Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Value of Science', 'Specimen inventorum' and 'Reflections on my Critics'

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5 ideas

3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth

12129	'Truth' may only apply within a theory [Kuhn]
	Full Idea: 'Truth' may, like 'proof', be a term with only intra-theoretic applications.
	From: Thomas S. Kuhn (Reflections on my Critics [1970], §5)
	A reaction: I think we can blame Tarski (via Quine, Kuhn's teacher) for this one. I take it to be an utter failure to grasp the meaning of the word 'truth' (and sneakily substituting 'satisfaction' for it). For a start, we have to compare theories on some basis.

14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory

6809	Kuhn came to accept that all scientists agree on a particular set of values [Kuhn, by Bird]
	Full Idea: Kuhn later came to accept that there are five values to which scientists in all paradigms adhere: accuracy; consistency with accepted theories; broad scope; simplicity; and fruitfulness.
	From: report of Thomas S. Kuhn (Reflections on my Critics [1970]) by Alexander Bird - Philosophy of Science Ch.8
	A reaction: To shake off the relativism for which Kuhn is notorious, we should begin by asking the question WHY scientists favoured these particular values, rather than (say) bizarreness, consistency with Lewis Carroll, or alliteration. (They are epistemic virtues).

14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability

12128	In theory change, words shift their natural reference, so the theories are incommensurable [Kuhn]
	Full Idea: In transitions between theories words change their meanings or applicability. Though most of the signs are used before and after a revolution - force, mass, cell - the ways they attach to nature has changed. Successive theories are thus incommensurable.
	From: Thomas S. Kuhn (Reflections on my Critics [1970], §6)
	A reaction: A very nice statement of the view, from the horse's mouth. A great deal of recent philosophy has been implicitly concerned with meeting Kuhn's challenge, by providing an account of reference that doesn't have such problems.

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence

12729	The cause of a change is not the real influence, but whatever gives a reason for the change [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: That thing from whose state a reason for the changes is most readily provided is adjudged to be the cause. ...Causes are not derived from a real influence, but from the providing of a reason.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Specimen inventorum [1689], A6.4.1620), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 5
	A reaction: Leibniz is not denying that there are real influences. He seems to be offering the thesis which I am pursuing, that the need for explanation is the crucial factor in shaping the structure of our metaphysics.

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature

15877	The aim of science is just to create a comprehensive, elegant language to describe brute facts [Poincaré, by Harré]
	Full Idea: In Poincaré's view, we try to construct a language within which the brute facts of experience are expressed as comprehensively and as elegantly as possible. The job of science is the forging of a language precisely suited to that purpose.
	From: report of Henri Poincaré (The Value of Science [1906], Pt III) by Rom Harré - Laws of Nature 2
	A reaction: I'm often struck by how obscure and difficult our accounts of self-evident facts can be. Chairs are easy, and the metaphysics of chairs is hideous. Why is that? I'm a robust realist, but I like Poincaré's idea. He permits facts.