4 ideas
10245 | One geometry cannot be more true than another [Poincaré] |
Full Idea: One geometry cannot be more true than another; it can only be more convenient. | |
From: Henri Poincaré (Science and Method [1908], p.65), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics | |
A reaction: This is the culminating view after new geometries were developed by tinkering with Euclid's parallels postulate. |
18435 | Resemblance Nominalists say that resemblance explains properties (not the other way round) [Rodriquez-Pereyra] |
Full Idea: Resemblance Nominalists cannot explain the resemblance between particulars in terms of their properties, because they explain particulars' properties in terms of their resemblances. | |
From: Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (Resemblance Nominalism and Russell's Regress [2001], p.397), quoted by Douglas Edwards - Properties 5.5.1 | |
A reaction: While resemblance does seem to be a primitive fact of experience, and it points us towards the properties, to say that resemblance explains properties is obviously (as so often...) getting things the wrong way round. Properties ARE resemblances?? |
13160 | To exist and be understood, a multitude must first be reduced to a unity [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: A plurality of things can neither be understood nor can exist unless one first understands the thing that is one, that to which the multitude necessarily reduces. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Notes on Comments by Fardella [1690], Prop 3) | |
A reaction: Notice that it is our need to understand which imposes the unity on the multitude. It is not just some random fiction, or a meaningless mechanical act of thought. |
13161 | Substances are everywhere in matter, like points in a line [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: There are substances everywhere in matter, just as points are everywhere in a line. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Notes on Comments by Fardella [1690], Clarif) | |
A reaction: Since Leibniz is unlikely to believe in the reality of the points, we must wonder whether he was really committed to this infinity of substances. The more traditional notion of substance is always called 'substantial form' by Leibniz. |