Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Science and Method', 'Frege's Distinction of Sense and Reference' and 'The Myth of the Given'

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4 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
9182 Ancient names like 'Obadiah' depend on tradition, not on where the name originated [Dummett]
     Full Idea: In the case of 'Obadiah', associated only with one act of writing a prophecy, ..it is the tradition which connects our use of the name with the man; where the actual name itself first came from has little to do with it.
     From: Michael Dummett (Frege's Distinction of Sense and Reference [1975], p.256)
     A reaction: Excellent. This seems to me a much more accurate account of reference than the notion of a baptism. In the case of 'Homer', whether someone was ever baptised thus is of no importance to us. The tradition is everything. Also Shakespeare.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
10245 One geometry cannot be more true than another [Poincaré]
     Full Idea: One geometry cannot be more true than another; it can only be more convenient.
     From: Henri Poincaré (Science and Method [1908], p.65), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics
     A reaction: This is the culminating view after new geometries were developed by tinkering with Euclid's parallels postulate.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
8790 The 'doctrine of the given' is correct; some beliefs or statements are self-justifying [Chisholm]
     Full Idea: In my opinion, the 'doctrine of the given' is correct in saying that there are some beliefs or statements which are 'self-justifying' and that among such beliefs are statements some of which concern appearances or 'ways of being appeared to'.
     From: Roderick Chisholm (The Myth of the Given [1964], §12)
     A reaction: To boldly assert that they are 'self-justifying' invites a landslide of criticisms, pointing at a regress. It might be better to say they are self-evident, or intuitively known, or primitive, or true by the natural light of reason.
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
9181 The causal theory of reference can't distinguish just hearing a name from knowing its use [Dummett]
     Full Idea: The causal theory of reference, in a full-blown form, makes it impossible to distinguish between knowing the use of a proper name and simply having heard the name and recognising it as a name.
     From: Michael Dummett (Frege's Distinction of Sense and Reference [1975], p.254)
     A reaction: None of these things are all-or-nothing. I have an inkling of how to use it once I realise it is a name. Of course you could be causally connected to a name and not even realise that it was a name, so something more is needed.