Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Science and Method', 'Propositions' and 'The Intentional Fallacy'

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12 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive

9455	Maybe proper names have the content of fixing a thing's category [Bealer]
	Full Idea: Some say that proper names have no descriptive content, but others think that although a name does not have the right sort of descriptive content which fixes a unique referent, it has a content which fixes the sort or category to which it belongs.
	From: George Bealer (Propositions [1998], §7)
	A reaction: Presumably 'Mary', and 'Felix', and 'Rover', and 'Smallville' are cases in point. There is a well known journalist called 'Manchester', a famous man called 'Hilary', a village in Hertfordshire called 'Matching Tie'... Interesting, though.

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions

9454	The four leading theories of definite descriptions are Frege's, Russell's, Evans's, and Prior's [Bealer]
	Full Idea: The four leading theories of definite descriptions are Frege's, Russell's, Evans's, and Prior's, ...of which to many Frege's is the most intuitive of the four. Frege says they refer to the unique item (if it exists) which satisfies the predicate.
	From: George Bealer (Propositions [1998], §5)
	A reaction: He doesn't expound the other three, but I record this a corrective to the view that Russell has the only game in town.

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry

10245	One geometry cannot be more true than another [Poincaré]
	Full Idea: One geometry cannot be more true than another; it can only be more convenient.
	From: Henri Poincaré (Science and Method [1908], p.65), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics
	A reaction: This is the culminating view after new geometries were developed by tinkering with Euclid's parallels postulate.

19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions

9453	Sentences saying the same with the same rigid designators may still express different propositions [Bealer]
	Full Idea: The propositions behind 'Cicero is emulated more than Tully' seems to differ somehow from 'Tully is emulated more than Cicero', despite the proper names being rigid designators.
	From: George Bealer (Propositions [1998], §1)
	A reaction: Interesting, because this isn't a directly propositional attitude situation like 'believes', though it depends on such things. Bealer says this is a key modern difficulty with propositions.

9452	Propositions might be reduced to functions (worlds to truth values), or ordered sets of properties and relations [Bealer]
	Full Idea: The reductionist view of propositions sees them as either extensional functions from possible worlds to truth values, or as ordered sets of properties, relations, and perhaps particulars.
	From: George Bealer (Propositions [1998], §1)
	A reaction: The usual problem of all functional accounts is 'what is it about x that enables it to have that function?' And if they are sets, where does the ordering come in? A proposition isn't just a list of items in some particular order. Both wrong.

19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense

9451	Modal logic and brain science have reaffirmed traditional belief in propositions [Bealer]
	Full Idea: Philosophers have been skeptical about abstract objects, and so have been skeptical about propositions,..but with the rise of modal logic and metaphysics, and cognitive science's realism about intentional states, traditional propositions are now dominant.
	From: George Bealer (Propositions [1998], §1)
	A reaction: I personally strongly favour belief in propositions as brain states, which don't need a bizarre ontological status, but are essential to explain language, reasoning and communication.

21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 1. Artistic Intentions

20400	Intentions either succeed or fail, so external evidence for them is always irrelevant [Wimsatt/Beardsley, by Davies,S]
	Full Idea: Wimsatt and Beardsley claimed that either the intention succeeded, so one does not need to look outside the work for its meaning, or the intention failed, so external evidence does not help.
	From: report of W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946]) by Stephen Davies - The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) 5.3
	A reaction: Actually, the external evidence may tell you much more clearly and accurately what the intention was than the work itself does. The best example may be the title of the work, which is presumably outside the work.

7266	The author's intentions are irrelevant to the judgement of a work's success [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
	Full Idea: The design or intention of the author is neither available nor desirable as a standard for judging the success of a work of literary art.
	From: W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946], §I)
	A reaction: This famous proposal may have been misunderstood. Note that it is a comment about judging the work, not about understanding it. The idea allows for a work being much more successful than the author's humble intentions (e.g. Pepys).

7267	Poetry, unlike messages, can be successful without communicating intentions [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
	Full Idea: Poetry differs from practical messages, which are successful if and only if we correctly infer the intention.
	From: W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946], §I)
	A reaction: I am not convinced by this claim. It is plausible that a work does much more than it intends (Astaire said he danced "to make a buck"), but it is rather odd to rate very highly a work of which you have missed the point.

7268	The thoughts of a poem should be imputed to the dramatic speaker, and hardly at all to the poet [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
	Full Idea: We ought to impute the thoughts and attitudes of the poem immediately to the dramatic speaker, and if to the author at all, only by an act of biographical inference.
	From: W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946], §I)
	A reaction: Wrong. If in Browning's "My Last Duchess" (say), we only inferred the mind of the speaker (and his Duchess), and took no interest in Browning's view of things, we would miss the point. We might end up respecting the Duke, which would be daft.

7269	The intentional fallacy is a romantic one [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
	Full Idea: The intentional fallacy is a romantic one.
	From: W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946], §II)
	A reaction: Wrong. Even with those most famous of anonymous artists, the architects and carvers of medieval cathedrals, without some discernment of the purpose you won't get it. The Taj Mahal is a love letter, not a potential ice cream parlour.

7271	Biography can reveal meanings and dramatic character, as well as possible intentions [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
	Full Idea: The use of biographical evidence need not involve intentionalism, because while it may be evidence of what the author intended, it may also be evidence of the meaning of his words and the dramatic character of his utterance.
	From: W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946], §IV)
	A reaction: I am very keen to penetrate the author's intentions, but I have always be doubtful about the use of biography as a means to achieve this. Most of the effort to infer intentions must come from a study of the work itself, not introductions, letters etc.