Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Value of Science', 'Letters to Paul Pellison-Fontinier' and 'Conditionals'

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4 ideas

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals

14289	There are some assertable conditionals one would reject if one learned the antecedent [Jackson, by Edgington]
	Full Idea: Jackson came to realise that there are assertable conditionals which one would not continue to believe if one learned the antecedent, such as Lewis's "If Reagan worked for the KGB, I'll never find out".
	From: report of Frank Jackson (Conditionals [1987]) by Dorothy Edgington - Conditionals (Stanf) 4.2
	A reaction: That pesky David Lewis made trouble for everybody. Edgington agrees that his earlier formulation (Idea 14288) holds good for nearly all cases. There is a self-referential element in Lewis's example.

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature

15877	The aim of science is just to create a comprehensive, elegant language to describe brute facts [Poincaré, by Harré]
	Full Idea: In Poincaré's view, we try to construct a language within which the brute facts of experience are expressed as comprehensively and as elegantly as possible. The job of science is the forging of a language precisely suited to that purpose.
	From: report of Henri Poincaré (The Value of Science [1906], Pt III) by Rom Harré - Laws of Nature 2
	A reaction: I'm often struck by how obscure and difficult our accounts of self-evident facts can be. Chairs are easy, and the metaphysics of chairs is hideous. Why is that? I'm a robust realist, but I like Poincaré's idea. He permits facts.

27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces

12719	Clearly, force is that from which action follows, when unimpeded [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: The notion of force is as clear as that of action and passion, because it is that from which action follows when nothing prevents it.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Paul Pellison-Fontinier [1691], A1.6.226), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 4
	A reaction: For Leibniz, force seems to be a metaphysical notion, rather than a feature of the physical world. I take it to be the bottom level of explanation, and it equates with Aristotelian form and essence.

27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time

12720	Time doesn't exist, since its parts don't coexist [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Time never exists, since all of its parts never exist together.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Paul Pellison-Fontinier [1691], A1.6.226), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 4
	A reaction: The problem here is that he seems to be admitting that time has 'parts'. Can something have parts and not exist? Events will also fail to exist by this criterion, though we could hardly deny that events (or some such) 'happen'.