Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Value of Science', 'Epistemology Externalized' and 'Justified Belief as Responsible Belief'

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8 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence

12801	Coherentists seek relations among beliefs that are simple, conservative and explanatory [Foley]
	Full Idea: Coherentists try to provide an explication of epistemic rationality in terms of a set of deductive and probabilistic relations among beliefs and properties such as simplicity, conservativeness, and explanatory power.
	From: Richard Foley (Justified Belief as Responsible Belief [2005], p.317)
	A reaction: I have always like the coherentist view of justification, and now I see that this has led me to the question of explanation, which in turn has led me to essentialism. It's all coming together. Watch this space. 'Explanatory' is the key to everything!

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / c. Disjunctivism

12800	Externalists want to understand knowledge, Internalists want to understand justification [Foley]
	Full Idea: Externalists are principally interested in understanding what knowledge is, ..while internalists, by contrast, are principally interested in explicating a sense of justification ..from one's own perspective.
	From: Richard Foley (Justified Belief as Responsible Belief [2005], p.314)
	A reaction: I find this very helpful, since I have a strong bias towards internalism (with a social dimension), and I see now that it is because I am more interested in what a (good) justification is than what some entity in reality called 'knowledge' consists of.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification

12802	We aren't directly pragmatic about belief, but pragmatic about the deliberation which precedes it [Foley]
	Full Idea: It is rare for pragmatic considerations to influence the rationality of our beliefs in the crass, direct way that Pascal's Wager envisions. Instead, they determine the direction and shape of our investigative and deliberative projects and practices.
	From: Richard Foley (Justified Belief as Responsible Belief [2005], p.320)
	A reaction: [See Idea 6684 for Pascal's Wager] Foley is evidently a full-blown pragmatist (which is bad), but this is nicely put. We can't deny the importance of the amount of effort put into an enquiry. Maybe it is an epistemic duty, rather than a means to an end.

12803	Justification comes from acceptable procedures, given practical constraints [Foley]
	Full Idea: One justifiably believes a proposition if one has an epistemically rational belief that one's procedures with respect to it have been acceptable, given practical limitations, and one's goals.
	From: Richard Foley (Justified Belief as Responsible Belief [2005], p.322)
	A reaction: I quite like this, except that it is too individualistic. My goals, and my standards of acceptability decree whether I know? I don't see the relevance of goals; only a pragmatist would mention such a thing. Standards of acceptability are social.

18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content

8872	It is widely supposed that externalism cannot be reconciled with first-person authority [Davidson]
	Full Idea: It has been widely supposed that externalism, which holds that the contents of a person's propositional attitudes are partly determined by factors of which the person may be ignorant, cannot be reconciled with first-person authority.
	From: Donald Davidson (Epistemology Externalized [1990], p.197)
	A reaction: It is certainly a bit puzzling if you go around saying 'Actually, people don't know their own thoughts'. Davidson aims to defend first-person authority. The full story is developed in Tyler Burge's views on 'anti-individualism'.

8874	It is hard to interpret a speaker's actions if we take a broad view of the content [Davidson]
	Full Idea: It will explain a speaker's actions far better if we interpret him as he intended to be interpreted, than if we suppose he means and thinks what someone else might mean and think who used the same words 'correctly'.
	From: Donald Davidson (Epistemology Externalized [1990], p.199)
	A reaction: This comes down to the fact that our actions have to be motivated by internal meanings. If I defer to experts on the essence of gold, I still buy gold according to how I myself understand it. So meaning has two components?

26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds

8873	The cause of a usage determines meaning, but why is the microstructure of water relevant? [Davidson]
	Full Idea: While I agree that the usual cause of the use of the word determines what it means, I do not see why sameness of microstructure is necessarily the relevant similarity that determines my reference of the word 'water'.
	From: Donald Davidson (Epistemology Externalized [1990], p.198)
	A reaction: This is a problem for essentialists who build their views on semantic considerations. But the stability of what causes 'water' thoughts is the microstructure of water. However, that is an explantion of meaning, not a definition of it.

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature

15877	The aim of science is just to create a comprehensive, elegant language to describe brute facts [Poincaré, by Harré]
	Full Idea: In Poincaré's view, we try to construct a language within which the brute facts of experience are expressed as comprehensively and as elegantly as possible. The job of science is the forging of a language precisely suited to that purpose.
	From: report of Henri Poincaré (The Value of Science [1906], Pt III) by Rom Harré - Laws of Nature 2
	A reaction: I'm often struck by how obscure and difficult our accounts of self-evident facts can be. Chairs are easy, and the metaphysics of chairs is hideous. Why is that? I'm a robust realist, but I like Poincaré's idea. He permits facts.