Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Value of Science', 'Actions' and 'The philosophical basis of intuitionist logic'

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7 ideas

4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic

18073	Dummett says classical logic rests on meaning as truth, while intuitionist logic rests on assertability [Dummett, by Kitcher]
	Full Idea: Dummett argues that classical logic depends on the choice of the concept of truth as central to the theory of meaning, while for the intuitionist the concept of assertability occupies this position.
	From: report of Michael Dummett (The philosophical basis of intuitionist logic [1973]) by Philip Kitcher - The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge 06.5
	A reaction: Since I can assert any nonsense I choose, this presumably means 'warranted' assertability, which is tied to the concept of proof in mathematics. You can reason about falsehoods, or about uninterpreted variables. Can you 'assert' 'Fx'?

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification

19057	Classical quantification is an infinite conjunction or disjunction - but you may not know all the instances [Dummett]
	Full Idea: Classical quantification represents an infinite conjunction or disjunction, and the truth-value is determined by the infinite sum or product of the instances ....but this presupposes that all the instances already possess determinate truth-values.
	From: Michael Dummett (The philosophical basis of intuitionist logic [1973], p.246)
	A reaction: In the case of the universal quantifier, Dummett is doing no more than citing the classic empiricism objection to induction - that you can't make the universal claim if you don't know all the instances. The claim is still meaningful, though.

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions

19055	Stating a sentence's truth-conditions is just paraphrasing the sentence [Dummett]
	Full Idea: An ability to state the condition for the truth of a sentence is, in effect, no more than an ability to express the content of the sentence in other words.
	From: Michael Dummett (The philosophical basis of intuitionist logic [1973], p.224)
	A reaction: Alternatively, if you give something other than a paraphrase of the sentence as its meaning (such as a proof of its truth), then you seem to have departed from your target sentence. Can we reduce and eliminate our sentences in this way?

19056	If a sentence is effectively undecidable, we can never know its truth conditions [Dummett]
	Full Idea: If a sentence is effectively undecidable, the condition which must obtain for it to be true is not one which we are capable of recognising whenever it obtains, or of getting ourselves in a position to do so.
	From: Michael Dummett (The philosophical basis of intuitionist logic [1973], p.225)
	A reaction: The instances of 'undecidable' sentences are most clearly seen in mathematics, such as the Continuum Hypothesis or Goldbach's Conjecture, or anything involving vast infinite cardinals. But do you need precise truth-conditions for meaning?

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use

19054	Meaning as use puts use beyond criticism, and needs a holistic view of language [Dummett]
	Full Idea: If use constitutes meaning, it might seem that use is beyond criticism. ....But such an attitude can, ultimately, be supported onlly by the adoption of a holistic view of language.
	From: Michael Dummett (The philosophical basis of intuitionist logic [1973], p.218)
	A reaction: Dummett goes on to say that the rejection of the holistic view of mathematical meaning leads to his preference for intuitionistic logic.

20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 5. Action as Trying

20082	Bodily movements are not actions, which are really the tryings within bodily movement [Hornsby, by Stout,R]
	Full Idea: Hornsby claims the basic description of action is in terms of trying, that all actions (even means of doing other actions) are actions of trying, and that tryings (and therefore actions) are interior to bodily movements (which are thus not essential).
	From: report of Jennifer Hornsby (Actions [1980]) by Rowland Stout - Action 9 'Trying'
	A reaction: [compression of his summary] There is no regress with explaining the 'action' of trying, because it is proposed that trying is the most basic thing in all actions. If you are paralysed, your trying does not result in action. Too mentalistic?

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature

15877	The aim of science is just to create a comprehensive, elegant language to describe brute facts [Poincaré, by Harré]
	Full Idea: In Poincaré's view, we try to construct a language within which the brute facts of experience are expressed as comprehensively and as elegantly as possible. The job of science is the forging of a language precisely suited to that purpose.
	From: report of Henri Poincaré (The Value of Science [1906], Pt III) by Rom Harré - Laws of Nature 2
	A reaction: I'm often struck by how obscure and difficult our accounts of self-evident facts can be. Chairs are easy, and the metaphysics of chairs is hideous. Why is that? I'm a robust realist, but I like Poincaré's idea. He permits facts.