Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Science and Method', 'Conspectus libelli (book outline)' and 'Objections to 'Meditations' (Fifth)'

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6 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
One geometry cannot be more true than another [Poincaré]
     Full Idea: One geometry cannot be more true than another; it can only be more convenient.
     From: Henri Poincaré (Science and Method [1908], p.65), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics
     A reaction: This is the culminating view after new geometries were developed by tinkering with Euclid's parallels postulate.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
A body would be endless disunited parts, if it did not have a unifying form or soul [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Without soul or form of some kind, a body would have no being, because no part of it can be designated which does not in turn consist of more parts. Thus nothing could be designated in a body which could be called 'this thing', or a unity.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Conspectus libelli (book outline) [1678], A6.4.1988), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 1
     A reaction: The locution 'soul or form' is disconcerting, and you have to spend some time with Leibniz to get the hang of it. The 'soul' is not intelligent, and is more like a source of action and response.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
Form or soul gives unity and duration; matter gives multiplicity and change [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Substantial form, or soul, is the principle of unity and duration, matter is that of multiplicity and change
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Conspectus libelli (book outline) [1678], A6.4.1398-9), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 2
     A reaction: Leibniz was a fan of the unfashionable Aristotle, and tried to put a spin on his views consonant with contemporary Hobbesian mechanistic views. Oddly, he likes the idea that 'form' is indestructable, which I don't understand.
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent
If we understand God and his choices, we have a priori knowledge of contingent truths [Leibniz, by Garber]
     Full Idea: Insofar as we have some insight into how God chooses, we can know a priori the laws of nature that God chooses for this best of all possible worlds. In this way, it is possible to have genuine a priori knowledge of contingent truths.
     From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (Conspectus libelli (book outline) [1678], A6.4.1998-9) by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 6
     A reaction: I think it would be doubtful whether our knowledge of God's choosings would count as a priori. How do we discover them? Ah! We derive God from the ontological argument, and his choosings from the divine perfection implied thereby.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Things must have parts to intermingle [Gassendi]
     Full Idea: If you are no larger than a point, how are you joined to the whole body, which is so large? …and there can be no intermingling between things unless the parts of them can be intermingled.
     From: Pierre Gassendi (Objections to 'Meditations' (Fifth) [1641]), quoted by Jaegwon Kim - Philosophy of Mind p.131
     A reaction: As Descartes says that mind is distinct from body because it is non-spatial, it doesn't seem quite right to describe it as a 'point', but the second half is a real problem. Being non-spatial is a real impediment to intermingling with spatial objects.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
Every body contains a kind of sense and appetite, or a soul [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: I believe that there is in every body a kind of sense and appetite, or a soul.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Conspectus libelli (book outline) [1678], A6.4.2010), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 1
     A reaction: Note that he never says that there is any intelligence present. This eventually becomes his monadology, but Leibniz is the most obvious post-Greek philosopher to flirt with panpsychism.