17555
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'One' can mean undivided and not a multitude, or it can add measurement, giving number [Aquinas]
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Full Idea:
There are two sorts of one. There is the one which is convertible with being, which adds nothing to being except being undivided; and this deprives of multitude. Then there is the principle of number, which to the notion of being adds measurement.
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From:
Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones de Potentia Dei [1269], q3 a16 ad 3-um)
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A reaction:
[From a lecture handout] I'm not sure I understand this. We might say, I suppose, that insofar as water is water, it is all one, but you can't count it. Perhaps being 'unified' and being a 'unity' are different?
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23681
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The first motion or effect cannot be produced necessarily, so the First Cause must be a free agent [Reid]
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Full Idea:
That the first motion, or the first effect, whatever it be, cannot be produced necessarily, and, consequently, that the First Cause must be a free agent, has been demonstrated clearly and unanswerably.
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From:
Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 8)
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A reaction:
He has said that the First Cause can only be conceived by us as an 'agent'. If there is an agential First Cause, then he must be right. It is this need for God to be free which makes scepticism about free will unacceptable to many.
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23680
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We are morally free, because we experience it, we are accountable, and we pursue projects [Reid]
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Full Idea:
I believe in moral liberty first because we have a natural conviction of belief that in many cases we act freely, second because we are accountable, and third because we can prosecute an end by a long series of means adapted.
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From:
Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 5)
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A reaction:
This is his final summary of why he believes in free will. Why didn't Plato and Aristotle have this natural belief? He could only believe we are 'accountable' because he believes in free will. Ants and bees pursue lengthy projects. Hm.
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23679
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The principle of the law of nature is that matter is passive, and is acted upon [Reid]
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Full Idea:
The law of nature respecting matter is grounded upon this principle: That matter is an inert, inactive substance, which does not act, but is acted upon.
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From:
Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 5)
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A reaction:
A clear statement (alongside Euler's) of the 18th century view, still with us, but strikes me as entirely wrong. Their view needs the active power of God to drive the laws. Matter has intrinsic primitive powers, and laws describe patterns of behaviour.
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