Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Value of Science', 'What is Analytic Philosophy?' and 'Proof of an External World'

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6 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis

22334	Analysis must include definitions, search for simples, concept analysis, and Kant's analysis [Glock]
	Full Idea: Under 'analysis' a minimum would include the Socratic quest for definitions, Descartes' search for simple natures, the empiricists' psychological resolution of complex ideas, and Kant's 'transcendental' analysis of our cognitive capacities.
	From: Hans-Johann Glock (What is Analytic Philosophy? [2008], 6.1)
	A reaction: This has always struck me, and I find the narrow focus on modern logic a very distorted idea of the larger project. The aim, I think, is to understand by taking things apart, in the spirit of figuring out how a watch works.

11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty

6349	I can prove a hand exists, by holding one up, pointing to it, and saying 'here is one hand' [Moore,GE]
	Full Idea: I can prove now that two human hands exist. How? By holding up my two hands, and saying, as I make a certain gesture with the right hand, 'Here is one hand', and adding, as I gesture with the left, 'and here is another'.
	From: G.E. Moore (Proof of an External World [1939], p.1)
	A reaction: The words need to be spoken, presumably, so that what he is doing fits into the linguistic conventions of what will normally be accepted as a proof. In fact, just holding the hand up seems enough. The proof begs the question of virtual reality.

11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism

22332	German and British idealism is not about individual ideas, but the intelligibility of reality [Glock]
	Full Idea: Neither German nor British Idealism reduced reality to episodes in the minds of individuals. Instsead, they insisted that reality is intelligible only because it is a manifestation of a divine spirit or rational principle.
	From: Hans-Johann Glock (What is Analytic Philosophy? [2008], 5.2)
	A reaction: They standardly reject Berkeley. Such Idealism seems either to be the design argument for God's existence, or neo-Stoicism (in its claim that nature is rational). Why not just say that nature seems to be intelligible, and stop there?

18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / h. Family resemblance

22336	We might say that the family resemblance is just a consequence of meaning-as-use [Glock]
	Full Idea: Against Wittgenstein's family resemblance view one might evoke his own idea that the meaning of a word is its use, and that diversity of use entails diversity of meaning.
	From: Hans-Johann Glock (What is Analytic Philosophy? [2008], 8.2)
	A reaction: Wittgenstein might just accept the point. Diversity of concepts reflects diversity of usage. But how do you distinguish 'football is a game' from 'oy, what's your game?'. How does usage distinguish metaphorical from literal (if it does)?

22335	The variety of uses of 'game' may be that it has several meanings, and isn't a single concept [Glock]
	Full Idea: The proper conclusion to draw from the fact that we explain 'game' in a variety of different ways is that it is not a univocal term, but has different, albeit related, meanings.
	From: Hans-Johann Glock (What is Analytic Philosophy? [2008], 8.2)
	A reaction: [He cites Rundle 1990] Potter says Wittgenstein insisted that 'game' is a single concept. 'Game' certainly slides off into metaphor, as in 'are you playing games with me?'. The multivocal view would still meet family resemblance on a narrower range.

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature

15877	The aim of science is just to create a comprehensive, elegant language to describe brute facts [Poincaré, by Harré]
	Full Idea: In Poincaré's view, we try to construct a language within which the brute facts of experience are expressed as comprehensively and as elegantly as possible. The job of science is the forging of a language precisely suited to that purpose.
	From: report of Henri Poincaré (The Value of Science [1906], Pt III) by Rom Harré - Laws of Nature 2
	A reaction: I'm often struck by how obscure and difficult our accounts of self-evident facts can be. Chairs are easy, and the metaphysics of chairs is hideous. Why is that? I'm a robust realist, but I like Poincaré's idea. He permits facts.