18 ideas
18543 | Do aesthetic reasons count as reasons, if they are rejectable without contradiction? [Scruton] |
Full Idea: The judgement of beauty makes a claim about its object, and can be supported by reasons. But the reasons do not compel the judgement and can be rejected without contradiction. So are they reasons or aren't they? | |
From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 1) | |
A reaction: I suspect that what he is really referring to is evidence rather than reasons. |
18542 | Defining truth presupposes that there can be a true definition [Scruton] |
Full Idea: How can you define truth, without already assuming the distinction between a true definition and a false one? | |
From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 1) | |
A reaction: Don't say we have to accept truth as yet another primitive! Philosophers are out of business if all the basic concepts are primitive. The axiomatic approach to truth is an alternative - by specifying how the primitive should be used. |
10245 | One geometry cannot be more true than another [Poincaré] |
Full Idea: One geometry cannot be more true than another; it can only be more convenient. | |
From: Henri Poincaré (Science and Method [1908], p.65), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics | |
A reaction: This is the culminating view after new geometries were developed by tinkering with Euclid's parallels postulate. |
18546 | The pleasure taken in beauty also aims at understanding and valuing [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Like the pleasure in friendship, the pleasure in beauty is curious: it aims to understand its object, and to value what it finds. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 1) | |
A reaction: At least he is trying to pin down the way in which aesthetic pleasure is phenomenologically different from other kinds of pleasure. |
18550 | Art gives us imaginary worlds which we can view impartially [Scruton] |
Full Idea: One aim of art is to present imaginary worlds, towards which we can adopt, as part of the integral aesthetic attitude, a posture of impartial concern. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 5) | |
A reaction: It connects to the pleasure of watching people when they don't know they are being watched (such as watching the street from a restaurant window). Scruton's suggestion makes art resemble examples in philosophy. Cf the Frege-Geach problem in ethics. |
18544 | Maybe 'beauty' is too loaded, and we should talk of fittingness or harmony [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Maybe we can understand the 'beauty' of a building better if we describe it in another and less loaded way, as a form of fittingness or harmony. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 1) | |
A reaction: Almost everyone accepts the word 'beauty' for some things, such as a beautiful face, or goal, or steak. I remember a female interviewer writing that, reluctantly, the only appropriate word she could find for Nureyev's face was 'beautiful'. |
18553 | Beauty shows us what we should want in order to achieve human fulfilment [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Beauty speaks to us of human fulfilment: not of things that we want, but of things that we ought to want, because human nature requires them. Such, at least, is my belief. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 7) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure how this works with a beautiful natural landscape. And what should I see that I ought to desire after viewing a great Rembrandt self-portrait? That I don't want to end up looking as bleak as that? Hm. Lofty words. |
18556 | Beauty is rationally founded, inviting meaning, comparison and self-reflection [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Beauty is rationally founded; it challenges us to find meaning in its object, to make critical comparisons, and to examine our own lives and emotions in the light of what we find. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 9) | |
A reaction: This is the Kantian tradition, and I'm not finding it very persuasive. It seems to place the value of beauty in what we do with it afterwards, and he seems to make beauty a necessary stepping stone to virtue. I see beauty as more sui generis. |
18548 | Natural beauty reassures us that the world is where we belong [Scruton] |
Full Idea: The experience of natural beauty is not a sense of 'how nice!' or 'how pleasant!' It contains a reassurance that this world is a right and fitting place to be - a home in which our human powers and prospects find confirmation. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 2) | |
A reaction: To call it a 'reassurance' and 'confirmation' sounds like theism, anthropomorphism, or the pathetic fallacy. That said, this is certainly a heart-warming idea, and hence must contain a grain of truth. |
18551 | Croce says art makes inarticulate intuitions conscious; rival views say the audience is the main concern [Scruton] |
Full Idea: The Croce model is of an inarticulate inner state (an 'intuition') becoming articulate and conscious through artistic expression. The rival model is fitting thing together so as to create links which resonate in the audience's feelings. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 5) | |
A reaction: The first model tells you nothing about how the artist imagines the audience reacting. The second model tells you nothing about what matters personally to the artist. A good theory must do both! |
18541 | Beauty (unlike truth and goodness) is questionable as an ultimate value [Scruton] |
Full Idea: The status of beauty as an ultimate value is questionable, in the way that the status of truth and goodness are not. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 1) | |
A reaction: We suspect that a love of beauty may be a bit parochial, where it is hard to conceive of living creatures anywhere in the cosmos who don't value the other two. |
18554 | Prostitution is wrong because it hardens the soul, since soul and body are one [Scruton] |
Full Idea: The condemnation of prostitution was not just puritan bigotry; it was a recognition of a profound truth, that you and your body are not two things but one, and by selling the body you harden your soul. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 7) | |
A reaction: No one, I imagine, who condones or even enthuses about prostitution would hope that their own daughter followed the profession, so there is something wrong with it. But must an enthusiastic and cheerful prostitute necessarily have a hard soul? |
7602 | In the Bible God changes his mind (repenting of creating humanity, in the Flood) [Armstrong,K] |
Full Idea: In the Bible God changes his mind, as when he repents of having made man and decides to destroy the human race in the Flood. | |
From: Karen Armstrong (A History of God [1993], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: It becomes apparent that the most startling feature of Christian fundamentalism is its uncritical reading of the Bible, in which passages are wilfully lifted from context, and inconvenient inconsistencies are ruthlessly ignored. |
7605 | Monotheism introduced intolerance into religious thinking [Armstrong,K] |
Full Idea: We have become so used to the intolerance of monotheism that we may not appreciate that its hostility towards other gods was a new religious attitude; paganism was an essentially tolerant faith. | |
From: Karen Armstrong (A History of God [1993], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: The comedian Dave Allen always signed off with "may your god go with you". To me the most striking feature of monotheists is frequently their barely controlled aggression, beneath a mask of strained compassion. |
7599 | Around 800 BCE teachers superseded gods in India [Armstrong,K] |
Full Idea: Around the eighth century BCE the gods ceased to be very important in India, and would be superseded by the religious teacher, who would be considered higher than the gods. | |
From: Karen Armstrong (A History of God [1993], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: At least there has been one culture that gave an appropriate status to teachers. It seems astonishing in that age that human beings could have higher status than gods - way before the European 'humanists'. |
7597 | There is virtually no sign of monotheism in the Pentateuch [Armstrong,K] |
Full Idea: It is very difficult to find a single monotheistic statement in the whole of the Pentateuch, and even the Ten Commandments take the existence of other gods for granted ("There shall be no strange gods for you before my face"). | |
From: Karen Armstrong (A History of God [1993], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: The transition from polytheism to monotheism is very strange. First God is 'jealous' of other gods, then supremely above them, and eventually totally exclusive. It's like watching the rise of Stalin. |
7606 | The idea that Jesus was God was only settled in the fourth century [Armstrong,K] |
Full Idea: Jesus himself certainly never claimed to be God, and the doctrine that Jesus had been God in human form was not finalised until the fourth century. | |
From: Karen Armstrong (A History of God [1993], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: It was this final view which seems to have provoked Muhammed into developing a religion with the slogan "there is only one God". In Christianity an initially promising set of teachings grew into a prolonged irrational hysteria. |
7596 | Faith is not just belief in propositions, but also putting trust in them [Armstrong,K] |
Full Idea: There is a distinction between belief in a set of propositions and a faith which enables us to put our trust in them. | |
From: Karen Armstrong (A History of God [1993], Intro) | |
A reaction: This is interestingly distinct from the usual idea that faith is putting belief in propositions which are not sufficiently rationally justified. How many philosophers actually have faith in the propositions they say they believe? |