12699
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A body would be endless disunited parts, if it did not have a unifying form or soul [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
Without soul or form of some kind, a body would have no being, because no part of it can be designated which does not in turn consist of more parts. Thus nothing could be designated in a body which could be called 'this thing', or a unity.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Conspectus libelli (book outline) [1678], A6.4.1988), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 1
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A reaction:
The locution 'soul or form' is disconcerting, and you have to spend some time with Leibniz to get the hang of it. The 'soul' is not intelligent, and is more like a source of action and response.
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12700
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Form or soul gives unity and duration; matter gives multiplicity and change [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
Substantial form, or soul, is the principle of unity and duration, matter is that of multiplicity and change
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Conspectus libelli (book outline) [1678], A6.4.1398-9), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 2
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A reaction:
Leibniz was a fan of the unfashionable Aristotle, and tried to put a spin on his views consonant with contemporary Hobbesian mechanistic views. Oddly, he likes the idea that 'form' is indestructable, which I don't understand.
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12736
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If we understand God and his choices, we have a priori knowledge of contingent truths [Leibniz, by Garber]
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Full Idea:
Insofar as we have some insight into how God chooses, we can know a priori the laws of nature that God chooses for this best of all possible worlds. In this way, it is possible to have genuine a priori knowledge of contingent truths.
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From:
report of Gottfried Leibniz (Conspectus libelli (book outline) [1678], A6.4.1998-9) by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 6
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A reaction:
I think it would be doubtful whether our knowledge of God's choosings would count as a priori. How do we discover them? Ah! We derive God from the ontological argument, and his choosings from the divine perfection implied thereby.
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20440
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Art is a referential activity, hence indefinable, but it has a set of symptoms [Goodman]
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Full Idea:
No definition of art is possible (since it is a referential activity), …but the symptoms of art are syntactic density, semantic density, syntactic repleteness, exemplificationality, and multiple and complex reference.
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From:
Nelson Goodman (Languages of Art (2nd edn) [1968], p.22-255), quoted by Alessandro Giovannelli - Nelson Goodman (aesthetics) 4
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A reaction:
I wish these labels were more self-explanatory. Goodman seems to want to assimilate art to his earlier interests in linguistic anti-realism and mereology. I wouldn't have thought he now had many followers.
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20437
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A copy only becomes an 'instance' of an artwork if there is a system of notation [Goodman]
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Full Idea:
Paintings and sculptures do not work within a notation; hence, there is no copying of an original that would preserve its originality. A copy of a painting is a copy, not an instance of the original.
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From:
Nelson Goodman (Languages of Art (2nd edn) [1968], p.212), quoted by Alessandro Giovannelli - Nelson Goodman (aesthetics) 2
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A reaction:
Sounds conclusive, but isn't. Is a poetry manuscript a 'notation' or an original? Why is an etching plate a notation, but painting on canvas is an original? Can I create a painting specifically so that it can be copied (by my students)? Intention matters.
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