12729
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The cause of a change is not the real influence, but whatever gives a reason for the change [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
That thing from whose state a reason for the changes is most readily provided is adjudged to be the cause. ...Causes are not derived from a real influence, but from the providing of a reason.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Specimen inventorum [1689], A6.4.1620), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 5
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A reaction:
Leibniz is not denying that there are real influences. He seems to be offering the thesis which I am pursuing, that the need for explanation is the crucial factor in shaping the structure of our metaphysics.
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2171
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The 'will' doesn't exist; there is just conclusion, then action [Homer, by Williams,B]
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Full Idea:
Homer left out another mental action lying between coming to a conclusion and acting on it; and he did well, since there is no such action, and the idea is the invention of bad philosophy.
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From:
report of Homer (The Iliad [c.850 BCE]) by Bernard Williams - Shame and Necessity II - p.37
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A reaction:
This is a characteristically empiricist view, which is found in Hobbes. The 'will' seems to have a useful role in folk psychology. We can at least say that coming to a conclusion that I should act, and then actually acting, are not the same thing.
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21819
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Plato says the Good produces the Intellectual-Principle, which in turn produces the Soul [Homer, by Plotinus]
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Full Idea:
In Plato the order of generation is from the Good, the Intellectual-Principle; from the Intellectual-Principle, the Soul.
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From:
report of Homer (The Iliad [c.850 BCE], 509b) by Plotinus - The Enneads 5.1.08
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A reaction:
The doctrine of Plotinus merely echoes Plato, in that case, except that the One replaces the Form of the Good. Does this mean that what is first in Plotinus is less morally significant, and more concerned with reason and being?
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