5 ideas
| 19735 | Wisdom has a higher value than understanding, which has a higher value than knowledge [Greco] |
| Full Idea: Intuitively, understanding is more valuable than knowledge and wisdom is more valuable than understanding. | |
| From: John Greco (The Value Problem [2011], 'Knowledge') | |
| A reaction: Down at the bottom is having an 'inkling' of something, I presume. Not convinced of this. I would rate understanding above knowledge, but wisdom seems rather different. It implies a breadth that does not focus on any particular topic. |
| 19734 | If value is practical, knowledge is no better than true opinion [Greco] |
| Full Idea: Why should knowledge be more valuable than true opinion, if their practical value is the same? | |
| From: John Greco (The Value Problem [2011], Intro) | |
| A reaction: We have exam systems and academic titles to bestow social prestige on people who know, not to mention quiz shows. Modern society needs lots of knowledgeable citizens. I'm not sure what intrinsic value knowledge could have. |
| 19724 | Belief is knowledge if it is true, certain, and obtained by a reliable process [Ramsey] |
| Full Idea: I have always said that a belief was knowledge if it was (i) true, (ii) certain, (iii) obtained by a reliable process. | |
| From: Frank P. Ramsey (Knowledge [1929]), quoted by Juan Comesaña - Reliabilism 2 | |
| A reaction: Remarkable to be addressing the Gettier problem at that date, but Russell had flirted with the problem. Ramsey says the production of the belief must be reliable, rather than the justification for the belief. Note that he wants certainty. |
| 19733 | Externalist theories don't explain why knowledge has value [Greco] |
| Full Idea: Externalist theories do not give knowledge the sort of value that internalists want knowledge to have. | |
| From: John Greco (The Value Problem [2011], Intro) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Pritchard 2008] This is not a very strong argument, given the uncertainties and complexities in the idea that we share a 'value'. If the value of knowledge is really instrumental (and loved no less because of that), then externalism could cope. |
| 15877 | The aim of science is just to create a comprehensive, elegant language to describe brute facts [Poincaré, by Harré] |
| Full Idea: In Poincaré's view, we try to construct a language within which the brute facts of experience are expressed as comprehensively and as elegantly as possible. The job of science is the forging of a language precisely suited to that purpose. | |
| From: report of Henri Poincaré (The Value of Science [1906], Pt III) by Rom Harré - Laws of Nature 2 | |
| A reaction: I'm often struck by how obscure and difficult our accounts of self-evident facts can be. Chairs are easy, and the metaphysics of chairs is hideous. Why is that? I'm a robust realist, but I like Poincaré's idea. He permits facts. |