20 ideas
10245 | One geometry cannot be more true than another [Poincaré] |
Full Idea: One geometry cannot be more true than another; it can only be more convenient. | |
From: Henri Poincaré (Science and Method [1908], p.65), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics | |
A reaction: This is the culminating view after new geometries were developed by tinkering with Euclid's parallels postulate. |
23681 | The first motion or effect cannot be produced necessarily, so the First Cause must be a free agent [Reid] |
Full Idea: That the first motion, or the first effect, whatever it be, cannot be produced necessarily, and, consequently, that the First Cause must be a free agent, has been demonstrated clearly and unanswerably. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 8) | |
A reaction: He has said that the First Cause can only be conceived by us as an 'agent'. If there is an agential First Cause, then he must be right. It is this need for God to be free which makes scepticism about free will unacceptable to many. |
23676 | A willed action needs reasonable understanding of what is to be done [Reid] |
Full Idea: There can be no will without such a degree of understanding, at least, as gives the conception of that which we will. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 1) | |
A reaction: Presumably this 'conception' includes an understanding of the probable consequences, but they are of infinite complexity. I see this as an objection to 'ultimate' free will and responsibility, because there are only ever degrees of understanding. |
23680 | We are morally free, because we experience it, we are accountable, and we pursue projects [Reid] |
Full Idea: I believe in moral liberty first because we have a natural conviction of belief that in many cases we act freely, second because we are accountable, and third because we can prosecute an end by a long series of means adapted. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 5) | |
A reaction: This is his final summary of why he believes in free will. Why didn't Plato and Aristotle have this natural belief? He could only believe we are 'accountable' because he believes in free will. Ants and bees pursue lengthy projects. Hm. |
23678 | A motive is merely an idea, like advice, and not a force for action [Reid] |
Full Idea: A motive is equally incapable of action and of passion; because it is not a thing that exists, but a thing that is conceived. …Motives may be compared to advice or exhortation. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 4) | |
A reaction: We say people are motivated by greed or anger or love, which seems a bit stronger than mere advice. |
23677 | We all know that mere priority or constant conjunction do not have to imply causation [Reid] |
Full Idea: Every man who understands the language knows that neither priority, nor constant conjunction, nor both taken together, imply efficiency. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 2) | |
A reaction: This invites the question of how we do know causal events, if none of our experiences are enough to prove it. Reid says we have an innate knowledge that all events are caused, but that isn't much help. The presence of power? |
23679 | The principle of the law of nature is that matter is passive, and is acted upon [Reid] |
Full Idea: The law of nature respecting matter is grounded upon this principle: That matter is an inert, inactive substance, which does not act, but is acted upon. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 5) | |
A reaction: A clear statement (alongside Euler's) of the 18th century view, still with us, but strikes me as entirely wrong. Their view needs the active power of God to drive the laws. Matter has intrinsic primitive powers, and laws describe patterns of behaviour. |
20712 | God is 'eternal' either by being non-temporal, or by enduring forever [Davies,B] |
Full Idea: Saying 'God is eternal' means either that God is non-temporal or timeless, or that God has no beginning and no end. The first ('classical') view is found in Anselm, Augustine, Boethius, Aquinas, Calvin and Descartes. | |
From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 8 'Meaning') | |
A reaction: A God who is outside of time but performs actions is a bit of a puzzle. It seems that Augustine started the idea of a timeless God. |
20701 | Can God be good, if he has not maximised goodness? [Davies,B] |
Full Idea: We may wonder whether God can be good since he has not produced more moral goodness than he has. We may wonder whether God is guilty by neglect. | |
From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 3 'Freedom') | |
A reaction: The orthodox response is that we cannot possibly know what the maximum of moral goodness would look like, so we can't make this judgement. Atheists say that God fails by human standards, which are not particularly high. |
20702 | The goodness of God may be a higher form than the goodness of moral agents [Davies,B] |
Full Idea: If we can know that God exists and if God's goodness is not moral goodness, then moral goodness is not the highest form of goodness we know. There is the goodness of God to be reckoned with. | |
From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 3 'Goodness') | |
A reaction: This idea is to counter the charge that God fails to meet human standards for an ideal moral agent. But it sounds hand-wavy, since we presumably cannot comprehend the sort of goodness that is postulated here. |
20703 | How could God have obligations? What law could possibly impose them? [Davies,B] |
Full Idea: We have good reason for resisting the suggestion that God has any duties or obligations. …What can oblige God in relation to his creatures? Could there be a law saying God has such obligations? Where does such a law come from? | |
From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 3 'Goodness') | |
A reaction: Plato can answer this question. Greek gods are not so supreme that nothing could put them under an obligation, but 'God' has to be supreme in every respect. |
20694 | 'Natural theology' aims to prove God to anyone (not just believers) by reason or argument [Davies,B] |
Full Idea: 'Natural theology' is the attempt to show that belief in God's existence can be defended with reference to reason or argument which ought to be acceptable to anyone, not simply to those who believe in God's existence. | |
From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 1 'Other') | |
A reaction: I assume by 'reason or argument' he primarily means evidence (plus the ontological argument). He cites Karl Barth as objecting to the assumption of natural theology (preferring revelation). Presumably Kierkegaard offers a rival view too. |
20706 | A distinct cause of the universe can't be material (which would be part of the universe) [Davies,B] |
Full Idea: If the universe was caused to come into being, it presumably could not have been caused to do so by anything material. For a material object would be part of the universe, and we are now asking for a cause distinct from the universe. | |
From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 5 'God') | |
A reaction: We're out of our depth here. We only have two modes of existence to offer, material and spiritual, and 'spiritual' means little more than non-material. |
20707 | The universe exhibits design either in its sense of purpose, or in its regularity [Davies,B] |
Full Idea: The design argument offers two lines: the first states that the universe displays design in the sense of purpose; the second that it displays design in the sense of regularity. | |
From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 6 'Versions') | |
A reaction: I would have thought that you would infer the purpose from the regularity. How could you see purpose in a totally chaotic universe? |
20708 | If God is an orderly being, he cannot be the explanation of order [Davies,B] |
Full Idea: If God is an instance of something orderly, how can he serve to account for the order of orderly things? | |
From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 6 'b Has') | |
A reaction: You can at least explain the tidiness of a house by the tidiness of its owner, but obviously that won't explain the phenomenon of tidiness. |
20710 | Maybe an abnormal state of mind is needed to experience God? [Davies,B] |
Full Idea: Might it not be possible that experience of God requires an unusual state or psychological abnormality, just as an aerial view of Paris requires that one be in the unusual state of being abnormally elevated? | |
From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 7 'Are the') | |
A reaction: That would make sense if it were analogous to great mathematical or musical ability, but it sounds more like ouija boards in darkened rooms. Talent has a wonderful output, but people in mystical states don't return with proofs. |
20711 | A believer can experience the world as infused with God [Davies,B] |
Full Idea: Maybe someone who believes in God can be regarded as experiencing everything as something behind which God lies. Believers see the world as a world in which God is present. | |
From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 7 'Experiencing') | |
A reaction: [Attributed to John Hick] This would count as supporting evidence for God, perhaps, if seeing reality as infused with God produces a consistent and plausible picture. But seeing reality as infused with other things might pass the same test. |
20709 | The experiences of God are inconsistent, not universal, and untestable [Davies,B] |
Full Idea: A proclaimed experience of God must be rejected because a) there is no agreed test that it is such an experience, b) some people experience God's absence, and c) there is no uniformity of testimony about the experience. | |
From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 7 'Objections') | |
A reaction: [compressed] I'm not sure that absence of an experience is experience of an absence. Compare it with experiencing the greatness of Beethoven's Ninth. |
20697 | One does not need a full understanding of God in order to speak of God [Davies,B] |
Full Idea: In order to speak meaningfully about God, it is not necessary that one should understand exactly the import of one's statements about him. | |
From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 2 'Sayng') | |
A reaction: Perfectly reasonable. To insist that all discussion of a thing requires exact understanding of the thing is ridiculous. Equally, though, to discuss God while denying all understanding of God is just as ridiculous. |
20699 | Paradise would not contain some virtues, such as courage [Davies,B] |
Full Idea: There are virtues (such as courage) that would not be present in a paradise. | |
From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 3 'Evil') | |
A reaction: Part of a suggestion that morality would be entirely inapplicable in paradise, and so we need dangers etc in the world. |