Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Value of Science', 'Against the Professors (six books)' and 'Dispositional Essentialism and the Laws of Nature'

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7 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
It is only when we say a proposition that we speak truly or falsely [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: It is only when we say a proposition that we speak truly or falsely.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Professors (six books) [c.180], 8.74)
     A reaction: This makes assertions truth-bearers, rather than propositions. But a proposition can be true or false if it is stamped with a date and/or place. "Shakespeare was born in Stratford on 23rd April 1664". No one needs to assert that.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
'Man is a rational mortal animal' is equivalent to 'if something is a man, that thing is a rational mortal animal' [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: Definitions are identical to universal propositions in meaning, and only differ in syntax, for whoever says 'Man is a rational mortal animal' says the same thing in meaning as whoever says 'If something is a man, that thing is a rational mortal animal'.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Professors (six books) [c.180], 11.8)
     A reaction: How strikingly like Bertrand Russell's interest and solutions. Sextus shows a straightforward interest in logical form, of a kind we associate with the twentieth century. Did Sextus Empiricus invent quantification?
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
How can you investigate without some preconception of your object? [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: A preconception and conception must precede every object of investigation, for how can anyone even investigate without some conception of the object of investigation?
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Professors (six books) [c.180], 8.331a)
     A reaction: The Duhem-Quine thesis about the 'theory-ladenness of observation' is just a revival of some routine ancient scepticism. As well as a conceptual scheme to accommodate the observation, there must also be some motivation for the investigation.
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 9. Contractualism
Right actions, once done, are those with a reasonable justification [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: Right action is whatever, once it has been done, has a reasonable justification.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Professors (six books) [c.180], 7.158)
     A reaction: Why does he add 'once it has been done'? Wouldn't a proposed action be right if it had a reasonable justification? This grows out of the classical and Stoic emphasis on reason in ethics, and leads towards Scanlon's Contractualism.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 4. Mathematical Nature
The tektraktys (1+2+3+4=10) is the 'fount of ever-flowing nature' [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: The tektraktys (1+2+3+4=10) is the 'fount of ever-flowing nature', because nature is a harmony of three concords (4th,5th and octave), and these ratios (4:3, 3:2, and 2:1) are found in the tektraktys.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Professors (six books) [c.180], 7.95)
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
Laws are relations of kinds, quantities and qualities, supervening on the essences of a domain [Vetter]
     Full Idea: The laws of a domain are the fundamental, general explanatory relationships between kinds, quantities, and qualities of that domain, that supervene upon the essential natures of those things.
     From: Barbara Vetter (Dispositional Essentialism and the Laws of Nature [2012], 9.3)
     A reaction: Hm. How small can the domain be? Can it embrace the multiverse? Supervenience is a rather weak relationship. How about 'are necessitated/entailed by'? Are the relationships supposed to do the explaining? I would have thought the natures did that.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
The aim of science is just to create a comprehensive, elegant language to describe brute facts [Poincaré, by Harré]
     Full Idea: In Poincaré's view, we try to construct a language within which the brute facts of experience are expressed as comprehensively and as elegantly as possible. The job of science is the forging of a language precisely suited to that purpose.
     From: report of Henri Poincaré (The Value of Science [1906], Pt III) by Rom Harré - Laws of Nature 2
     A reaction: I'm often struck by how obscure and difficult our accounts of self-evident facts can be. Chairs are easy, and the metaphysics of chairs is hideous. Why is that? I'm a robust realist, but I like Poincaré's idea. He permits facts.