373 | We become objective when we detach ourselves from the world [Janaway] |
Full Idea: We apprehend the world purely objectively, only when we no longer know that we belong to it. | |
From: Christopher Janaway (Schopenhauer [1994], II:368), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 6 'Objectivity' | |
A reaction: Since we are not actually detached from the world, that makes objective thought an act of imagination. And none the worse for that, I would say, since philosophers don't seem to understand the central epistemological importance of imagination. |
10245 | One geometry cannot be more true than another [Poincaré] |
Full Idea: One geometry cannot be more true than another; it can only be more convenient. | |
From: Henri Poincaré (Science and Method [1908], p.65), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics | |
A reaction: This is the culminating view after new geometries were developed by tinkering with Euclid's parallels postulate. |
19698 | Deviant causal chain: a reason causes an action, but isn't the reason for which it was performed [Davidson, by Neta] |
Full Idea: A 'deviant causal chain' is when an agent has a reason for performing an action, and for the reason to cause the performance, without that being the reason for which the agent performed it. | |
From: report of Donald Davidson (Freedom to Act [1973]) by Ram Neta - The Basing Relation II | |
A reaction: Davidson's thesis is that 'reasons are causes'. This was a problem he faced. I think this discussion is now obscured by the complex and multi-layered account of action which is emerging from neuroscience. |