Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Science and Method', 'Notes on Comments by Fardella' and 'Issues of Pragmaticism'

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4 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
10245 One geometry cannot be more true than another [Poincaré]
     Full Idea: One geometry cannot be more true than another; it can only be more convenient.
     From: Henri Poincaré (Science and Method [1908], p.65), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics
     A reaction: This is the culminating view after new geometries were developed by tinkering with Euclid's parallels postulate.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
13160 To exist and be understood, a multitude must first be reduced to a unity [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: A plurality of things can neither be understood nor can exist unless one first understands the thing that is one, that to which the multitude necessarily reduces.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Notes on Comments by Fardella [1690], Prop 3)
     A reaction: Notice that it is our need to understand which imposes the unity on the multitude. It is not just some random fiction, or a meaningless mechanical act of thought.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
13161 Substances are everywhere in matter, like points in a line [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: There are substances everywhere in matter, just as points are everywhere in a line.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Notes on Comments by Fardella [1690], Clarif)
     A reaction: Since Leibniz is unlikely to believe in the reality of the points, we must wonder whether he was really committed to this infinity of substances. The more traditional notion of substance is always called 'substantial form' by Leibniz.
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
19087 The meaning or purport of a symbol is all the rational conduct it would lead to [Peirce]
     Full Idea: The entire intellectual purport of any symbol consists in the total of all modes of rational conduct which, conditionally upon all the possible different circumstances and desires, would ensue upon the acceptance of the symbol.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Issues of Pragmaticism [1905], EP ii.246), quoted by Danielle Macbeth - Pragmatism and Objective Truth p.169 n1
     A reaction: Macbeth says pragmatism is founded on this theory of meaning, rather than on a theory of truth. I don't see why the causes of a symbol shouldn't be as much a part of its meaning as the consequences are.