6 ideas
13099 | Analysing right down to primitive concepts seems beyond our powers [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: An analysis of concepts such that we can reach primitive concepts...does not seem to be within human power. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Introduction to a Secret Encyclopaedia [1679], C513-14), quoted by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz | |
A reaction: Leibniz is nevertheless fully committed, I think, to the existence of such primitives, and is in the grip of the rationalist dream that thoughts can become completely clear, and completely well-founded. |
5022 | We hold a proposition true if we are ready to follow it, and can't see any objections [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: A proposition is held to be true by us when our mind is ready to follow it and no reason for doubting it can be found. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Introduction to a Secret Encyclopaedia [1679], p.7) | |
A reaction: This follows on from Descartes' view, but it now sounds more like psychology than metaphysics. Clearly a false proposition could fit this desciption. Personally I follow propositions to which I can see no objection, without actually holding them true. |
7776 | Metaphors just mean what their words literally mean [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Metaphors mean what the words, in their most literal interpretation, mean, and nothing more. | |
From: Donald Davidson (What Metaphors Mean [1978], p.30) | |
A reaction: This pronouncement must be the result of Davidson anguishing over the truth conditions for metaphors, which are usually either taken to have a 'metaphorical meaning', or to be abbreviated similes. He solved his problem at a stroke! Plausible. |
7777 | We accept a metaphor when we see the sentence is false [Davidson] |
Full Idea: It is only when a sentence is taken to be false that we accept it as a metaphor. | |
From: Donald Davidson (What Metaphors Mean [1978], p.40) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a very nice and true generalisation, even though Davidson mentions "no man is an island" as a counterexample. We thirst for meaning, and switch to a second meaning when the first one looks peculiar. |
7775 | Understanding a metaphor is a creative act, with no rules [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Understanding a metaphor is as much a creative endeavour as making a metaphor, and as little guided by rules. | |
From: Donald Davidson (What Metaphors Mean [1978], p.29) | |
A reaction: This is good news for literature studies courses. Davidson's point is that the metaphor itself only gives you a literal meaning, so it doesn't tell you how to interpret it. It seems an attractive proposal. |
15877 | The aim of science is just to create a comprehensive, elegant language to describe brute facts [Poincaré, by Harré] |
Full Idea: In Poincaré's view, we try to construct a language within which the brute facts of experience are expressed as comprehensively and as elegantly as possible. The job of science is the forging of a language precisely suited to that purpose. | |
From: report of Henri Poincaré (The Value of Science [1906], Pt III) by Rom Harré - Laws of Nature 2 | |
A reaction: I'm often struck by how obscure and difficult our accounts of self-evident facts can be. Chairs are easy, and the metaphysics of chairs is hideous. Why is that? I'm a robust realist, but I like Poincaré's idea. He permits facts. |