5 ideas
22102 | Arguing with opponents uncovers truths, and restrains falsehoods [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: There is no better way of uncovering the truth and keeping falsity in check than by arguing with people who disagree with you. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (On the spiritual perfection of life [1268], 26), quoted by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 05 | |
A reaction: Not the sort of attitude you associate with medieval scholastics, who are presumed to be dogmatists. How many modern philosophers actually have the courage to follow this advice? |
10245 | One geometry cannot be more true than another [Poincaré] |
Full Idea: One geometry cannot be more true than another; it can only be more convenient. | |
From: Henri Poincaré (Science and Method [1908], p.65), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics | |
A reaction: This is the culminating view after new geometries were developed by tinkering with Euclid's parallels postulate. |
18200 | Very large sets should be studied in an 'if-then' spirit [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Sets of a very high type or very high cardinality (higher than the continuum, for example), should today be investigated in an 'if-then' spirit. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (The Philosophy of Logic [1971], p.347), quoted by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics | |
A reaction: Quine says the large sets should be regarded as 'uninterpreted'. |
18199 | Indispensability strongly supports predicative sets, and somewhat supports impredicative sets [Putnam] |
Full Idea: We may say that indispensability is a pretty strong argument for the existence of at least predicative sets, and a pretty strong, but not as strong, argument for the existence of impredicative sets. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (The Philosophy of Logic [1971], p.346), quoted by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics II.2 |
8857 | We must quantify over numbers for science; but that commits us to their existence [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Quantification over mathematical entities is indispensable for science..., therefore we should accept such quantification; but this commits us to accepting the existence of the mathematical entities in question. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (The Philosophy of Logic [1971], p.57), quoted by Stephen Yablo - Apriority and Existence | |
A reaction: I'm not surprised that Hartry Field launched his Fictionalist view of mathematics in response to such a counterintuitive claim. I take it we use numbers to slice up reality the way we use latitude to slice up the globe. No commitment to lines! |