Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Value of Science', 'works' and 'Two Kinds of Possibility'

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7 ideas

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind

13074	Only natural kinds and their members have real essences [Suárez, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
	Full Idea: On Suarez's account, only natural kinds and their members have real essences.
	From: report of Francisco Suárez (works [1588]) by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 1.3.1 n21
	A reaction: Interesting. Rather than say that everything is a member of some kind, we leave quirky individuals out, with no essence at all. What is the status of the very first exemplar of a given kind?

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality

12205	There are two families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, of equal strength [Edgington]
	Full Idea: In my view, there are two independent families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, neither stronger than the other.
	From: Dorothy Edgington (Two Kinds of Possibility [2004], Abs)
	A reaction: My immediate reaction is that epistemic necessity is not necessity at all. 'For all I know' 2 plus 2 might really be 95, and squares may also be circular.

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity

12207	Metaphysical possibility is discovered empirically, and is contrained by nature [Edgington]
	Full Idea: Metaphysical necessity derives from distinguishing things which can happen and things which can't, in virtue of their nature, which we discover empirically: the metaphysically possible, I claim, is constrained by the laws of nature.
	From: Dorothy Edgington (Two Kinds of Possibility [2004], §I)
	A reaction: She claims that Kripke is sympathetic to this. Personally I like the idea that natural necessity is metaphysically necessary (see 'Scientific Essentialism'), but the other way round comes as a bit of a surprise. I will think about it.

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity

12206	Broadly logical necessity (i.e. not necessarily formal logical necessity) is an epistemic notion [Edgington]
	Full Idea: So-called broadly logical necessity (by which I mean, not necessarily formal logical necessity) is an epistemic notion.
	From: Dorothy Edgington (Two Kinds of Possibility [2004], §I)
	A reaction: This is controversial, and is criticised by McFetridge and Rumfitt. Fine argues that 'narrow' (formal) logical necessity is metaphysical. Between them they have got rid of logical necessity completely.

12208	An argument is only valid if it is epistemically (a priori) necessary [Edgington]
	Full Idea: Validity is governed by epistemic necessity, i.e. an argument is valid if and only if there is an a priori route from premises to conclusion.
	From: Dorothy Edgington (Two Kinds of Possibility [2004], §V)
	A reaction: Controversial, and criticised by McFetridge and Rumfitt. I don't think I agree with her. I don't see validity as depending on dim little human beings.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation

7563	The old 'influx' view of causation says it is a flow of accidental properties from A to B [Suárez, by Jolley]
	Full Idea: The 'influx' model of causation says that causes involve a process of contagion, as it were; when the kettle boils, the gas infects the water inside the kettle with its own 'individual accident' of heat, which literally flows from one to the other.
	From: report of Francisco Suárez (works [1588]) by Nicholas Jolley - Leibniz Ch.2
	A reaction: This nicely captures the scholastic target of Hume's sceptical thinking on the subject. However, see Idea 2542, where the idea of influx has had a revival. It is hard to see how the water could change if it didn't 'catch' something from the gas.

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature

15877	The aim of science is just to create a comprehensive, elegant language to describe brute facts [Poincaré, by Harré]
	Full Idea: In Poincaré's view, we try to construct a language within which the brute facts of experience are expressed as comprehensively and as elegantly as possible. The job of science is the forging of a language precisely suited to that purpose.
	From: report of Henri Poincaré (The Value of Science [1906], Pt III) by Rom Harré - Laws of Nature 2
	A reaction: I'm often struck by how obscure and difficult our accounts of self-evident facts can be. Chairs are easy, and the metaphysics of chairs is hideous. Why is that? I'm a robust realist, but I like Poincaré's idea. He permits facts.