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22361
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Contextual values are acceptable in research, but not in its final evaluation [Reichenbach, by Reiss/Sprenger]
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Full Idea:
Reichenbach's claim is interpreted as saying that contextual values, which may have contributed to the discovery of a theory, are irrelevant for justifying the acceptance of a theory, and for assessing how evidence bears on theory.
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From:
report of Hans Reichenbach (On Probability and Induction [1938], pp.36-7) by Reiss,J/Spreger,J - Scientific Objectivity 3.2
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A reaction:
This influential idea is very helpful. It allows Galileo and co to pursus all sorts of highly personal and quirky lines of enquiry, because we only demand full objectivity when it is all over. Very good!
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15877
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The aim of science is just to create a comprehensive, elegant language to describe brute facts [Poincaré, by Harré]
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Full Idea:
In Poincaré's view, we try to construct a language within which the brute facts of experience are expressed as comprehensively and as elegantly as possible. The job of science is the forging of a language precisely suited to that purpose.
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From:
report of Henri Poincaré (The Value of Science [1906], Pt III) by Rom Harré - Laws of Nature 2
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A reaction:
I'm often struck by how obscure and difficult our accounts of self-evident facts can be. Chairs are easy, and the metaphysics of chairs is hideous. Why is that? I'm a robust realist, but I like Poincaré's idea. He permits facts.
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