6 ideas
23559 | We have the concept of 'knowledge' as a label for good informants [Craig, by Fricker,M] |
Full Idea: Craig's explanation of why we have the concept of knowledge is that it arises from our fundamental need to distinguish good informants. | |
From: report of Edward Craig (Knowledge and the State of Nature [1990]) by Miranda Fricker - Epistemic Injustice 6.1 | |
A reaction: That is, why do we have the label 'knowledge', in addition to 'true belief'? This strikes me as a good explanation which had never occurred to me. Every social group needs to identify members who have some authority in knowledge of various areas of life. |
23633 | Many truths seem obvious, and point to universal agreement - which is what we find [Reid] |
Full Idea: There are many truths so obvious to the human faculties, that it should be expected that men should universally agree in them. And this is actually found to be the case with regard to many truths, against which we find no dissent. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 1: Preliminary [1785], 2) | |
A reaction: He says that a few sceptical philosophers may disagree. This is a nice statement of his creed of common sense. I agree with him, and Aristotle observes the same fact. |
23630 | Only philosophers treat ideas as objects [Reid] |
Full Idea: The vulgar allow that an 'idea' implies a mind that thinks, an act of mind which we call thinking, and an object about which we think. But the philosopher conceives a fourth - the idea, which is the immediate object. …I believe this to be a mere fiction. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 1: Preliminary [1785], 1) | |
A reaction: Another example, to add to Yablo's list, of abstract objects invented by philosophers to fill holes in their theories. This one is illuminating, because we all say 'I've got an idea'. Cf discussions of the redundancy of truth. Cf propositions. |
23629 | The ambiguity of words impedes the advancement of knowledge [Reid] |
Full Idea: There is no greater impediment to the advancement of knowledge than the ambiguity of words. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 1: Preliminary [1785], 1) | |
A reaction: He means that ambiguity leads to long pointless disagreements. |
23632 | Similar effects come from similar causes, and causes are only what are sufficient for the effects [Reid] |
Full Idea: A first principle is that similar effects proceed from the same or similar causes; that we ought to admit of no other causes …but such as are sufficient to account for the effects. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 1: Preliminary [1785], 2) | |
A reaction: He treats these as a priori axioms of natural philosophy. In evolution similar causes seem to produce startlingly divergent effects, such as the mating needs of male birds. |
15877 | The aim of science is just to create a comprehensive, elegant language to describe brute facts [Poincaré, by Harré] |
Full Idea: In Poincaré's view, we try to construct a language within which the brute facts of experience are expressed as comprehensively and as elegantly as possible. The job of science is the forging of a language precisely suited to that purpose. | |
From: report of Henri Poincaré (The Value of Science [1906], Pt III) by Rom Harré - Laws of Nature 2 | |
A reaction: I'm often struck by how obscure and difficult our accounts of self-evident facts can be. Chairs are easy, and the metaphysics of chairs is hideous. Why is that? I'm a robust realist, but I like Poincaré's idea. He permits facts. |