3 ideas
7091 | The argument from analogy is not a strong inference, since the other being might be an actor or a robot [Grayling] |
Full Idea: The argument from analogy is a weak one, because it does not logically guarantee the inference I draw to the other's inner states, for he might be dissimulating or acting, or may even be a cleverly contrived robot which feels nothing. | |
From: A.C. Grayling (Wittgenstein [1988], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: This gives the impression that for an argument to be strong it must logically guarantee its inference. It strikes me that analogy is a good reason for believing in other minds, but that is because I am looking for the best explanation, not logical proof. |
17613 | We should judge principles by the science, not science by some fixed principles [Zermelo] |
Full Idea: Principles must be judged from the point of view of science, and not science from the point of view of principles fixed once and for all. Geometry existed before Euclid's 'Elements', just as arithmetic and set theory did before Peano's 'Formulaire'. | |
From: Ernst Zermelo (New Proof of Possibility of Well-Ordering [1908], §2a) | |
A reaction: This shows why the axiomatisation of set theory is an ongoing and much-debated activity. |
15877 | The aim of science is just to create a comprehensive, elegant language to describe brute facts [Poincaré, by Harré] |
Full Idea: In Poincaré's view, we try to construct a language within which the brute facts of experience are expressed as comprehensively and as elegantly as possible. The job of science is the forging of a language precisely suited to that purpose. | |
From: report of Henri Poincaré (The Value of Science [1906], Pt III) by Rom Harré - Laws of Nature 2 | |
A reaction: I'm often struck by how obscure and difficult our accounts of self-evident facts can be. Chairs are easy, and the metaphysics of chairs is hideous. Why is that? I'm a robust realist, but I like Poincaré's idea. He permits facts. |