7 ideas
12129 | 'Truth' may only apply within a theory [Kuhn] |
Full Idea: 'Truth' may, like 'proof', be a term with only intra-theoretic applications. | |
From: Thomas S. Kuhn (Reflections on my Critics [1970], §5) | |
A reaction: I think we can blame Tarski (via Quine, Kuhn's teacher) for this one. I take it to be an utter failure to grasp the meaning of the word 'truth' (and sneakily substituting 'satisfaction' for it). For a start, we have to compare theories on some basis. |
10245 | One geometry cannot be more true than another [Poincaré] |
Full Idea: One geometry cannot be more true than another; it can only be more convenient. | |
From: Henri Poincaré (Science and Method [1908], p.65), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics | |
A reaction: This is the culminating view after new geometries were developed by tinkering with Euclid's parallels postulate. |
8386 | Events are picked out by descriptions, and facts by whole sentences [Crane] |
Full Idea: Events are picked out using descriptions ('The death of Caesar'), while facts are picked out using whole sentences ('Caesar died'). | |
From: Tim Crane (Causation [1995], 1.4.2) | |
A reaction: Useful, and interesting. He mentions that Kim's usage doesn't agree with this. For analysis purposes, this means that an event is a more minimal item than a fact, and many facts will contain events as components. |
6809 | Kuhn came to accept that all scientists agree on a particular set of values [Kuhn, by Bird] |
Full Idea: Kuhn later came to accept that there are five values to which scientists in all paradigms adhere: accuracy; consistency with accepted theories; broad scope; simplicity; and fruitfulness. | |
From: report of Thomas S. Kuhn (Reflections on my Critics [1970]) by Alexander Bird - Philosophy of Science Ch.8 | |
A reaction: To shake off the relativism for which Kuhn is notorious, we should begin by asking the question WHY scientists favoured these particular values, rather than (say) bizarreness, consistency with Lewis Carroll, or alliteration. (They are epistemic virtues). |
12128 | In theory change, words shift their natural reference, so the theories are incommensurable [Kuhn] |
Full Idea: In transitions between theories words change their meanings or applicability. Though most of the signs are used before and after a revolution - force, mass, cell - the ways they attach to nature has changed. Successive theories are thus incommensurable. | |
From: Thomas S. Kuhn (Reflections on my Critics [1970], §6) | |
A reaction: A very nice statement of the view, from the horse's mouth. A great deal of recent philosophy has been implicitly concerned with meeting Kuhn's challenge, by providing an account of reference that doesn't have such problems. |
8387 | A cause has its effects in virtue of its properties [Crane] |
Full Idea: Some philosophers say that a cause has its effects in virtue of its properties. | |
From: Tim Crane (Causation [1995], 1.4.2) | |
A reaction: The trouble with this approach, I think, is that it encourages us to invent dubious properties, because every explanation of an effect will require one. Dormative properties, for example, are ascribed to sleeping pills. |
8384 | The regularity theory explains a causal event by other items than the two that are involved [Crane] |
Full Idea: An unsatisfactory aspect of the regularity thesis is that it explains why this A caused this B in terms of facts about things other that this A and this B. But we want to know what it is about this A and this B that makes one the cause of the other? | |
From: Tim Crane (Causation [1995], 1.3) | |
A reaction: Well said. This is the failing of any attempt to define things by their relationships (e.g. functional definitions). Hume, of course, was only relying on regularity because when he focused on the actual A and B, they had no helpful experiences to offer. |