22361
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Contextual values are acceptable in research, but not in its final evaluation [Reichenbach, by Reiss/Sprenger]
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Full Idea:
Reichenbach's claim is interpreted as saying that contextual values, which may have contributed to the discovery of a theory, are irrelevant for justifying the acceptance of a theory, and for assessing how evidence bears on theory.
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From:
report of Hans Reichenbach (On Probability and Induction [1938], pp.36-7) by Reiss,J/Spreger,J - Scientific Objectivity 3.2
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A reaction:
This influential idea is very helpful. It allows Galileo and co to pursus all sorts of highly personal and quirky lines of enquiry, because we only demand full objectivity when it is all over. Very good!
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23655
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An ad hominem argument is good, if it is shown that the man's principles are inconsistent [Reid]
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Full Idea:
It is a good argument ad hominem, if it can be shewn that a first principle which a man rejects, stands upon the same footing with others which he admits, …for he must then be guilty of an inconsistency.
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From:
Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 6: Judgement [1785], 4)
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A reaction:
Good point. You can't divorce 'pure' reason from the reasoners, because the inconsistency of two propositions only matters when they are both asserted together. …But attacking the ideas isn't quite the same as attacking the person.
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23659
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If someone denies that he is thinking when he is conscious of it, we can only laugh [Reid]
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Full Idea:
If any man could be found so frantic as to deny that he thinks, while he is conscious of it, I may wonder, I may laugh, or I may pity him, but I cannot reason the matter with him.
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From:
Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 6: Judgement [1785], 5)
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A reaction:
An example of the influence of Descartes' Cogito running through all subsequent European philosophy. There remain the usual questions about personal identity which then arise, but Reid addresses those.
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23654
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In obscure matters the few must lead the many, but the many usually lead in common sense [Reid]
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Full Idea:
In matters beyond the reach of common understanding, the many are led by the few, and willingly yield to their authority. But, in matters of common sense, the few must yield to the many, when local and temporary prejudices are removed.
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From:
Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 6: Judgement [1785], 4)
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A reaction:
Wishful thinking in the 21st century, when the many routinely deny the authority of the expert few, and the expert few occasionally prove that the collective common sense of the many is delusional. I still sort of agree with Reid.
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23653
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If you can't distinguish the features of a complex object, your notion of it would be a muddle [Reid]
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Full Idea:
If you perceive an object, white, round, and a foot in diameter, if you had not been able to distinguish the colour from the figure, and both from the magnitude, your senses would only give you one complex and confused notion of all these mingled together
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From:
Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 6: Judgement [1785], 1)
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A reaction:
His point is that if you reject the 'abstraction' of these qualities, you still cannot deny that distinguishing them is an essential aspect of perceiving complex things. Does this mean that animals distinguish such things?
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15877
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The aim of science is just to create a comprehensive, elegant language to describe brute facts [Poincaré, by Harré]
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Full Idea:
In Poincaré's view, we try to construct a language within which the brute facts of experience are expressed as comprehensively and as elegantly as possible. The job of science is the forging of a language precisely suited to that purpose.
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From:
report of Henri Poincaré (The Value of Science [1906], Pt III) by Rom Harré - Laws of Nature 2
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A reaction:
I'm often struck by how obscure and difficult our accounts of self-evident facts can be. Chairs are easy, and the metaphysics of chairs is hideous. Why is that? I'm a robust realist, but I like Poincaré's idea. He permits facts.
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